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ABSTRACT 
 
When analyzing the policies of the John F. Kennedy administration towards the 
People’s Republic of China, previous historians have focused on the lack of substantive 
change, emphasizing the continuity of action with the prior polices of the Dwight D. 
Eisenhower administration. At the same time, a number of historians have noted that it 
was during the years Kennedy was in office that a majority of the American people 
began viewing communist China as a greater threat to world peace than the Soviet 
Union. However, none have sought to explain this sizeable shift in public opinion, or 
analyze its potential impact on policy. This thesis incorporates archival materials with 
contemporary print and visual media to make a connection between the sources of public 
opinion shifts and a change in the assumptions upon which U.S. China policy was based. 
 Almost from the moment the new president assumed office, Robert Komer at the 
National Security Council and Chester Bowles at the State Department began pushing 
for changes in China policy based on the assumptions that the communist regime was 
not a “passing phase,” would only become more powerful and over time constitute an 
inexorable greater threat to U.S. interests in Asia, and that rapprochement, rather than 
isolation, was the best means of ameliorating this threat. Together with James Thomson, 
Roger Hilsman, and eventually Walt Rostow, they pushed for the adoption of what A. 
Doak Barnett would later term “Containment Without Isolation.” While the Sino-Soviet 
split accentuated charges of Chinese anti-white racism and the Great Leap Forward 
reinforced the sense of Mao’s irrationality, the Sino-Indian War confirmed both rising 
 iii 
 
Chinese power and their leadership’s capacity for rational calculation. Meanwhile, in the 
popular culture, particularly motion pictures, the Yellow Peril enjoyed a revival as 
Chinese villains stepped to the fore, beginning to free themselves of their Soviet masters. 
However, while foreign Chinese were feared as never before, Chinese in America gained 
new acceptance. Laying the groundwork for the next five decades of China policy and 
enemy images, Kennedy’s Thousand Days constituted a turning point. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: LAYING THE FOUNDATION FOR CHANGE 
 
“Ultimately there is no such thing as an inscrutable people – only uninformed 
onlookers.”1 
 
 Perhaps more than anything else, what frightened the Kennedy administration 
about communist China was its apparent lack of fear. Mao Zedong habitually referred to 
the United States, hegemon of the Pacific, and most powerful nation on the planet, as a 
“Paper Tiger.” Chinese leaders extolled the virtues of the sorts of asymmetric “Wars of 
National Liberation” which had preserved their own ragtag forces during the decades 
before they seized power, drove the French out of Indochina, and were proving a mighty 
nuisance to the British in Malaya. Most frightening of all were Mao's stated refusals to 
be intimidated by America's massive nuclear arsenal. At a time when the leaders of both 
superpowers made a point of proclaiming their horror at the prospect of a nuclear 
holocaust, Mao's apparent welcoming of such a global calamity was positively terrifying, 
and did much to cement his image as a bloodthirsty madman. The lives of millions may 
have meant little to Joseph Stalin, but Mao talked calmly of losing hundreds of millions 
of his own countrymen. 
                                                 
1
  Valentin Chu, “China: a Monster Devours Itself,” Life, May 3, 1963, 87. 
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 This was because Mao believed the superpowers would lose an even greater 
proportion of their populations. As the Cold War heated up again in the early 1960s, and 
the extent of China's demographic and economic expansion during the previous decade 
became widely known, fears grew that China was biding its time and waiting for the two 
superpowers to batter each other into oblivion. Within weeks of Kennedy assuming the 
presidency, Richard Hirsch at the National Security Council addressed this fear in a 
memo to then-Deputy National Security Adviser Walt Rostow. He began by claiming he 
was adding a piece to “the Chinese puzzle,” a presumed reference to their Oriental 
inscrutability. However, Hirsch proceeded to analyze the Chinese as if they were in fact 
highly scrutable. Hirsch's concern was Mao's supposed belief that “the Chinese would 
win in the event of a U.S.-USSR thermonuclear war.” His goal was “to disabuse the 
Chinese of this notion.” His solution was bloody-minded in its own right. Hirsch 
wondered if it would be “reasonable to set aside a certain number of extremely dirty 
bombs and the means of laying them down a north-south line, and let Mao know through 
suitable channels that they will be reserved for China in the event of a U.S.-USSR 
clash.”2 If the United States and the Soviet Union were going to destroy each other, 
Hirsch wanted the Chinese to know they would be going down with them. 
 Besides a willingness to use nuclear weapons against a nation which at the time 
did not possess them in a conflict that nation might not be a direct participant in, this 
demonstrated that policy makers perceived the Chinese as perhaps not so puzzling after 
                                                 
2
  Richard Hirsch, Memorandum for Mr. Rostow, February 14, 1961, John F. Kennedy Presidential 
Library, National Security Files, Box 21a, Folder 2. 
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all. A true madman cannot be deterred. Yet Hirsch clearly believed that signals sent by 
the U.S. government could discourage Mao's belligerence and adventurism. During the 
Kennedy administration, prominent officials reviewing China's seemingly reckless 
behavior during the past decade came to the conclusion that Mao, for all his tough talk, 
was in fact a low-stakes gambler who invariably backed down when confronted with 
superior force. At the same time, Mao's popular image in the United States worsened, in 
part because of revelations regarding the consequences of his domestic policies. The 
widespread famines occasioned by the Great Leap Forward, coupled with concurrent 
border crises, a war, and a zealous push to acquire the very atomic weapons he professed 
to disdain,  cemented Mao's image as a fanatic who starved his own people in order to 
gain the means to terrorize his neighbors and threaten the United States. Rather than 
disagree, in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy chose to stoke the 
flames, comparing Mao to Hitler and contrasting him with the newly reasonable Soviet 
leadership.
3
 
 Yet if the Great Leap Forward emphasized Mao's seeming irrationality and 
China's continuing weakness, it paradoxically demonstrated the regime's strength and 
staying power. If the Chinese communists could survive a three-year famine of 
unprecedented proportions with nary a sign of open rebellion, perhaps it could survive 
anything. And if the Chinese communists were there to stay, they could not  officially be 
ignored for much longer. Membership in the United Nations, and eventual diplomatic 
                                                 
3
  Leonard A. Kusnitz, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: America's China Policy, 1949-1979 
(Greenwood Press: Westport, Connecticut, 1984), 106. 
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recognition by the United States, were only a matter of time. This sense that U.S. China 
policy since 1949 was untenable existed in certain official circles from the beginning of 
the administration, and eventually spread to sections of the media, particularly on the 
center-left. By the end of 1963, a turning point had been reached in how American elites 
both inside and outside of government discussed relations between the United States and 
communist China. Government officials and leading newspapers advocated previously 
unspeakable ideas, such as the permanence of Mao's regime and the futility of 
continuing to isolate the nation he led. China was still feared, by the American public 
more than ever before. But the new goal was to contain, not overthrow, this menacing 
power, and perhaps make it less menacing. 
 It would take years for advocates of this new approach to convince the American 
public, particularly Republicans who had harvested such immense political capital from 
Mao's victory over the Guomindong during the Truman administration, that it was the 
correct one. And, at least during the Kennedy years, few wanted to try, particularly those 
such as Secretary of State Dean Rusk who bore career scars from Truman's tumultuous 
second term. By the time Richard Nixon shook Zhou En-lai's hand in February 1972, he 
was standing on the shoulders of men who worked for the man who defeated him for the 
presidency more than a decade before. Men such as Chester Bowles, James Thomson, 
Robert Komer, and Roger Hilsman largely failed to prevail in the bureaucratic 
skirmishes in the State Department and the National Security Council between 1961 and 
1963. But they were the first individuals with any modicum of official power both to 
admit that U.S. policy towards communist China was unsustainable and to concoct 
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pragmatic proposals intended to remedy this policy's fundamental deficiencies. China's 
leaders would prove even more stubborn than the Republicans who demonized them, 
and far more unpredictable. But in the end, what was once unspeakable in both nations 
became official policy. 
 The standard story of America's changing China policy during this period may be 
accurately characterized as a temporal comet, with Richard Nixon's and Henry 
Kissinger's dramatic actions in 1971 and 1972 the massive and bright head, Lyndon 
Johnson's tentative attempts at outreach the fainter but still visible tail, and the seeming 
stasis of the Kennedy years the isolated fragments of ice trailing in the distance. Previous 
historians' interpretations of the Kennedy Administration's policies towards communist 
China have emphasized the continuity of these policies with those adopted by the 
Eisenhower administration. As carried out by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, 
Dwight Eisenhower established a strategy of isolation coupled with tactical hostility. In 
1954, Dulles went out of his way to avoid shaking his Chinese counterpart Zhou En-lai's 
hand in Geneva before they conducted negotiations over the future of Indochina. 
Eisenhower treated the People's Republic as an illegitimate regime which posed a mortal 
danger to its neighbors, as well as its own people. Most of the incoming officials who 
would specialize in east Asian affairs under President Kennedy believed this overt 
hostility had proven counterproductive in the court of global opinion, making the United 
States, rather than the communist Chinese, appear to be the unreasonable party. They 
were determined to reverse tactics, offering the Chinese a chance for dialogue and 
negotiation. If the Chinese accepted, it would reduce the risks of war and the prospects 
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for communist expansion in Asia. If they refused, the Chinese would be the ones who 
looked unreasonable. Essentially, the plan was to adopt towards China the tactics which 
Eisenhower employed concerning the Soviet Union. The Chinese would be contained, 
but not shunned or insulted. 
 None of this was to transpire during Kennedy's lifetime. He offered no olive 
branch, in part because the Chinese made clear they would promptly break it in two, and 
in part because at that time the domestic constituency for hostility was far larger and 
better mobilized that the constituency for outreach. An official change in policy 
promised no reward either at home or abroad. This was the conclusion reached by James 
Fetzer in his chapter on China policy in Kennedy's Quest For Victory, published in 1989. 
The chapter's title, “Clinging to Containment,” revealed much of what has been wrong 
with the admittedly small number of scholarly works concerning this subject. It 
emphasized policy continuity in a manner which, if taken literally, means U.S. China 
policy still has not changed, and will not for the foreseeable future. Every U.S. 
administration since 1949 has endeavored to contain the expansion of Chinese territory 
and regional influence. Yet it would be extremely difficult to find an informed observer 
who would argue nothing has changed in relations between these two powers. 
 In part because of the space allotted, as well as due to the book's overall theme of 
policy failures, Fetzer merely skimmed the surface. And this surface was not terribly 
interesting. Not only was there no appreciable change in policy, but there were none of 
the momentous crises which defined the Eisenhower administration's interactions with 
the Chinese communists. The first historian to delve beneath the surface was Noam 
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Kochavi, with his 2002 monograph A Conflict Perpetuated. As the title implies, Kochavi 
also emphasized continuity. To his credit, Kochavi extensively documented the 
considerable ferment within the Kennedy administration on this subject, though his 
analysis of the relevant documents was thin. Most importantly, he failed to conclusively 
connect the ideas presented in these documents with the policies of future 
administrations. 
 Evelyn Goh made these connections in 2005's Constructing the U.S. 
Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974. Goh identified a “turning point in official 
American thinking” in 1965.4 In addition, this new consensus for outreach, which she 
termed “revisionist,” came to dominate both “official and public discourse” in 1966.5 
This thesis pushes both events back at least two years, to 1963 and 1964 respectively. 
Unlike Goh's work, it seeks to chronicle the connection between these two related 
events. Since Goh identified and analyzed competing discourses and in the process 
heavily employed constructivist international relations theory, she clearly valued the 
importance of ideas in shaping policy. Yet Goh failed to account for the process of 
dissemination, particularly the interlocking relationship between administration officials, 
academic experts, and  journalists. Not only did members of these three groups 
communicate frequently, they were often one and the same. The few China experts who 
then existed in America served in and advised administrations, talked to reporters, and 
published articles in both the academic and the popular presses. Goh observed, as did 
                                                 
4
  Evelyn Goh, Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 95. 
5
  Ibid. 92. 
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Rosemary Foot, that during the mid-1960s public opinion on China policy was ahead of 
the actual policy.
6
 Yet neither scholar explained why that was the case. 
 While both Kochavi and Goh noted both the constraining effects of public 
opinion on Kennedy's foreign policy and the fact that opinion towards China was 
beginning to change, they neglected to document manifestations of this opinion, or 
analyze in any depth the interactive relationship between, to use James Rosenau's three-
step pyramid – which he developed during this period – the mass public, the informed 
public, and the elite.
7
 Rosenau's model was unidirectional and top-down, with elites 
influencing the informed public, who in turn influenced those members of the mass 
public paying attention to foreign affairs. Fellow political scientist V.O. Key, who 
focused – also during this period – on the bottom-up influence of opinion on policy, 
viewed mass opinion as creating “a system of dikes” which worked to set “the range or 
limits of policy.”8 Both scholarly models were applicable to Kennedy's China policy. 
Widespread public opposition to any sort of significant change in the nation's official 
approach towards the Chinese communists limited Kennedy's room for maneuver to 
almost nothing. The only hope for those desiring a change in policy would have been to 
move public opinion, which according to Rosenau would entail first converting elites, 
who would then evangelize informed observers, who would in turn convert the mass 
                                                 
6
  Ibid. 94; Rosemary Foot, The Practice of Power: U.S. Relations with China since 1949 
(Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1995), 84. 
7
  James N Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1961). 
8
  V.O. Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Knopf, 1961). 
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public. As George Edwards has demonstrated, this is an exquisitely difficult if not 
impossible task for any presidential administration to achieve.
9
 
 Adam Berinsky has argued that it is possible to mobilize those individuals 
predisposed toward policy change on a given issue by altering “elite discourse.”10 Using 
the Vietnam War as an example, he concluded that the end of elite consensus for the 
continuation of that war, and the public expressions of doubt about or opposition to the 
war by leading politicians, foreign policy experts, and journalists led to a decrease in 
support for the war as revealed through opinion polls. John Zaller had previously termed 
the influence of elite consensus the “Mainstream Effect.”11 According to Berinsky, the 
breakdown of elite consensus caused substantial numbers of undecideds to shift from 
uncertainty to dissent. In the case of communist China, the percent of undecideds on 
questions of diplomatic recognition never exceeded ten percent, and the number of 
China “doves” remained low. Thus, dissent within the elite would not be sufficient. Only 
the forging of a new elite consensus in opposition to the existing policy could move 
mass opinion. Zaller's Mainstream Effect, which nearly always resulted in a continuation 
of an existing policy, would instead exert a subversive influence. This process would 
require substantial exogenous shocks in the form of momentous foreign events, as well 
as signals from often dissident government officials that it was permissible for elites to 
respond to these shocks by calling for policy alterations. 
                                                 
9
  George C. Edwards III, On Deaf Ears: The Limits of the Bully Pulpit (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2003). 
10
  Adam J. Berinsky, Silent Voices: Public Opinion and Political Participation in America 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 106. 
11
  John Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1992), 99. 
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 Chinese Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong could be counted on to 
produce these shocks. Whether they would move American sentiment in the direction 
desired by men like Bowles, Thomson, Komer, and Hilsman was another matter. Since 
coming to power, Mao's repeated provocations had only served to harden American 
opinion against any outreach to his regime. Kennedy's ascension did not dampen Mao's 
proclivities for provocation. Yet the changing structure of international relations caused 
these provocations to lead to a seemingly counterintuitive softening of American elite 
opinion. Mao's increasingly contentious relationship with his strongest ally inspired U.S. 
policymakers to, in the phrase of Gordon Chang, play the “Russia Card” against China, 
rather than the other way around.
12
 It moved the majority of American mass and elite 
opinion to view the Chinese, rather than the Russians, as the greatest threat to world 
peace for the first time during the Cold War. That this occurred in the context of the 
failed Vienna summit, the building of the Berlin Wall, and most of all the Cuban Missile 
Crisis was intriguing in its own right. That this heightened assessment of the Chinese 
threat coincided with increasing calls in the United States to improve relations with the 
Chinese seemed even harder to explain. Victor Kaufman saw it as a contradiction.
13
 It 
would have been, provided it was anticipated at the time that increased expressions of 
hostility toward China would be viewed in the U.S. as more productive than acts of 
conciliation. 
                                                 
12
  Gordon H Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-
1972 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990). 
13
  Victor S Kaufman, Confronting Communism: U.S. and British Policies toward China 
(Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2001), 175. 
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 The assumption of the increasing numbers of experts calling for a rethinking of 
U.S. policy was that, despite persistent misrule, communist China would only become 
stronger over time. Unlike the Soviet Union, it was not destined to fracture or collapse. 
The lack of any significant unrest or loss of control during the worst of the famine 
occasioned by the Great Leap Forward appeared to prove that much. The successful 
projection of military force across the Himalayas and humiliating defeat of the Indian 
army emphasized both Chinese operational prowess and strategic self-control. Final, 
China's inexorable march towards developing a nuclear weapon, which neither the 
Soviets nor the Americans desired nor proved willing or able to arrest, added to the 
growing sense that this was a regime which could not be ignored and must eventually be 
engaged. In his seminal work America's Response to China, Warren Cohen referred to 
this policy as a “taming” of the Chinese, allowing them to be “brought back into the 
family of nations, ready to live in peace with her neighbors.”14 
 The year John F. Kennedy was elected president, the China scholar A. Doak 
Barnett, who enjoyed great media influence because of his moderation and seeming 
even-handedness, called for the acquisition of greater American knowledge concerning 
China and the Chinese. He did not endorse increased diplomatic outreach as a means of 
acquiring that knowledge. Essentially, he still backed the Eisenhower-Dulles status quo, 
though he objected to the theoretical assumptions upon which it was based.
15
 Within a 
                                                 
14
  Warren I. Cohen, America's Response to China: An Interpretive History of Sino-American 
Relations (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1980) 235. 
15
  A. Doak Barnett, Communist China And Asia: Challenge to American Policy (New York: Harper 
Brothers, 1960). 
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year after Kennedy's death, Barnett began calling for “containment without isolation.” 
This would become a rallying cry for China doves, widely penetrate the media, and 
eventually become the basis for a new American policy which survives to this day. It 
would also cause Barnett to be lumped by those who opposed any changes to the 
Eisenhower-Dulles status quo as a leading member of the “Red China Lobby.”16 Other 
members of this “lobby” included John K. Fairbank and Hans Morgenthau, who had 
opposed the status quo for much longer, and thus enjoyed far less political influence. 
Barnett coined his slogan in the aftermath of Roger Hilsman's December 1963 speech on 
China policy in San Francisco, the same city where six years earlier Dulles had declared 
communist rule over mainland China to be a “passing phase.” By expressing the belief 
that this regime was in fact here to stay, and must therefore be dealt with, Hilsman 
publicly proclaimed what many inside the Kennedy administration had been saying for 
nearly three years, and provided official sanction for those outside the administration to 
express similar sentiments. This breaking of the China Lobby's “Code of Silence” ended 
the hegemony of one set of arguments, and initiated the establishment of a new 
hegemony. What was once heresy soon became conventional.  
 Chapter One of this work introduces the individuals who first attacked existing 
assumptions within the corridors of power, and reveals the alternative approaches they 
developed but were unable to have implemented during their tenures. Chapter Two 
                                                 
16
  The Red China Lobby. Speech by Representative John M. Ashbrook, June 28, 1966, 2, Sterling 
Memorial Library, Yale University, Right-Wing Pamphlets Collection, Group No. 775, Box No. 10, 
Folder 166. 
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describes how many of these same individuals reacted to events such as the Great Leap 
Forward, and adjusted or reiterated their ideas accordingly. Chapter Three explores the 
level of awareness in the American government and the American media regarding the 
Sino-Soviet split, and the various initial proposals for exploiting this epochal Cold War 
event. Chapter Four follows the course of the brief but pivotal Sino-Indian War, and its 
paradoxical effect on American perceptions of Chinese intentions. Finally, Chapter Five 
places the depictions of Chinese and Chinese-Americans during these years in the 
context of longstanding stereotypes and fears. As a whole, the work endeavors to present 
as complete a picture as possible of American diplomacy, public opinion, and popular 
culture concerning China during the Kennedy years. 
 This thesis investigates the relationships between ideas and events, opinion and 
policy, image and reality, and threat and response. For the first time, it provides detailed 
exposition and analysis of the American image of China and the Chinese during this 
period of revived Sinophobia. Given China's increasing aggression and unpredictability 
during these years, the shift in American sentiment away from isolation was by no 
means foreordained. Had Richard Nixon become president in 1960, a very different 
consensus would most likely have emerged. Only Kennedy – or more accurately those 
who worked for Kennedy – could lay the ground work for Nixon to go to China. 
  
 14 
 
CHAPTER II 
CHESTER BOWLES AND ROBERT KOMER: 
RETHINKING U.S. CHINA POLICY AMIDST AMERICAN FEAR 
AND CHINESE LOATHING 
 
“China – there lies a sleeping giant. Let him sleep, for when he wakes he shall shake the 
world.” 
 Napoleon Bonaparte
1
 
 
 As president, John F. Kennedy promised, or at least hinted at, far more change 
that he could or even probably wanted to deliver. One area in which he promised little 
was U.S. policy regarding communist China. Yet this silence did not prevent 
speculation, hope, and particularly fear that change was imminent. The State Department 
noted in 1962 that “one of the more notable developments in the public discussion of 
U.S. China policy” during that calendar year “has been the upsurge in speculation that 
the U.S. is considering a change in that policy.”2 While a number of individuals within 
the National Security Council and the State Department fervently desired significant 
changes, there was never a serious chance they could have convinced their superiors to 
convince the president to take the sizable political risks any altering of perhaps the most 
                                                 
1
  “A Long Look at China,” Saturday Evening Post, Final Draft, December 31, 1958, 1, Sterling 
Memorial Library, Yale University, Chester Bowles Papers, Group No. 628, Series No. 11, Box No. 238, 
Folder 0604. 
2
  Special Report on American Opinion, Department of State: 1962 Public Attitudes Toward U.S. 
Policy On China, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, James C. Thomson Papers, Box 15, Folder 4. 
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sensitive aspect of U.S. foreign policy would no doubt have entailed. However, the 
writings those individuals produced contained the seeds of what would over the next 
decade germinate into the nation's eventual new China policy. Containment and isolation 
with the hope that communist China might someday collapse were replaced by 
containment without isolation in the hope that engagement might moderate a regime 
which was not going away. 
 The two individuals who initiated this process of change could not have been 
more different. Chester Bowles was a Democratic Party politician and diplomat who had 
loathed the previous administration's foreign policy. Unlike many Democrats who 
criticized Eisenhower, he was not primarily seeking to score political points. Bowles had 
profound philosophical objections to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles's strategy of 
containment. He was a strategist in the Cold War but not of it, who in 1964 drafted an 
article for Foreign Affairs entitled “American Foreign Policy After The Cold War.”3 
Robert Komer, by contrast, had worked proudly for Eisenhower, though not as a 
political appointee. He believed the primary purpose of U.S. foreign policy was to 
contain communism, though he doubted the ability of U.S. allies in Asia to offer 
assistance. Komer was an incurable pessimist who saw the worst in human nature where 
Bowles saw the best, who spotted faults where Bowles glimpsed potential. He minced no 
words when writing to his colleagues, yet long prospered in a federal bureaucracy where 
Bowles quickly foundered. These two men, one working at Dean Rusk's State 
                                                 
3
  Sterling, Bowles Papers, Group No. 628, Series No. 11, Box No. 341, Folder 0316. Howard B. 
Schaffer appropriately subtitled his biography of Bowles “A New Dealer in the Cold War.” 
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Department, the other at McGeorge Bundy's National Security Council, independently 
came to strikingly similar conclusions about the challenges U.S. policy towards China 
would face in the near term, and how to overcome them. Both assumed the current 
policy was living on borrowed time, that the clock was ticking down to zero, and 
change, while sure to be agonizing, must come sooner rather than later. 
 That these changes ultimately came later rather than sooner would appear to 
render the efforts of Bowles and Komer of trivial interest to historians. The types of 
policy changes they advocated occurred in a different decade under a different 
administration representing a different political party. One cannot compare their memos 
and policy papers to, for instance, George Kennan's Long Telegram or Paul Nitze's 
NSC-68. The effects of their writings were both less profound and less immediate. That 
historians of U.S.-China relations have regarded them as unconnected footnotes is thus 
understandable. It also reflects of a striking discrepancy between the studies of U.S.-
Soviet and U.S.-China relations during the Cold War. To historians who study relations 
between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., ideas matter a great deal, and the archival documents 
which put forth those ideas are almost sacred writ. Regarding the origins of the Cold 
War, John Lewis Gaddis and Melvyn Leffler may not agree on much with Walter 
LaFeber and Bruce Cummings, and each pair of scholars would disagree with each other 
on a large number of matters as well. But, in their writings, all four have maintained that 
the documents recording the debates within the Truman administration mattered, even 
while they sharply disagree as to why they mattered. This was because the ideas 
expressed in these documents appear connected to subsequent actions. 
 17 
 
 That relationship is far less obvious with regards to U.S. relations with 
communist China. Actions did not appear to follow ideas. They superseded them. When 
Chinese troops attacked U.N. forces in Korea, they rendered moot whatever Truman's 
and Acheson's existing plans were for dealing with Mao's regime. Whether or not he 
wanted to, Johnson could not go to China while he was ordering hundreds of thousands 
of American troops into South Vietnam and Mao was unleashing the Red Guards. 
However, once those soldiers were on their way home, the Red Guards dispersed, and 
the Soviets had both achieved nuclear parity with the U.S. and engaged in sizable border 
skirmishes with the Chinese, the geopolitical stars were finally aligned for Nixon's and 
Kissinger's diplomatic masterstroke. If there was a defining internal document on that 
matter, it was on the Chinese side, and took the form of the report of the Four Marshals 
calling for a rethinking of Chinese policy concerning the United States.
4
 The Nixon 
administration produced no comparably seminal documents. 
 In part, that was because it would have been contrary to Nixon's secretive 
approach to foreign policy. Yet it was also because such documents had already been 
produced within the Kennedy administration. Their proposals had found their way into 
Nixon's writings and speeches even before he became president, not because he had read 
them, but because they had by then become elite conventional wisdom. Kennan in 1946 
and Nitze in 1950 could rely on events quickly pushing the American people, and their 
elected leaders, in their direction. Bowles and Komer could not. Their opponents would 
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have called them appeasers, and claimed they were advocating rewarding an enemy 
government for its bad behavior. One of these detractors would no doubt have been 
Richard Nixon. But by the middle of 1967 at the earliest and the beginning of 1969 at 
the latest, Nixon had come to think differently. That cannot be credited to China 
behaving in the intervening years in a more predictable manner that was more conducive 
to U.S. interests. Nor had the Sino-Soviet split devolved by then into outright armed 
conflict, opening an obvious path for a new form of triangular diplomacy. What had 
changed were the ideas and assumptions governing the U.S. response to China's 
unpredictability, belligerence, and inexorably increasing power. Those ideas were first 
articulated in 1961 by Robert Komer and Chester Bowles. Whether an idea takes ten 
weeks or ten years to be transformed into policy, it is still influential. 
 First, it is important to note the proximate reason for policy formulation was 
quite different than that for policy implementation. Given the decade of separation, it 
would be shocking if that were not the case. The Sino-Soviet split would eventually play 
an important role in President Richard Nixon's decision to establish diplomatic contacts 
with communist China and acquiesce to that regime's admission to the United Nations. 
In this earlier period, such a connection was not especially evident. If anything, the 
opposite was the case, with the split significantly delaying U.N. admission and 
increasing the reasons to diplomatically isolate China. Both Bowles and Komer quickly 
identified friction between the two great communist powers, and correctly predicted a 
future split. Yet neither offered this rift as a justification for changing policy towards 
communist China. The immediate reason both men offered for the necessity of a new 
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approach was the growing likelihood that the U.N. General Assembly would override 
U.S. opposition and vote to admit the People's Republic as a member state in the very 
near future. The Sino-Soviet split helped delay this event for nearly a decade. 
Furthermore, the Kennedy administration responded to Sino-Soviet divisions by 
establishing closer relations with the Soviets, not the Chinese. Thus, for the most part, 
the rethinking of China policy and the recognition of the end of monolithic communism 
moved on separate tracks during these years. Only later, and after the once highly-
charged issue of U.N. admission for communist China became an afterthought in U.S. 
domestic politics, did a connection emerge. 
 In the late-1950s, Chester Bowles thought more about China than probably any 
other Democratic member of the House of Representatives. This may have been because 
being a congressman was among the least impressive items on his resume. Previously 
serving as governor of Connecticut, and before that as ambassador to India, Bowles had 
long been one of the leading foreign policy authorities within his party, particularly 
when it came to Asia. He was, in fact, that rare Democratic “Asia-Firster,” though in a 
vastly different way than standard conservative Republican “Asia-Firsters” such as 
Senator William Knowland, Representative Walter Judd, or General Douglas 
MacArthur. In the first draft for a 1959 Saturday Evening Post article on China's future, 
Bowles wrote that “what happens in China in the next ten years may have a more 
profound influence on our lives than developments in the Soviet Union.”5 Furthermore, 
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“Moscow and Peking view our fast-changing world from rather different perspectives 
and these differences may grow.” China was “an explosive new force” which “will be 
with us for the foreseeable future” and “constitutes a potential threat to the Soviet 
Union.”6 A little over one year after Secretary of State John Foster Dulles termed 
Communist China “a passing phase,” and when the monolithic nature of the Communist 
Bloc was official U.S. policy, Bowles challenged both presumptions. 
 Yet Bowles did not go so far as to advocate any alternative policy to regional 
containment. Based on his travels and experiences, he informed the Saturday Evening 
Post's readers that “gradually the Communist colossus to the North is creating alarm 
among thoughtful observers in Indonesia, Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, and even in 
India.” Bowles predicted that “India's growing skepticism of China's intentions holds 
promise that her leaders may ultimately see the need for a new power balance in South 
and Southeast Asia.”7 Bowles had made clear in previous statements that what he had in 
mind was not a new round of Dulles-inspired “Pactomania” binding China's neighbors to 
the U.S. militarily. In a 1957 speech at the Naval War College, Bowles termed 
containment as currently being practiced  “left-over American isolationism” which 
reflected an atavistic desire to keep the world at arm's length. This approach was both 
lopsided and counterproductive, since “in our failure to balance the military factors with 
the economic and political factors – we have often made ourselves appear, not as the 
promoters of peace, but as the promoters of pure militarism.” People the world over 
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wanted the same things Americans wanted in 1776 – political freedom and economic 
prosperity.
8
 By failing to fully support independence movements and wholeheartedly 
embrace an anti-colonialist foreign policy, the current administration was denying them 
the former. By neglecting to provide sufficient economic aid, they were failing to help 
them achieve the latter. 
 This was nowhere more evident than with the problematic U.S. relationship with 
India. More than an Asia-Firster, Bowles was an “India-Firster,” and would remain so 
throughout his political and diplomatic career. His professional experiences in that 
nation bred a deep personal affection for its culture and people. On a strategic level, he 
saw the world's largest democracy as the continent's vital pivot. Whereas Republicans 
condemned Truman's “loss” of China, Bowles warned of Eisenhower's “loss” of India. 
In this he was of one mind with Senator Kennedy. Like Bowles, Kennedy never missed 
an opportunity to criticize President Eisenhower's prosecution of the Cold War. Unlike 
Bowles, he preferred to attack the president's dealings with the Soviets not from the 
dovish left by from the hawkish right. However, India brought out his humanitarian 
idealism. In a 1959 speech, Kennedy labeled “the struggle between India and China” as 
a contest between a democracy and a dictatorship “for leadership of the East, for the 
respect of all Asia, for the opportunity to demonstrate whose way of life is the better.” 
During that decade, India had fallen behind China in terms of economic development. 
Kennedy argued that it should be the goal of the U.S. government to help India catch up 
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to and surpass China through “a serious long-range program of long-term loans, backed 
up by technical and agricultural assistance.” Seconding Bowles's calls for the United 
States to match its policies to universal aspirations for political freedom and economic 
prosperity, though in the far more stirring language with which the nation – and the 
world – would soon gain familiarity, Kennedy ended by proclaiming “as a nation we 
think not of war but of peace; not of crusades of conflict but of covenants of 
cooperation; not of the pageantry of imperialism but of the pride of new states freshly 
risen to independence.”9 It would appear that the Massachusetts senator and the 
Connecticut representative were on the same page, if not concerning China, then 
certainly with regards to India. 
 Bowles's hopes for India extended beyond the subcontinent to Southeast Asia, 
where Chinese empires and various Indian states had long ago competed for cultural, 
economic, and political influence. India was the largest and most important link in a 
chain extending throughout the “Arc of Crisis,” to quote the title of a 1962 book by 
Stanford Professor Charles Russ.
10
 In a proposed 1959 article for the New York Times 
Magazine which was never published, Bowles wrote that “the principle military threat in 
Asia during the next decade may take the form of a major Chinese push into Southeast 
Asia.”11 Though Bowles never spelled this out, given his previous utterances and 
writings, one would assume his strategy for containing China in this region would 
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involve not an expansion of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), but 
economic aid to enable China's neighbors to build up their own military forces and form 
their own regional alliances. 
 In that same unpublished article, Bowles for the first time raised the issue of a 
“Two Chinas” policy, meaning recognition of the People's Republic of China as the 
official government on the mainland and the Republic of China as sovereign ruler of the 
island of Taiwan. Official U.S. contacts with Communist Chinese officials during the 
Second Quemoy Crisis in 1958, as well as intermittent negotiations with P.R.C. 
diplomats in Warsaw, proved that the U.S. already had a de facto Two Chinas policy. In 
addition, the Guomindong were becoming progressively less obsessed with renewing the 
Chinese Civil War, for “under the brittle crust of nationalist rule, a new national identity 
is emerging that is predominantly Chinese by culture but Formosan in outlook.”12 
 Bowles made precisely this proposal in an April 1960 article which appeared in 
Foreign Affairs. Published during the Democratic Party primaries, this piece by a close 
Kennedy foreign policy adviser garnered much attention, and was correctly assumed to 
reflect at least some of the senator's own beliefs. The article was in many ways a revised 
draft of the unpublished New York Times Magazine piece from the previous year. 
Bowles predicted that “mainland China, with an inadequate resource base, spiraling 
population, ruthless Communist leadership and intense nationalist spirit, will develop 
fiercely expansionist tendencies directed toward the weaker neighboring states to the 
south.” The states of “free Asia” were beginning to recognize this threat, and “seem to be 
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moving closer together in the face of the common danger.” An independent Taiwan, 
along with a strong India, would prove vital to containing Chinese expansion. But if the 
American goal was to foster the creation and international acceptance of a Taiwanese 
nation, “our exposed position on Quemoy and Matsu makes very little sense.”13 
 Abandonment of the Offshore Islands would physically separate Chiang Kai-
shek's forces from Mao's, eliminate the Guomindong's threat to the Mainland, and foster 
goodwill towards America throughout Asia, including within China itself. This was 
vital, both for establishing a de facto alliance of China's southern neighbors and for 
changing Chinese attitudes. To achieve that end, “we should be striving by all reasonable 
means to establish people-to-people contacts with mainland China.” Bowles recognized 
that “the Communists serve their own interests best by keeping us their Public Enemy.” 
However, this could change, particularly if the U.S. and its current and future Asian 
allies ensured that Chinese aggression would not pay. When that realization dawned on 
the Chinese, they would have no choice but to abandon the Soviets, with whom “deep 
potential differences exist,” and move closer, at least economically, to the capitalist 
industrial powers. As Bowles presciently put it, “in the longer perspective it seems clear 
that China's only practical alternative to an effort to seize the resources of Southeast Asia 
by force was to embark on a greatly expanded trade program.”14 
 Bowles's article generated controversy. It had been less than two years since 
Dulles and Eisenhower last threatened to use nuclear weapons to ensure continued 
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Taiwanese control of the Offshore Islands. Kennedy backed Bowles to an extent, 
declaring in a debate with Nixon that fall that as president he would consider supporting 
the evacuation of the islands, the only instance in which he differed with Nixon on a 
major issue in a non-hawkish direction. Bowles's unpublished New York Times 
Magazine article and his Foreign Affairs piece notably differed in the latter's lack of the 
phrase “Two Chinas,” a clear concession to acceptable public opinion at the time, and a 
sign of the “China Lobby's” continuing influence. 
 Bowles served as Chairman of the Platform Committee for the 1960 Democratic 
National Convention in Los Angeles. In that capacity, he received three letters from the 
Committee of One Million against the Admission of Communist China to the United 
Nations, the China's Lobby's organizational arm since 1954. James Thomson, a 
missionary's son who spent his childhood in China, worked for Bowles's congressional 
office and served as his chief foreign policy aide on the Platform Committee. He termed 
the “tone” of the third letter from the Committee of One Million “outrageous,” and 
found the enormous number of Democratic representatives and senators who signed the 
note “curious.” Thomson concluded that “the pressure at Los Angeles will be 
enormous.”15 Bowles did receive a letter from private citizen Cae Soule commending 
him on the open-mindedness of his Foreign Affairs article and wishing him the best of 
luck in resisting the pressure from those who demanded the status quo regarding 
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Communist China. In a letter of reply, Bowles told Soule that “in all frankness, I must 
admit that this campaign irritates me a great deal.”16 
 Bowles's professed openness to significant change in U.S. China policy created 
potential difficulties when President-elect Kennedy chose him to be Undersecretary of 
State. On the eve of his confirmation hearings, Senator Norris Cotton of New Hampshire 
wondered whether Bowles believed opposition to American recognition of “Red China” 
or that nation's admission to the United Nations “are bedrock foundations of our 
policy.”17 At this point, Bowles had not publicly endorsed either proposition, though his 
strong allusions to a desire for an independent Taiwan appeared to imply eventual 
support for neither. Bowles quickly put the matter to rest at his Senate hearing on 
January 19. In his opening remarks, Bowles declared “we are going to defend Formosa 
at whatever the cost and whatever the risk.”18 This was an eliding of the fundamental 
question, but his militant tone convinced the Republicans on the committee that he 
possessed sufficient antipathy to the Chinese communist regime to warrant confirmation. 
 While Bowles was the highest-ranking member of the new administration to 
openly call for a rethinking of U.S. policy towards Communist China, he was far from 
alone in his concerns and proposed solutions. University of Rochester Professor 
Alexander Eckstein, one of the leading dozen American experts on China, wrote 
Thomson shortly after the election to tell him the incoming administration's policy 
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should be based on two premises: “the Chinese Communist regime is here to stay” and 
“the admission of Communist China in the United Nations is only a matter of time.”19 
Pressure was also building from abroad. British Foreign Secretary Lord Home told the 
House of Lords in February 1961 that “the facts of international life require that 
Communist China get a seat in the United Nations even though it has few of the 
credentials of a peace-loving nation.”20 Within the administration, officials openly feared 
that “support was running out for the moratorium” and that “if the Chinese 
representation this year came up as a simple credentials question, our position would be 
technically weak, since the issue could be decided by a bare majority.”21 In 1960, which 
the U.N. declared the “Year of Africa,” 17 nations on that continent gained their 
independence.
22
 Incoming administration officials had every reason to expect dozens 
more to join the international organization in the coming years, potentially shifting the 
balance of power on this and other issues against the positions advocated by the U.S. and 
its allies. 
 Komer recognized these trends, and intended to launch a preemptive policy strike 
while there was still time. The only prominent holdover from the Eisenhower 
administration, Komer was a former Central Intelligence Agency analyst who had spent 
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a decade on the staff which wrote National Intelligence Estimates. Beginning in 1956, he 
served as chief C.I.A. liaison to the N.S.C.
23
 A committed Cold War hardliner on every 
major issue with the exception of China, Komer would go on to object to the removal of 
Jupiter Missiles from Turkey during the Cuban Missile Crisis, calling the matter “non-
negotiable.”24 During the Johnson administration, he became General William 
Westmoreland's de facto civilian second-in-command overseeing the pacification effort 
in Vietnam. Nicknamed “Blowtorch Bob” by Ambassador to Vietnam Henry Cabot 
Lodge, Jr., Komer was blunt, hard-charging, and usually achieved his bureaucratic 
objectives.
25
 A Harvard graduate twice over (B.A. 1942, M.B.A. 1947), he quickly 
developed a close bond with his boss, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, who 
previously served as Dean of Harvard's Graduate School of Arts and Sciences.
26
 
 In Vietnam, Komer insisted upon and received a four-star ranking so that 
generals below Westmoreland would be compelled to obey him.
27
 But in 1961, he did 
not yet have the stature to match his ambition. That did not stop him from trying to 
influence sensitive matters of policy. On March 1, 1961, when Kennedy's foreign policy 
team was still moving into their new offices, he suggested to Bundy that “we should 
prod State to get started pronto on a broad-scale rethinking exercise.” He proposed that 
the administration “disengage, as skillfully as we can, from unproductive aspects of our 
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China policy, e.g. UN membership where we're likely to get clobbered and later on 
Offshores in order to rationalize our posture for long term struggle with hard-line CPR.” 
But avoiding getting “clobbered” by world opinion risked getting clobbered by domestic 
opinion. Komer admitted that “this one is going to be painful as hell to us,” but added 
the caveat “the longer we wait the more painful (and costly) it's going to be.”  Negative 
reaction from Congress and the American public was “a real problem,” but one which 
“will be just as great later as now.” To blunt the expected backlash, Komer proposed 
“we give a few public hints we're rethinking now, lest we later look like [we're] being 
dragged into such changes” by world opinion and events.28 
 Komer's memo to Bundy and Rostow was a preview of his April 1961 report 
“Strategic Framework For Rethinking China Policy.” Komer's argument for such a 
rethinking was based on the assumption that “time is not working in our favor in the Far 
East.” He offered two reasons for this. The first involved America's allies. Komer 
believed that the United States faced “a striking increase in Free World dissent from our 
China policy,” and that “the secular trend is toward increasing acceptance of a powerful 
Red China as a fact of political life.” The second was China's increasing military and 
economic strength, which meant that the situation of “containment without too great an 
allocation of US resources is unlikely to persist.” A NATO-style regional military 
alliance was out of the question because of “the essential weakness of the target areas 
around the CPR periphery.” The one exception was the Soviet Union, technically 
China's closest ally and the United States's leading adversary. The emergent Sino-Soviet 
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dispute created future opportunities for the United States to make a “tacit agreement with 
the USSR at Chinese expense” since “Moscow too fears Peiping” and there was 
“growing competition between” the two communist giants. Even so, the Soviets were 
highly unlikely to prevent the Chinese-backed North Vietnamese from conquering South 
Vietnam, an eventuality Komer considered “far more devastating” than even the loss of 
Taiwan.
29
 Chinese-backed expansion southwards could therefore not easily be stopped 
with military force, certainly not that of China's neighbors. This necessitated a more 
novel, and perhaps controversial, approach. 
 To sell this new approach, Komer reverted to a textbook example of outlining 
three putative options, only one of which appeared reasonable and feasible. This tactic 
would later become commonplace during the escalating American commitment to South 
Vietnam.
30
 He presented two extreme proposals, which he labeled “hostility” and 
“accommodation,” as well as his own preferred plan, with he labeled the “middle road.” 
The communist Chinese regime could not be overthrown with continued hostility. It 
could be appeased with accommodation only at the cost of U.S. hegemony in the 
Western Pacific. What Komer offered instead was a new mixture of containment and 
outreach. The outreach would be a combination of rhetorical ploys designed to sway 
overseas opinion and serious attempts to moderate the mainland regime and make it less 
dangerous. The central rhetorical gambit would be American acceptance of communist 
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China in the United Nations. An independent Taiwan would remain in the U.N., but the 
P.R.C. would take the R.O.C.'s seat on the Security Council. Komer assumed that 
Taiwan would be expelled from that organization within “several years.”31 Yet that was 
bound to happen with or without U.S. support, and if it did happen in the face of 
continued U.S. intransigence, this would constitute a severe blow to American prestige. 
Acting preemptively could redound to the United States's favor and to China's detriment. 
 Komer knew the Chinese would reject any proposal that allowed the government 
of Chiang Kai-shek to retain membership in the United Nations, even (in fact especially) 
as the de facto government in Taiwan. But this refusal would make the Chinese, not the 
U.S., appear to be the intransigent party, and “demonstrate sufficient [American] 
flexibility to calm neutralist fears, and to shift the onus for continued tensions as much 
as possible to Peiping.” This would only be the opening move, and future proposals 
would be made by the United States which would continue to put “the onus of refusal” 
upon the Chinese.
32
 Whatever damage Dulles's uncompromising rejection of Communist 
China's legitimacy had done to America's global reputation would thereby quickly be 
undone. 
 Komer recognized his proposal would be unpalatable not only to China, but to 
many Americans as well. The administration “must fight a two-front war” because “any 
revision of China policy unfortunately requires, perhaps more than any other facet of US 
foreign affairs, considering the impact at home.” However, times were changing. 
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Because nearly a decade had passed since the end of the Korean War, Komer had a 
hunch that “the original fervor of popular and Congressional anti-Peiping feeling has 
abated somewhat.” The key would be to stress that what he proposed would not be “a 
shift in policy but an effort to adjust this policy to the facts of life” and “make our China 
policy more parallel to our policy toward the USSR.” As with the Soviet Union, the 
United States must engage with communist China “precisely because it is an enemy, not 
despite this fact.” Komer believed the U.S. “must plan for a power conflict with 
Communist China lasting at least a generation,” due both to “our basic conflicts of 
interest in the Far East” and because “the sturm und drang phase of Mao's revolution 
requires an external devil.” Yet while the United States was endeavoring to contain and 
resist Chinese expansion, American leaders must also demonstrate a new-found “flexible 
willingness to explore the possibilities of influencing the long-run evolution of the 
Peiping regime.”33 
 This was the first instance of a government official putting forth what would by 
the end of the decade become official U.S. policy towards communist China. Almost 
exactly one year later, Chester Bowles offered a striking similar proposal in a policy 
memorandum, albeit with important additions. Bowles call for the U.S. to use its 
“leverage” to “weaken China's expansionist tendencies and military capacity, encourage 
the opening of its society to non-Communist influences, enlarge its economic ties to the 
West, and gradually modify its hard-shell Communism.” Due to the previous 
administration's “sterile, inept and unrealistic” policies in Asia, the current 
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administration was burdened with “a complex of contradictory policies many of which 
had their root in domestic partisan conflicts.”34 Bowles belittled the American policy of 
“non-recognition and U.N. exclusion” as “a national posture rather than a national 
policy.” China's “re-entry into the family of nations,” including American diplomatic 
recognition and a seat in the United Nations, should become the “desirable long-term 
goal of U.S. foreign policy.” Neither was possible in the near-term because of Chinese 
demands. But, as Komer had recognized, this created opportunities. Echoing Komer, 
Bowles wrote that “it is to our clear advantage to place the onus for the present 
communication impasse squarely on the Peiping regime.” This could be accomplished 
by offering communist China U.N. membership at the cost of Chinese acceptance of 
continued Taiwanese membership. Since the P.R.C. would be certain to refuse such a 
deal, “it will leave the situation unchanged.”35 
 As a man who openly detested all things Eisenhower when it came to foreign 
policy, Bowles would have almost certainly been quite reluctant to recognize that he was 
applying to the Chinese a tactic Eisenhower employed multiple times in his dealings 
with the Soviets. Eisenhower intended proposals such as Open Skies and Atoms For 
Peace to appeal to global opinion, particularly in poorer nations not aligned with either 
the U.S or the U.S.S.R., by making the United States look generous and peace-loving. 
Even better, the Soviets were certain to reject them, and thus appear to be the 
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unreasonable party in the Cold War competition.
36
 Though, according to Kenneth 
Osgood, neither Eisenhower, Dulles, nor any subordinate official talked about placing 
the “onus” on the Soviets through such methods, at least not in those exact words,37 that 
was clearly their intention. Komer never explained when he “rethought” China policy, or 
if he was influenced by Eisenhower's methods of appealing to world opinion. Still, the 
tactical parallel is unmistakable. 
 Perhaps unlike Komer, in the near-term Bowles had more in mind than mere 
rhetorical gambits. He made concrete proposals which he believed the Chinese might 
accept. Bowles focused on two substances - wheat and uranium. China currently lacked 
and needed both. Bowles believed it had the capability to produce sufficient quantities of 
the latter, but not the former. He correctly predicted that “by 1964 China will almost 
certainly detonate a nuclear device.” Any changes in American policy after that date 
would be viewed by the world as “a defensive U.S response to increased mainland 
power.” Once again, time was not on the American side. But it was not on the Chinese 
side in important respects either. Bowles believed the ongoing acute scarcity of food in 
China was not a passing phase. He asserted that crisis was “endemic” to communist 
Chinese agriculture due to the fact that, even in good years, yields were increasing 
slower than population.
38
 The seemingly unbridgeable Malthusian gap between Chinese 
agricultural productivity and the population's fecundity provided the U.S. with 
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unprecedented leverage. The promise of wheat sales could be employed to encourage 
Chinese cooperation in Northeast and Southeast Asia.
39
 China was powerful and 
dangerous, but its people would likely remain on the verge of hunger so long as food 
imports were not substantially increased. If the Chinese government refused such a quid 
pro quo, they would appear not only intransigent but heartless, willing to starve their 
own citizens rather than forgo foreign aggression. 
 While Komer confronted concerns about domestic public opinion head-on, 
Bowles was more circumspect, and at times contradictory. He chided the previous 
administration for having “side-stepped and postponed the essential, long-overdue 
decisions in Asia on the ground that the American people could not be persuaded to 
support the moves which were necessary.” Yet he also recommended that “every effort 
should be made to keep the operation in lo [sic] key. All talk of a 'new Asia policy' 
should be discouraged.” Important decisions must be made, but apparently they must be 
kept from the public, a curious stance from a man who gave a speech five years earlier 
extolling the wisdom of public opinion. Further tying himself in knots, Bowles later 
declared that “here in the United States we will be undertaking an educational task as 
momentous and necessary as those relating to Lend Lease and the Marshall Plan.”40 
Much like Kennedy himself, Bowles was not quite able to reconcile his idealistic faith in 
the American people with his cynical but well-founded fear of their reactions to change 
on an emotionally sensitive matter. 
                                                 
39
  Ibid. 38. 
40
  Ibid. 53, 33, 51. 
 36 
 
 The way to slice this Gordian Knot was to successfully mobilize public opinion. 
The simplest, but also the riskiest, method of achieving this result would be a direct 
presidential appeal for change. In November 1961, officials working under Bowles in 
the State Department felt sufficiently emboldened to have an unnamed speechwriter craft 
an address for President Kennedy to read on national television calling for an epochal 
change in the U.S. approach to China. No historian of the administration's policy 
towards communist China has ever mentioned this address, most likely because it was 
never actually given. Yet it is an important artifact for two reasons. First, its very 
existence, and the manner in which its content was debated and analyzed, demonstrated 
the boldness of those pushing for change, particularly during the first year of the 
administration. Second, and much more importantly, the words President Kennedy never 
uttered bore an unmistakable similarity to those spoken by President Nixon eight to ten 
years in the future. They demonstrated a continuity, if not in actions or words, then in 
thoughts and hopes. On China, Nixon would ultimately fulfill the dreams of Chester 
Bowles, much as Bowles would have hated to admit it. Much as Nixon and Henry 
Kissinger would have hated to admit it, their vision of a new Asia after Vietnam had 
been glimpsed long before that war began in earnest. 
 As bold as the speech's words were, nowhere in the text, entitled “Proposed 
Presidential Speech on a Two Chinas Policy,” did the words “Two” and “Chinas” appear 
consecutively. Chester Bowles noted after reading the speech that “the key point is the 
 37 
 
establishment of the two China concept, although, of course, we must not call it that.”41 
Similar to Lyndon Johnson's approach to Vietnam, the strategy would be creeping 
escalation coupled with public obfuscation. By the time the public realized what was 
happening, events would have already taken their course. However, there was no 
“Vietnam Peace Lobby” in the United States to warn of that president's devious 
intentions. The speech itself contained plenty of phrases to prick the ears of the China 
Lobby and their supporters. The most notable was the repeated usage of the word 
“Peking.” The U.S. government officially referred to the Chinese capital as “Peiping,” 
which was what the Guomindong had called it. No American president publicly uttered 
the word Peking until 1969, at which time it was seen as a major, and meaningful, 
innovation.  Not coincidentally, the Committee of One Million had ceased to exist by 
1969.
42
 
 The speech began with the recognition that the American relationship, or lack 
thereof, with the Chinese communists was anomalous, stating  that “with no other nation 
in the world has the United States maintained a similar relationship.” The text went on to 
claim this was in large part because of lingering bitterness regarding the Korean War, 
but added “although this emotional reaction is understandable, we cannot allow it to 
shape our policy toward Communist China in the new decade of the '60's.” The new era 
Kennedy had proclaimed at his inauguration demanded new policies unburdened by the 
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old rancor. Without a doubt, communist China was a threat, and not just because it was 
communist. There was “a 2000-year tradition of imperialism which has seen one 
Chinese dynasty after another in its early dynamic years attempt to expand at the 
expense of its neighbors.” Compounding this dynastic imperative was the fact that China 
lacked the food to feed its people and the raw materials to industrialize. This created “a 
classic aggressor situation similar to that which fed the expansionist armies of Nazi 
Germany and pre-war Japan.” The Chinese dilemma demanded not only containment but 
outreach. With this in mind, “we must welcome every opportunity to encourage more 
moderate attitudes on the part of the Peking government.”43 
 The Chinese government might at the moment be akin to that of the Nazis, but 
“the lessons of history clearly show that no conflict between nations is permanent. 
People change, governments change, and nations change. It is the rigid, the inflexible, 
and the arrogant who fall by the wayside.” The words would have been vintage Kennedy 
in their soaring optimism, faith in future progress, and implicit criticism of previous 
leaders. Mao was not the only one who had been rigid, inflexible, and arrogant. The 
conclusion of the speech made this even more plain, and for the first time obliquely took 
on the China Lobby, declaring that the United States can no longer afford to “allow our 
national policies to be shaped by shrill charges and sterile slogans.”44  The final line 
Kennedy was supposed to have spoken - “soberly, thoughtfully and without rancor the 
time has come for us Americans to consider what in many ways is the most perplexing 
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and explosive question of our age” - was a sort of plea for the “Silent Majority” to 
overcome the noisy “China Lobby” minority and end their vise grip on policy. 
 The speech would have also been Kennedy-esque because it was heavy on 
symbolism and light on substance. In fact, the speech proposed no actual policy changes. 
At its heart, it was merely a plea for both the American people and the Chinese 
leadership to change their conceptions of one another. It asserted “how much better it 
would be for the people of China if Peking were to choose the road of peace, of trade, 
and of trust.” The mention of trade was the closest the text came to making any allusion 
to policy matters then under discussion. For the most part, the writer contented himself 
with normative statements such as “in the months and years ahead it must be our fervent 
hope and prayer that the government of Communist China will adopt more reasonable 
policies towards the world as a whole.” Absent were any possible means to bring this 
about. Perhaps this was because the writer believed that the time “is not yet here, and I 
can see no signs that point to its coming in the near future.” Nevertheless, “the door 
remains open; we for our part will never close it.”45 
 Coming at the end of a year which included Kennedy's consecutive humiliations 
at the Bay of Pigs and the Vienna summit, as well as the building of the Berlin Wall, 
such conciliatory words would no doubt have been taken at home and abroad not as an 
act of magnanimity, but a sign of weakness. A similar speech given one year later, in the 
immediate aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, might have been received differently. 
But by then, China appeared even less amenable to such appeals. In either year, it would 
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have been an audacious address for a careful politician. The closest equivalent would 
have been Kennedy's 1963 address on civil rights, which boldly attacked the morality of 
segregation and thereby risked alienating southern whites, something Kennedy had 
previously been extremely wary of doing. Yet that speech was not a mere plea for 
dialogue or understanding, but an announcement of support for new legislation. The 
proposed China speech lacked this element. It was thus both too bold to be uttered and 
not bold enough to be worth uttering. Finally, the civil rights speech occurred in the 
context of a groundswell of non-violent black activism and violent white responses, both 
of which received ample press and television coverage. It had become difficult for the 
president not to take a stand on the matter. The matter of China presented no equivalent 
political urgency. 
 As it was, even those most supportive of the speech's message were 
unenthusiastic about the text itself. Bowles wrote “this needs more work. It is right and 
awkward in several areas, and I don't want it to go unless it is good.”46 He told his 
subordinate Tom Hughes that while “this is no time to send the President a controversial 
memorandum and proposal,” that day was fast approaching as “with Averell [Harriman] 
and the new team I believe we may soon be prepared to move.” In addition to Harriman, 
Bowles believed the American Ambassador to the United Nations, who had just 
succeeded in keeping communist China out of that organization, was supportive, writing 
“I discussed this (the speech) in general terms with Adlai, who thought it would do 
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wonders for our position domestically and abroad.” In terms of congress, he surmised 
the Democratic senator from Montana and noted Asia expert Mike Mansfield “would 
buy it.” Finally, and most hopefully of all, “the general line appears to me reasonable 
and in line with the President's instincts.”47 No mention was made as to what Dean Rusk 
would think of the speech. This, along with all other contemporary evidence, would 
indicate Rusk was opposed to such a change in China policy. In his memo on the speech, 
Bowles was clearly eager to mention every prominent official who might be supportive 
of a Two-China policy, from Ambassador Stevenson up to the president himself. To 
have excluded his own immediate superior from the list  would have been a most 
uncharacteristic omission. 
 Rusk was not to remain Bowles's immediate superior for long. The mention of 
“the new team” was an allusion to a substantial bureaucratic reshuffling of State 
Department personnel which the press quickly dubbed the “Thanksgiving Day 
Massacre.” The massacre's chief victim was Bowles himself. Technically “promoted” to 
the position of  “President's Special Representative for Africa, Asia, and Latin America” 
as well as “Ambassador at Large,” he would spend most of the next eighteen months 
traveling to those three continents and reporting on economic development and foreign 
aid projects. Harriman ceased being an “Ambassador at Large” and assumed the formal 
position of Undersecretary for Far Eastern Affairs, the one aspect of this series of moves 
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which Bowles appeared to have supported and lobbied for.
48
 Harriman would remain in 
that position until April 1963, when he was replaced by Roger Hilsman. Harriman and 
Hilsman would carry on Bowles's attempts to change China policy, though Harriman 
would waver, at times seeking to exploit the U.S.'s and the U.S.S.R.'s  mutual suspicions 
of China's growing power to improve relations with the Soviets. James Thomson, who 
had been serving as Bowles's Special Assistant, remained in this position until 1963, at 
which point he became Hilsman's Special Assistant. Returning to a position where he 
could attempt to change China policy, Thomson would within the year successfully push 
Hilsman in that direction. 
 There is no evidence Bowles's views on China had anything to do with his 
reassignment. In fact, he had yet to produce his lengthy memorandum calling for 
significant changes in U.S. China policy. He lacked Komer's sense of urgency. Bowles's 
writings going back to 1959 indicate that he shared Komer's beliefs on how to handle 
growing Chinese power, and his longing to take on the China lobby probably went back 
even further. Bowles also lacked Komer's ability to make important allies. His chief 
achievement during his brief tenure as Undersecretary of State was to become a leading 
enemy of the president's brother. According to Harris Wofford, Attorney General Robert 
Kennedy termed Bowles a “gutless wonder” after he prevented U.S. military 
intervention in the Dominican Republic following the death of Rafael Trujillo. In 
addition, Bowles was known to be “upset and troubled” by Kennedy's consent to the Bay 
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of Pigs operation. Within the State Department, Bowles had been warned that the 
Undersecretary's job was now seen as that of a “Chief of Staff,” and even James 
Thomson confessed that his boss possessed poor aptitude for that sort of administrative 
position.
49
 
 Regardless of these other, unrelated conflicts and shortcomings, Rusk was not a 
supportive superior when in came to China policy, and would have disapproved had 
Bowles put his thoughts on China in writing as early as Komer had. In later decades, 
after China policy had changed drastically under both Republican and Democratic 
administrations, Rusk claimed he was personally supportive of significant policy 
changes during this period, including the specifics of Bowles's proposal. In 1977, he told 
Warren Cohen that he supported a “two Chinas” policy as early as the mid-1950s. 
However, Kennedy was opposed to such a change. According to Rusk, this was not 
simply because Kennedy feared a domestic political backlash, but rather because “he 
seems to have retained an enduring hostility” towards the People's Republic, unlike his 
more flexible and evolving views on the Soviet Union.
50
 Rusk went into greater depth in 
his memoirs, published over a decade later, declaring that “I was leaning toward a two-
China policy in 1961.” However, Rusk recognized that “any change on China would 
have been one hell of a battle,” with Republicans from former President Dwight 
Eisenhower on down opposing any such moves. Rusk added Kennedy knew that “he 
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would have been cut to ribbons by the China Lobby, the Republicans, and many 
members of Congress.”  
 Rusk claimed his open-minded views on the matter were not known, even within 
the administration, because, since he worried about “that leaky Kennedy administration,” 
when Stevenson or Bowles tried to discuss China “I stonewalled them and play [sic] the 
role of 'village idiot.'” By that time, Rusk had come to agree with Kennedy confidants 
such as Arthur Schlesinger that the president did not hold any personal animus towards 
Communist China, and would have made significant changes in U.S. policy towards the 
regime in his second term.
51
 
 One thing all relevant parties agreed upon, either at that time or long after the 
fact, was the power of the China Lobby. In his seminal Friends and Enemies, Gordon 
Chang claimed that the lobby was a “spent force” by the time Kennedy entered office.52 
However, the administration and those who covered it almost universally disagreed. 
Representative Charles O. Porter, a Democrat from Oregon, and the only member of 
Congress who dared to publicly question Eisenhower's China policy, was defeated in the 
1960 election by a member of the Committee of One Million.
53
 More than two-thirds of 
Porter's colleagues – 296 Representatives, along with 55 Senators - consented in 1962 to 
have their names appear on Committee mailings. Republicans comprised 180 of the 
total, and Democrats 171 since the organization, though run by conservative activists 
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such as Marvin Liebman and Arthur Kohlberg, was always scrupulous about 
maintaining its bi-partisan image.
54
 At that time, only the Nation magazine agreed with 
Chang's retrospective assessment, calling it the “Lobby of a Million Ghosts” in 1960. 
But this was not because the Committee lacked popularity among politicians, but 
because few if any actual voters supported the organization.
55
 It was thus, in their view, 
a paper tiger, if only the politicians would dare recognize it as such, former 
Representative Porter's fate to the contrary. 
 There was evidence that the American people were moving, however tentatively, 
away from the China Lobby and towards Porter and the Nation. A March 1961 Gallup 
poll for the first time showed significant increases in support for improved relations with 
communist China. Anticipating precisely the arguments which would begin to be made 
within the corridors of power during the Kennedy years, gain increasing and influential 
adherents outside government during the Johnson administration, and become policy 
under Nixon, a Long Island housewife called China “a tremendous force that we can't 
and don't wish to annihilate,” adding “we are going to have to work out some way of 
getting along.”56 A majority of respondents supported selling the Chinese foodstuffs and 
making trade deals with them. Only 20 percent supported seating the P.R.C. in the 
United Nations, though this was double the percentage who had supported this action in 
1955. However, when asked if the United States should “go along with a decision to seat 
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Red China,” support jumped to 59 percent, again nearly double the proportion in 1955.57 
Though significant, this hardly indicated a groundswell for significant policy change. 
The State Department summarized the poll at the time as indicating that “the American 
public would like to see the U.S. take steps to improve our relations with Communist 
China.”58 
 Standing in the way of any such steps were not only congress, the Committee of 
One Million, and the Taiwanese government they supported, but the Chinese 
communists themselves. Roger Hilsman wrote in 1967 that “it almost seemed that the 
Communists feared a change in U.S. policy toward China as much as the China Lobby 
did.”59 The P.R.C. made this clear the same week the Gallup poll came out by presenting 
a series of conditions the United States had to meet to improve relations, conditions they 
knew the United States would find unacceptable. In response, the magazine America, 
normally an advocate during this period for changing China policy, announced “Red 
China's intransigent demands should make academic the whole matter of its admission to 
the UN until such time as Chairman Mao and his cohorts decide to join the human 
race.”60 This came on the heels of Mao's post-Inaugural statement that Kennedy was 
“worse than Eisenhower,” which wounded the new American president more than Mao 
could have known. On the surface, Mao intended to convey his belief that the smooth-
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talking Kennedy was deceitful and tricky. Deeper down, he might have been afraid the 
new president was serious. The candidate's consideration for abandoning Quemoy and 
Matsu appeared to signal that Kennedy supported recognition of both “Chinas.”61 Such a 
move on the part of the Americans would conflict with Mao's attempts to portray the 
United States as a “devil figure,” and limit its ability to serve as the enemy he needed for 
domestic mobilization. 
 These actions would appear to support Komer's and Bowles's strategy of offering 
dual recognition as a means of “putting the onus” on the Chinese. Yet scoring points 
abroad at the cost of fallout at home would provide a merely pyrrhic victory. Kennedy 
had anticipated this, telling the Prime Minister of New Zealand in early March that “he 
would be prepared to tackle the very deepseated and emotional opposition through the 
country from such groups as the Committee of One Million” if this could lead to 
concrete results. “However, it quickly became apparent that the Chinese Communists 
were just as hostile to the new administration as they were to the old, and were attacking 
him personally already.”62 Kennedy, who had a gift for telling an audience what it 
wanted to hear, was most likely putting on a brave face by pretending not to fear the 
China Lobby and their supporters. His future public comments would bear this out. 
 The next few months witnessed a number of warning shots in the press from 
those who feared Kennedy was being pushed by foreign leaders and certain advisers to 
allow the P.R.C.'s admission to the United Nations. A writer with the ironic name of 
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Chamberlain warned of a “Far East Munich,” with the United States giving in to British 
pressure on the matter. He called for mobilization of domestic public opinion to nip in 
the bud such a threat to America's strategic position in the Far East.
63
 After meeting with 
Kennedy the following month, British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan reported that 
Kennedy was willing to “explore” his options with Red China after he had been 
informed that the British and the Canadians both favored changes in American policy.
64
 
In May, the Los Angeles Times, a fervent opponent of any change in U.S. China policy, 
announced the existence of a plan “to appease Red China into the United Nations.”65 
 The villain in this case was a not wavering ally but the old China Lobby target 
Dean Acheson, who supposedly had Kennedy's ear on China. It was true that, shortly 
after the P.R.C.'s founding, Acheson had called for the U.S. “to attempt to detach China 
from subservience to Moscow and over a period of time encourage those vigorous 
influences which might modify it.”66 But this was always a low-valence issue for an 
Atlanticist focused on Europe first and last. In 1956, Acheson inserted a plank into the 
Democratic platform calling for a policy of “intelligent neglect” towards Communist 
China.
67
 In his grand strategic vision, China was always of limited economic and 
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strategic significance.
68
 It was therefore unlikely Acheson would use whatever access he 
enjoyed with the new president to lobby for changes in China policy. 
 Facts aside, these stories demonstrated growing alarm among supporters of the 
status quo. The Congressional Quarterly reported in April that Taiwan was once again 
marshaling its supporters in Congress and seeking the “support of American public 
opinion in any showdown over China policy.” The article noted their effectiveness was 
evident by the fact that in the past decade Congress has passed no fewer than 16 
resolutions opposing the seating of the Chinese communist regime in the U.N. Only four 
representatives voted against the previous resolution, and three of them had failed to 
secure reelection.
69
 On the eve of the United Nations vote, the State Department noted 
that “congressional, editorial and public opinion remains overwhelmingly opposed to 
Communist China's seating in the UN.”70 
 Alienating allies was thus a small price to pay for preventing a domestic political 
firestorm. However, as indicated by the statements of Komer and Bowles, the 
administration was not optimistic. Kennedy went so far as to ask Henry Luce “and others 
whether they had any better ideas about how to keep the Nationalists in the UN.”71 The 
anticipation of further erosion in international support for the moratorium led to an 
attempt to have the General Assembly declare the seating of Communist China an 
“important question” which in the future would require a two-thirds majority to seat the 
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communist Chinese. This motion passed by a margin on 61 to 34 in November 1961.
72
 
The Washington Post attributed this strategy to a fear that “if China were invited into the 
U.N. the entire Republican Party would reconstitute a China Lobby that for the past few 
years had become a fading, but unchallenged bugaboo.”73 This would appear to support 
Gordon Chang's contention, though it differs with nearly every other piece of 
contemporary journalistic and archival evidence. The Committee of One Million, while 
no longer as confident as it had been during the Eisenhower administration, would 
remain unchallenged for at least a few more years, both organizationally and politically.  
 During these years, it would still be appeased by the highest elected officials. In 
order to reassure his detractors, Kennedy went so far as to reiterate the stance he took in 
1949 that the United States should have done more to prevent the communists from 
winning the Chinese Civil War. This was a right-wing view when he first enunciated it, 
and remained so in 1961. Kennedy argued that history had proven him correct, 
explaining that “I always felt that we did not make a determined enough effort in the 
case of China. Given the problems we now see, a more determined effort would have 
been advisable.”74 From the standpoint of both Mao and Chiang, the civil war was 
ongoing. The premise of  Chester Bowles's proposals was that this situation must be 
changed, lest the war reignite and draw in the United States. In a December v1961 
newspaper column, the first prominent pundit agreed with him. Walter Lippmann wrote 
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that given “the existing stalemate in the Civil War there can be no solution of the China 
question in the U.N. except by admitting both Chinas, or neither of them.”75 Less than a 
month after the drafting of the speech Kennedy never gave, a prominent voice outside of 
the administration was in agreement with the text's spirit. 
 Ultimately, Communist China's entry into the United Nations occurred long after 
Bowles and Komer feared would be the case. The status of Taiwan remained, and 
continues to remain, a hindrance to improved relations between the U.S. and the P.R.C. 
But numerous other issues would intrude in subsequent years and push the matter of the 
“Two Chinas” into the background. The sleeping giant had awoken, but stumbled and 
repeatedly fell down as it struggled to firmly stand on its own two feet. Like many 
influential memoranda and policy papers from long ago, the works of Bowles and 
Komer appear alternately myopic and far-sighted. Their alarmism about the 
sustainability of the current policy were misplaced, but the visions inspired by that 
alarmism proved enduring. They knew implementing even a small piece of these visions 
would be an uphill battle. Both men recognized the difficulties of fighting a “two-front 
war” for change against adversaries foreign and domestic. Both believed Chinese 
resistance could be made to rebound against them in a sort of diplomatic jujitsu. 
Domestically, they differed. Komer, who had no experience running for elective office, 
wanted to rip off the band-aid rather than prolong the inevitable agony. Bowles held a 
different view. In practice, he feared the power of public opinion which he theoretically 
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had championed. In 1958 he had lost the Connecticut Democratic primary for the U.S. 
Senate to Thomas Dodd, who went on to be a leading supporter of the Committee of One 
Million. Honesty was too dangerous an approach. It risked arousing the not-quite-
sleeping  giant that was the China Lobby. 
 1961 was a good year for theorizing about China policy because it was 
comparatively tranquil. The status quo in Vietnam had yet to become untenable. 
Relations between the Chinese and the Soviets were clearly troubled, but few informed 
individuals saw a complete break as a likely outcome. It was increasingly obvious that 
the Great Leap Forward had been a failure, and that China faced a humanitarian crisis. 
How serious a crisis it would become could as yet not be determined, particularly given 
the utter lack of official or unofficial U.S. contacts behind the “Bamboo Curtain.” While 
China's intentions to acquire nuclear weapons were readily apparent, how soon they 
could do so, particularly without Soviet technical assistance, could not easily be 
predicted. The potential storm of U.N. membership had been averted with far greater 
ease than most anticipated. But this brief period of tranquility would soon come to an 
end. 
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CHAPTER III 
TAMING THE COLOSSUS IN TIME: 
CHINA AS A THREAT TO ITSELF AND OTHERS 
 
 On December 17, 1962, the Kennedy White House hosted a Nobel Laureate. She 
had not come to receive an award, attend a banquet, or discuss the arts. She was there to 
plead her case. Pearl Buck's cause, as usual, was China. She believed the people of 
Taiwan lived under grave danger from Mao Zedong's communists. Rather than support 
Chiang Kai-shek, much less “unleash” him on the mainland, Buck was willing to offer 
him – and the island he ruled - as a sacrifice for peace among the Chinese, and between 
Communist China and the western world. According to Michael Forrestal, “Miss Buck 
expounded at length on her fear that unless something was done in the very near future, 
the people of mainland China would become the permanent enemies of the Western 
World. She felt it was essential for the United States to make an attempt to reach a 
modus vivendi with Red China before the death of Chiang Kai-shek.” Buck predicted 
Chiang's death would bring about “a collapse of the Taiwanese political and economic 
structure, leading to war.” To prevent this catastrophe for the sake of all involved, “Miss 
Buck proposed that we make a discreet but very strong effort to convince the 
Generalissimo that his place in history can only be assured by a reunion under the 
auspices of the Formosa Chinese with their Mainland brothers.” The method of this 
reunion would involve the preservation of the “de facto independence of Formosa for a 
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10 to 25-year period with an agreement at the end of the period for a negotiated 
settlement based upon a plebiscite or some some other device.”1 
 Buck maintained the United States would not be acting alone on this matter, 
insisting “throughout the conversation” that there was “communication and a basis for 
accommodation between Mao and Chou En-lai on the one hand and the Gimo (Chiang) 
and his followers on the other.” What was needed to reach an agreement and preserve 
peace in East Asia was American involvement. At that moment, Kennedy was the man 
to provide it. According to Forrestal, Miss Buck said that she had been “convinced by 
the President's handling of the Cuban crisis that it might be possible in his 
Administration for this problem to be tackled, and that was why she had come to 
Washington with her proposal.”2 Kennedy's increased foreign policy stature after the 
Cuban Missile Crisis afforded him potentially far greater room to maneuver on China 
policy that he had previously enjoyed. In reality, there was not much. But during his first 
two years in office, there had been virtually none. 
 Buck made her case at a pivotal moment not only in Kennedy's presidency, but in 
the history of modern China. Whichever position a watcher of that nation took, their 
observations and prognostications were bound to be both confirmed and confounded. 
The situation within China was both stable and catastrophic. Its leaders were cautious 
and unpredictable. They led a rising power which might be in terminal decline. China 
was less a puzzle than a paradox. It could be resolved in two ways. The first, and most 
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appealing for Americans, was that the sword of Chinese communist power was hard and 
sharp, but brittle. Inevitability, it would shatter, so long as the U.S. did not succor the 
outlaw regime with diplomatic legitimacy or economic assistance. China was bluffing, 
and the U.S. had to keep calling that bluff, not matter how high China raised the stakes. 
Buck appeared to represent an alternative assessment. According to this view, time was 
on China's side. It was strong despite its manifold weaknesses and failings. More 
importantly, it was resilient, and would only get stronger. China's weaknesses and 
failings were the passing phase. Even worse, the preconditions for communist 
containment did not exist in East Asia the way they did in Western Europe. If the 
Chinese communists remained in control, and their nation continued to grow in power, it 
would prove to be the U.S. that was bluffing. The events of these years would increase 
the ranks of those in the U.S. who subscribed to the second assessment, particularly 
among members of the administration and their natural political supporters in certain 
sectors of the press. 
 In 1961 and 1962, Communist China had never seemed more threatening - or 
more vulnerable. It sought to develop nuclear weapons, massed troops across from 
Taiwan, worked to bring all of Indochina under communist rule, and sent several 
divisions across the Himalayan Mountains. At the same time, it suffered the monumental 
domestic calamity of mass famine due to the economic policies of the Great Leap 
Forward. If ever there was a time to test whether Chinese communism was indeed a 
“passing phase,” that had been it. Yet the regime had survived, with nary a trace of 
unrest. With past assumptions about the regime's fragility in tatters, future policy 
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appeared to be in need of a substantial revision. An unprecedented number of voices, for 
the time being concentrated exclusively on the center-left, advocated outreach instead of 
hostility as the best means of containing the Chinese threat. If China could not be 
stopped, it must be changed, and change within China could only be achieved through 
outreach from abroad. 
 At first glance, that Pearl Buck was proposing to surrender Taiwan “on the 
installment plan” is shocking. More than any other factor, Buck's books, particularly The 
Good Earth, created American affection toward the Chinese people in the 1930s and 
1940s, convincing many in the United States that peasants in China were very much like 
them.
3
 This affection and paternalistic identification had made the Communist takeover 
in 1949 and the following year's attack across the Yalu particularly traumatic. Given 
how the Chinese communists treated missionary families like her own, to say nothing of 
their local converts, one might have expected Buck to have sided with the burgeoning 
China Lobby. In fact, she did the opposite. Buck blamed Chinese militancy on the U.S.'s 
policies of isolation and hostility, writing in 1954 that “had we kept the doors open, I 
believe that China would not have been compelled to follow Russia as her sole friend. 
But we closed the doors as fast as we could, not knowing what we did.” She even 
maintained her affiliation with the Institute for Pacific Research, founded in the 1940s 
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by Owen Lattimore and John Fairbank and accused by Senator Joseph McCarthy and his 
supporters of being a communist-front organization.
4
 
 Given this information, it was actually unsurprising that Buck made these sorts of 
arguments in December 1962. But it was still significant that she chose to make them in 
the White House at that precise moment. China had survived the self-inflicted disaster of 
the Great Leap Forward, and had even crushed the Indian army during the worst of the 
suffering. The date when China would acquire nuclear weapons was seen to be rapidly 
approaching. By the end of 1962, Chiang had given up all hope of returning to the 
mainland. Ngo Dinh Diem's regime in South Vietnam was beginning to unravel as the 
Chinese supplied his National Liberation Front enemies with increasingly sophisticated 
medium and small arms. Just as Robert Komer had predicted, the period of easy, almost 
costless containment of communist China was coming to an end. Many within and 
beyond the government began to wonder if containment alone could suffice. While few 
went as far as Buck, they came to believe some sort of accommodation had to be reached 
with the Chinese Communists. Since 1949, the U.S. had refused to recognize the 
Chinese regime because it violated treaties and flouted international norms. Any change 
in this policy was contingent upon better Chinese behavior. Now, some in high places 
suggested the sequence be reversed. Engagement would be the cause of Chinese 
changes, rather than their result. 
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 No one in the Kennedy administration doubted that Communist China was an 
expansionist nation. What its members differed upon was whether China was reckless 
and adventurous, or merely opportunistic. Mao's rhetoric certainly seemed to indicate the 
former. His actions, according to some, proved that the latter was closer to reality. Roger 
Hilsman concluded that “caution and flexibility” had characterized Chinese behavior in 
Korea and the two Taiwan Straits crises. He noted how in 1958 “Chinese Communist 
forces exercised extreme caution to avoid hitting US ships and planes.” This pattern 
suggested “extreme caution in the planning and implementation of strategy” on the part 
of the Chinese.
5
 The repeated invocation of the word “caution” was meant to counter the 
belief that Mao was irrational. Hilsman wrote the memo in the context of communist 
Chinese troop concentrations along the coast across from Taiwan. Mao claimed the 
movement of hundreds of thousands of soldiers from the northern provinces more than a 
thousand miles away was a purely defensive measure. Detractors countered that half a 
million men was beyond the number needed to repel the Taiwanese forces, and thus Mao 
must have offensive intentions – if not to take Taiwan, then at least to once and for all 
seize the offshore island groups that he had attacked twice before. 
 Chiang had made no secret of his desire to exploit the calamity of the Great Leap 
Forward by launching massive raids onto the mainland in the hopes of inciting a general 
rebellion. American leaders saw this as a potential Bay of Pigs repeated on a far larger 
scale. In a March meeting with the president, Rusk had “intervened with great vigor and 
a strong opinion” to declare that “this operation just wouldn't wash,” that “the plan was 
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nonsense, and the idea that we could keep it covert was also nonsense.” Neither 
Kennedy, McGeorge Bundy, Ray Cline, General Pat Carter, or Mike Forrestal disagreed 
with this assessment. However, Roger Hilsman wondered whether the best course of 
action was to be honest with the Taiwanese and “reject the plan outright,” or if the 
administration should “temporize.” Hilsman expressed the fear that if given an outright 
rejection the Taiwanese “would immediately start a public campaign to arouse the China 
lobby.”6 Regardless of the methods used, Chiang must be convinced, one way or 
another, to stay on the defensive. But even if the Taiwanese remained off the mainland, 
it was uncertain the communists would be content to remain on it. As Hilsman conceded, 
“Chinese Communist troop movements appear capable of serving both defensive and 
offensive objectives.” Given this, “we cannot rule out the possibility that the Chinese 
Communists are preparing for a sudden all-out effort” to conquer Quemoy and Matsu. 
Still, he did not think this to be “either imminent or likely because of China's lack of 
marine troop transports.”7 In addition to being cautious, the Chinese were also 
comparatively backward. This was something even those who believed the Chinese were 
highly incautious had no choice but to concede. 
 An opportunistic and prudent China of limited offensive conventional 
capabilities could still be a cause for major concern. A National Intelligence Estimate 
released on the eve of the “Third Straits Crisis” began with the declaration, similar to 
those of Hilsman, that “we believe that over the next few years Communist China will 
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follow relatively conservative and rational policies of the kind recently instituted.” This 
was no excuse for the United States to rest easy. The NIE raised the specter of 
unconventional capabilities Hilsman overlooked. It predicted that Communist China 
“will be constantly probing for weaknesses, trying the push the US out of the Western 
Pacific, and causing trouble wherever else it can.” The Chinese planned to engage in a 
“two-level campaign of overt seduction and covert subversion.” In addition, there were 
signs of “a third and especially ominous motif in Communist China's foreign policy. 
This is racism.”8 Other Americans drew similar conclusions. Having previously 
refrained from joining the Soviet Union in condemning the United States for systematic 
discrimination against its black citizens, the Chinese entered the fray in September 1962 
by broadcasting “to color-conscious Asia a detailed report” regarding “the University of 
Mississippi's refusal to admit a Negro.”9 But for at least the next year, such rhetorical 
blasts would remain only an intermittent and tentative weapon in the Chinese 
propaganda arsenal. In terms of the conventional military threat, the report defined 
China as fundamentally defensive in outlook, concluding that “Communist China almost 
certainly does not intend to attempt the open military conquest of any Far Eastern 
country during the period of this estimate, although it would almost certainly be willing 
to take military action to defend Communist interests in North Vietnam and North Korea 
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and, probably, in Laos.”10 The human waves would remain at low tide, so long as the the 
United States did not stir the waters too much. 
 During the first two years of the Kennedy administration, the press expressed far 
more alarm, and the administration did nothing to counter these sentiments. Norman 
Cousins, who in two years would help lead the call for a friendlier attitude towards 
China, played up its menace in 1961 as fervently as any supporter of the Committee of 
One Million. “Throughout Southeast Asia,” he began with seeming authority, “there is a 
growing sense of foreboding about China.” This was due to a combination of rapid 
Chinese population growth and chronic food shortages. The clear implication, which 
would become popular in the American press, and was alluded to in the proposed 
Kennedy speech calling for a Two-Chinas policy, was that the Chinese regime would 
seek to alleviate its people's hunger by taking food surpluses from its southern 
neighbors. But the people in these nations were not the only ones who needed to fear 
China. Cousins defined the hatred the Chinese people felt for the United States as 
“consuming,” to the point where “few nations in history have been more deeply hated 
than the United States is today in China.” In a novel argument, he claimed the Chinese 
people blamed the United States for high Chinese defense expenditures, which had led to 
declines in their standards of living. Finally, Cousins predicted that “Communist China 
may now be only a matter of months away from the successful development of its first 
                                                 
10
  National Intelligence Estimate 13-4-62: Prospects for Communist China, May 2, 1962, 2. From 
Tracking The Dragon. 
 62 
 
atomic bomb.”11 A starving nuclear power whose citizens hated the United States would 
hardly prove a fount of reasonableness and calm calculation. Intriguingly, Cousins made 
no statement about how these characteristics should affect American policy. In fact, 
when he did finally call for policy changes, it was not because he had come to the 
conclusion that the Chinese threat had lessened. Rather, Cousins decided the current 
American approach would not be sufficient to allay that threat in the long-term. 
 John F. Kennedy assumed the office of the presidency at a time of renewed 
American interest in China's internal situation and external intentions, as evidenced by 
“the considerable increase in the number of books about the Red colossus” with such 
titles as The Anthill, The Endless Hours, Ten Years of Storm, and Diary From Red 
China.
12
 In March of 1961, Gallup asked a sample of Americans “Looking ahead to 
1970, which country do you think will be the greater threat to world peace – Russia or 
Communist China?” Thirty-two percent answered China, compared with 49 percent who 
responded Russia. According to George Gallup, most of those who chose China cited its 
“huge population” and “war-like policy.” He concluded that China remained the “lesser 
evil” in the eyes of most Americans, but led with the statement that China “has yet to 
displace Russia as our chief opponent in the cold war struggle.”13 That day was coming, 
and the fact that Gallup chose in 1961 to ask that question for the first time was itself 
significant. 
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 1961 was also the year General Douglas MacArthur reappeared on the national 
stage for a series of speeches on the grave threat China had come to pose. In his view, 
China's expanding power in the decade since he was relieved of command in Korea only 
demonstrated the wisdom of the proposals which led to his dismissal. Because of the 
American failure to fight for victory in Korea, China had become “a mighty military 
colossus to threaten the future of all men.”14 The “fatal consequences” of Truman not 
allowing MacArthur to expand the war and crush the Chinese communists had allowed 
them to develop “into a mighty colossus which threatens all of continental Asia and bids 
fair to emerge as the balance of military power in the world.” Such a result “would 
jeopardize the freedom of all continents.”15 Even America's backyard was at risk. 
According to Reader's Digest, “the Chinese have preempted the subversion lead in Latin 
America from their Russian partners.” Latin America, with its predominately rural 
population and weak, corrupt, and unpopular central governments, bore “striking 
similarities to the China” the communists conquered. No doubt with Cuba's recent fate in 
mind, the article concluded with the call to arms “it is very late, and we must hurry.”16 
 Numerous experts and informed observers expressed doubts about Chinese 
capabilities in the second half of 1962, though this appeared to be only tangentially 
related to increased knowledge of China's three-year famine. Reviewing the most recent 
book by influential China expert A. Doak Barnett, William Henry Chamberlain, who in 
the previous year had been fearful of appeasement, claimed “the author is too optimistic 
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about Red China's actual achievements and prospects.” He also opined that the 
professor's “scholarly objectivity” prevented him from making attempts at “moral 
evaluation.”17 In September, two leading magazines ran stories downplaying China's 
military prowess. In the judgment of  Newsweek, “Communist China is the strongest 
nation in Asia but is still not a first-class military power. As a world factor, her power is 
potential, not actual.”18 Writing in The New Republic, Richard Hughes, a New York 
Times writer who wrote frequently on East Asia in other major publications, noted that 
China had only “a handful” of armored or motorized divisions, and a small air force.19 
Still, as Newsweek stressed, its “potential for causing trouble far exceeds China's present 
military capacity,” and “only U.S. commitments in Asia can block eventual Chinese 
Communist expansion.”20 Appearing in the pages of the only major news weekly which 
entertained the notion of normalizing relations with the P.R.C., these were strong words 
indeed. 
 While the press began to express less alarmist sentiments, the public 
paradoxically became more alarmed. This was revealed by a March 1963 Gallup poll. 
When asked “Looking ahead the next few years, which country do you think will be the 
greater threat to world peace – Russia or Communist China?,” 46 percent chose China, 
and 33 percent Russia, a reversal from two years ealier.
21
 Perhaps in response, at an 
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August 1, 1963 press conference, John F. Kennedy called China “menacing” and 
“Stalinist,” while defining the Soviet Union as a status quo power.22 Around this same 
period, in an article which led by noting “news reports” which “suggest a Red China 
becoming increasingly menacing,” U.S. government experts went public with the 
knowledge that “they remain calmly assured that China raises no great threat to peace 
now.” Reflecting Hilsman's views, they maintained that the “whole history of Mao and 
his minions” showed “caution [in the presence] of superior force.” Thus, he could be 
deterred.
23
 
 However, reflecting the judgment of the previous year's NIE, the Chinese could 
fight asymmetrically, and would use racial arguments in addition to guerrilla proxies to 
achieve their goals. The analysts expected “Chinese propaganda to stress the race issue 
more and more, claiming the yellow and brown races have common interests against the 
whites – American or Soviet.” The article mentioned how in August, on the day of 
Martin Luther King, Jr.'s March on Washington, “all Peking theaters displayed a 
documentary film with shots of anti-Negro demonstrations in the Southern U.S., a Mao 
Tse-tung speech pledging support for American Negroes, and portions of a huge Peking 
rally at which Asiatic and African speakers voiced similar support.”24 While Mao had 
long made racialist arguments when courting the support of Africans and Asians, the 
attempt to appeal to black Americans marked a watershed. 
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 Administration officials were by no means unanimous regarding the Chinese 
threat. George Ball later claimed that he did not at the time “share the view then popular 
in some quarters that China – more than the Soviet Union – was the nation we should 
fear in the future.” He viewed its large population as “more a source of weakness than of 
power” since it created “simply too many mouths to feed.” Still, he conceded that “the 
fear of a militarily powerful China on the march was to become an obsession within 
some Administration circles.”25 Before his death, McGeorge Bundy told Kai Bird that 
Rusk “saw China as the ultimate strategic enemy,” an assessment he attributed to the fact 
that “Rusk was obsessed” with the previous war in Korea.26 Warren Cohen wrote in 
1980 that Kennedy shared Rusk's conclusion about China being more dangerous than the 
Soviet Union, if not to the United States, than at least to “world peace.”27 This 
coincidentally reflected the wording of the Gallup poll question. Since the United States 
was the leading global power, any nation which threatened world peace by definition 
threatened U.S. national interests. As events had shown by then, even Chinese attacks on 
nominally neutral neighbors could inspire swift United States reaction and alarm. 
 China's nuclear weapons program also occasioned alarm within the 
administration, though not for the reasons one might assume. At least in the near-term, a 
Chinese atom bomb was seen within the National Security Council as purely a weapon 
of public opinion. If it became the first Asian nation to weaponize this advanced 
                                                 
25
  George W. Ball, The Past Had Another Pattern: Memoirs (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1982), 179. 
26
  Kai Bird, The Color of Truth: McGeorge and William Bundy, Brothers in Arms, A Biography 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998), 354-355. 
27
  Warren I. Cohen, America's Response to China: An Interpretive History of Sino-American 
Relations (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1980,) 231. 
 67 
 
technology, China would stand to garner great esteem in the region. Shortly after 
assuming his position as National Security Adviser, McGeorge Bundy wrote to Dean 
Rusk that “the impact might even be like that of Sputnik I, which radically altered 
popular views as to the backwardness of the Soviet Union.” Bundy appointed his by-
then highly-trusted subordinate Robert Komer as “White House liaison concerning this 
matter.”28 In a memorandum Komer received around this time, his own subordinate 
Joseph O. Hanson, Jr., reflecting Komer's penchant for anticipating problems and 
attempting to neutralize them before it was too late, warned that “if we do not take 
advance action to offset expectable [sic] heavy ChiCom propaganda exploitation of their 
first atom bomb test, we can expect unnecessarily large psychological gains for the 
Chinese, especially in Asia and the underdeveloped areas.” Hanson worried less about 
regional leaders, whom he considered sufficiently sophisticated to realize the limitations 
of nuclear weaponry, than the populations they ruled over, who were more ignorant and 
easily frightened. Hanson proposed telling these leaders that “while the ChiCom atomic 
threat is a paper tiger, we realize that it might cause real concern in their government or 
in public opinion, and that we would be ready to reassure them” with security guarantees 
against Chinese threats.
29
 
 If there was one region where the Chinese could pose an immediate threat to the 
interests of the United States, it was Southeast Asia. During the Kennedy administration, 
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American involvement in Southeast Asia was based less on Chinese strength that on 
Chinese weakness and a supposed lack of resolve when faced with American might. The 
popular press presented a very different picture. Both the press and the administration 
agreed that China wanted to dominate its neighbors. They merely disagreed as to how 
the Chinese planned to bring this about. Both recognized that China had an 
overwhelming military advantage throughout Asia if one subtracted the United States, 
far greater than that the Soviets would enjoy in Europe without the presence of 
American forces. This was especially true all along China's southern borders. A Special 
National Intelligence Estimate prepared on the matter in 1961 noted that the 
“preponderance of Chinese Communist power is already a matter of growing concern to 
other countries in the Far East.” Despite, or perhaps because of, this preponderance of 
power, “the Chinese Communists feel little need to resort to overt military invasion in 
order to enlarge their influence or communize other countries. Instead, China's leaders 
believed they could achieve these objectives “at far less cost and risk through the 
techniques of Communist political warfare.” Yet while the Chinese preferred proxy 
wars, “Peiping has no compunctions about openly using its military forces to extend its 
control when it can do so with little or no risk.”30 
 It was thus the two-fold duty of the United States to ensure such military action 
would entail great risks and costs for the Chinese communists as well as counteract 
“Communist political warfare” within the borders of China's neighbors. In a clear 
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reference to the Great Leap Forward, the report inferred that “domestic difficulties thus 
far do not seem to have had a direct effect on Peiping's foreign policy.”31 Economic 
calamity had neither reduced Chinese capabilities nor made their intentions more 
desperate. All this had been taken into consideration the previous month in an 
intelligence estimate concerning possible Chinese and North Vietnamese reactions to a 
buildup of American advisers in South Vietnam and Laos. The authors stated “we do not 
believe Peiping would consider assignment of SEATO forces to South Vietnam as an 
immediate and direct threat to their own internal security.” At most, China might 
consider stationing air units in North Vietnamese territory. The same applied to the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam, whose leaders were assumed to be in lock-step with 
the Chinese. The estimate predicted “the DRV would probably seek to avoid having its 
regular units enter into a direct military engagement with SEATO, and in particular US, 
forces.”32 While the estimate proved correct regarding the Chinese, it was deeply 
erroneous concerning the North Vietnamese, as the United States would later discover. 
 The media provided little coverage of Chinese intentions towards and potential 
actions in Southeast Asia before 1964, but what did appear was pointed in tone, 
emphasizing Chinese strength and its neighbors' weaknesses. An April 1962 Saturday 
Evening Post article concluded that “no matter what we do, the future of Southeast Asia 
will be troubled and grim.” The author presciently observed that Diem's “prospects for 
victory” over the communist forces in South Vietnam “are not encouraging.” Regarding 
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the recent negotiated settlement in neighboring Laos, which led to the formation of a 
coalition government which included communists, the article stated “we may be sowing 
troubles which we won't be able to harvest without a war,” predicting that “our policy in 
Laos, by its timidity, will lead to disaster.” The chief beneficiary from this course of 
events would be the Chinese, since though “North Vietnam appears to be oriented 
toward Russian-style Communism, there is little doubt that if the time of conquest comes 
it will join the Chinese.”33 In this regard, the author proved rather less prescient. Like 
American government officials, he discounted the chances of balance-of-power behavior 
and nationalistic antagonisms and emphasized “bandwagoning” and ideological 
solidarity. All American observers assumed China could intimidate and overawe its 
neighbors, whether through conventional or unconventional weapons, irregular or 
regular warfare. Only the direct involvement of the United States could prevent the 
spread of communism in Asia. 
 The only other actors who could check China's drive for regional hegemony were 
China's leaders themselves. Their domestic policies might destroy Chinese power on the 
ground more thoroughly than MacArthur could ever have achieved from the air. During 
these years, Mao and his cohorts appeared put this supposition to the test. Next to the 
Sino-Soviet split, no aspect of Chinese policy received more attention from the 
American media during the Kennedy years than the failure of the Great Leap Forward. 
At first, the debate both within government and in the media centered around the extent 
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of the suffering, specifically whether there was extensive famine, or merely widespread 
hunger. Once the existence of a massive famine became apparent, the debate shifted to 
whether the communist regime could survive. When it became obvious rebellion was 
non-existent, observers took note of the stability of Mao's regime under the strain of a 
massive shock, and wondered what this portended for the future. Regarding the future, 
additional debates revolved around whether China's food shortages were chronic or 
temporary, and if the economic lurch backwards and the consequent erosion of support 
for Mao both within the party and among the people might lead to a moderation in 
rhetoric and behavior towards the rest of the world. 
 Within the U.S. government, members of the Defense Department recognized the 
true extent of the famine quite early. An April 1961 memorandum from then-Deputy 
Assistant for Special Operations Edward Lansdale to Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara declared flatly that “'The Great Leap Forward' in China has landed in the 
soup.” Discussions with the staff of outgoing Director of the Central Intelligence Agency 
Allen Dulles as well as “Chinese friends” presented Lansdale with a “picture of China 
weakened by overwork and malnutrition, a political regime being forced by growing 
discontent to start relaxing its stringent rules, and clear indications of more trouble to 
come.” Citing “the old Chinese political saying 'Three bad harvests and the mandate 
from heaven changes,'” Lansdale wondered if “it might well be time to initiate some 
actions inside China” in order to “keep the pressures on.” Making clear that he was not 
arguing the regime was on the brink of collapse, Lansdale stated flatly “it is not believed 
that China is on the point of general rebellion. Chinese are realists and know that they 
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have little chance of succeeding, unless helped from the outside.” Lansdale did not 
propose providing assistance to any would-be rebels. His reference to “actions” to “keep 
the pressure on” appeared to be intended to simply weaken the regime to the point where 
it could not pose a threat to American interests. To this effect, Lansdale concluded with 
the observation that while “the threat of China has hung heavy over our heads in Asia,” 
he hoped that “it may well be that we can start changing this in 1961.”34 
 Many periodicals recognized the extent of the famine early in 1961. Perhaps 
because of an inability to actually send reporters or use stringers to cover the famine 
first-hand, reports quickly shifted from description to speculation, producing numerous 
articles on the potential for revolt and collapse. Though most discounted the chances 
after entertaining them for sufficient space to capture the reader's attention, the press was 
more evenly divided on the matter than the government. This, of course, was not 
difficult, since no leading official in the government believed the communist regime 
could fall so long as Mao was alive. In a February 1961 article entitled “China's Grim 
Winter,” Bernard Ullman wrote in the New York Times Magazine that “never since the 
inauguration of the Communist regime in 1949 has poverty been so widespread as it is 
this year.”35 Fittingly, old P.R.C. enemy Time was the first to write “Communist China 
faces mass starvation.” In the same article, the magazine also alluded to the possibility of 
rebellion, claiming there was “a crisis in public morale” and calling the regime's 
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predicament “damn serious.”36 There were still dissenting voices regarding the 
seriousness of what the Chinese people faced as late as 1962, when Business Week wrote 
that “although China is hungry, it is not starving” due to the fact that food shortages 
were dispersed throughout the entire country.
37
 In October of that year, Richard Hughes 
wrote in the New York Times Magazine that “the tough Chinese peasants, despite their 
hardships, are not yet confronted with the terrible famines which were once their normal 
lot.”38 Journalists also debated whether this was primarily a natural or man-made 
catastrophe. U.S. News, no sympathizer with the communist Chinese, stated in early 
1961 that “nature refused to submit in 1959, and went out of control in 1960.”39 As with 
the Business Week story, and unlike the Time article, the U.S. News piece discounted the 
chances of revolt, indicating that those  in the media who correctly gauged the extent of 
Chinese suffering incorrectly assumed this meant revolt was possible. As of yet, no one 
was willing to say the regime could survive a massive famine. If revolt was not a 
possibility, conditions could not be that horrendous. 
 Of those who believed a revolt was likely, the most fervent, persistent, and 
prominent was Joseph Alsop. Echoing Lansdale's line about a Chinese dynasty losing 
the Mandate of Heaven after three consecutive bad harvests, Alsop wrote in May 1961 
that “conditions are beginning to exist in which a small spark can light a gigantic fire, as 
has happened before in China in comparable circumstances.” Recognizing the key actors 
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were in the army, and that “the army may well remain dependable,” he labeled “the other 
result” as “far from unimaginable.”40 In a column nearly a year later, Alsop wrote “it is 
clear that the Chinese have reached a grave turning point.”41 To make certain what he 
meant by “a grave turning point,” in August 1962 Alsop published a lengthy article in 
the Saturday Evening Post entitled “The Coming Explosion in Red China.” This leading 
foreign affairs pundit argued that for the past three years, “Communist China has been 
caught in a remorseless descending spiral, each year growing hungrier and hungrier, 
producing less and less, and suffering more and more painful internal strains. It even 
begins to look as though this downward spiral may be self-perpetuating.” He saw 
Chinese troop movements into the coastal region across from Taiwan as a sign of “inner 
weakness,” and discounted, for “logistical reasons,” a “major Chinese move into 
Southeast Asia.” Instead, the forces of the People's Liberation Army would be occupied 
with putting down internal rebellions, or possibly participating in them, the pundit noting 
that “any system of human society will automatically break down if the people rebel and 
the army sides with the people.” Alsop predicted that “the next down-twist of China's 
spiral is likely to be disturbingly dramatic in character.”42 In other words, the regime 
which he hated, and so many Americans still feared, was on its last legs. 
 Alsop was not the only one making such predictions, particularly in early 1962. 
In February of that year, the Atlantic Monthly, which had been one of the first magazines 
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during the previous decade to entertain the notion that Communist China was here to 
stay, wrote that since “700 million Chinese are now struggling on the brink of 
starvation,”  it was the case that “unrest and dissatisfaction have penetrated every corner 
of China.” Where Alsop merely speculated, the Atlantic flatly declared. Government 
officials had become demoralized, since “pessimism and defeatism prevail within the 
ruling class.”43 In April 1962, U.S. News, which the year before had downplayed the 
chance for revolt, claimed that prominent government officials were beginning to think 
differently. Citing newly-appointed Undersecretary of State for Asian Affairs Averell 
Harriman's recent statements, the magazine reported that “a crackup in Red China, long 
held by the West to be impossible, is beginning now to be regarded by Western 
authorities as something that could happen.” But while acknowledging a belief among 
influential individuals in this possibility, the magazine stuck to its previous assessment, 
reporting that “there have been no solid signs that a military rebellion might be 
brewing.” Nevertheless, and no doubt with a memory of what happened in the Soviet 
Union in the 1930s, the article concluded with the speculation that “a vast purge of top 
party and military leaders” might be underway.44 
 The “vast purge” did not occur during this period. Instead, in lieu of Stalinist 
scapegoating, the Chinese leadership appeared to be acknowledging their errors and 
trimming their sails before it was too late. As early at September 1961, Time reported 
that “Red China's leaders these days no longer talk of the great leap forward, but of the 
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'law of undulating progress.'”45 A month later, Newsweek seconded this assessment, 
noting the official Chinese announcement that “The Great Leap Forward” was being 
replaced by “The Great Readjustment.”46 In April 1962 they reported that “the Chinese 
Communist Party admitted to its most dedicated followers that the 'great leap forward' 
had been a flop.”47 The New Republic declared that same month that the Great Leap 
Forward “has at last been given a decent public burial,” and praised a new “realism” 
among the Chinese leadership.
48
 The Newsweek article went on to speculate about the 
foreign policy implications of this admission of error. The guiding assumption was that 
loss of legitimacy at home would lead to weakness abroad, with a possible acquiescence 
to the Soviets coupled with a new cautiousness. Life inside China might be “an 
Orwellian nightmare,”49 to quote an in-depth article in Henry Luce's Fortune, but it was 
a stable dystopia. Jacques Jacquet-Francillion, one of the multiple French intellectuals 
who ventured behind the “Bamboo Curtain” during this period and reported what they 
saw to curious Americans, concluded “according to all eye-witness accounts, the mass of 
the Red Chinese people are indifferent to everything which does not touch on the 
immediate interests of the family circle or, at most, the limited community represented 
by the village in rural areas and the local district in the cities.”50 According to this 
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observer, Mao had not succeeded in wrenching the Chinese populace out of its 
traditional provincialism, and this proved to be his saving grace. 
 Others begged to differ, though not in a way which could prove threatening to 
Mao's rule. These observers recognized that Mao's mass mobilization schemes could not 
have gotten off the ground without some degree of popular consent, or even temporary 
enthusiasm.
51
 Mass starvation appeared to have brought that era of tempestuous social 
revolution to a close. A May 1962 NIE predicted that the regime “will no longer be able 
to count on a high degree of revolutionary, almost frenetic enthusiasm.”52 U.S. News 
seconded this assessment in August, quoting an “expert” who declared definitively that 
“never again will the Communists be able to manipulate the Chinese people the way 
they once did.” China had entered an era of stasis. According to this expert, “most 
specialists on China say the people probably are not in the mood to revolt. But neither 
can they be enlisted into a mass drive by the Communists to lift the country out of its 
woes.”53 Such American sentiment inside and outside of government made the eruption 
of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution four years later a complete and inexplicable 
surprise. 
 Traveling in mainland China in the aftermath of the famine, Sir Fitzroy Hew 
MacLean found conditions “harsh, but slowly improving.”  Despite isolation from and 
antagonism towards both superpowers, “China's strength is growing.” Given that 
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Communist China was there to stay, and getting stronger by the day, “it is unrealistic for 
the United States government to maintain no relations with it.”54 The colossus could 
neither be defeated nor ignored. If the assumption was that the Chinese regime was not 
going to fall, the next question for U.S. policymakers was how dangerous it would 
remain. The consensus within both the administration and the media, though not the 
public, was that the Great Leap Forward had made the Chinese significantly less of a 
threat. Rostow wondered in a letter to Maxwell Taylor “whether Chinese development 
has been retarded for tens of years,” and stated definitively that “it is pretty clear for the 
1960's Communist China is not going to be a major industrial and military power.”55 In 
the Los Angeles Times, Theodore Chen concluded that “the Communists seem to have 
reached a high peak of success in 1958,” adding “we have good reasons to doubt the oft-
repeated statement that the Chinese Communist regime is becoming stronger and more 
stable all the time.”56 The tens of thousands of refugees who were allowed to flee the 
mainland for Hong Kong gave the impression of “disillusionment and apathy” inside 
China.
57
 Even Time called called the 1962 troop movements along the Taiwan Straits a 
“diversion” engineered by the government as “a big smoke screen” meant to distract the 
“masses from China's domestic troubles and upheavals.”58 Averell Harriman 
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downplayed both China's capabilities and intentions, telling reporters in July 1962 that 
“it looks like they are in no position to undertake military adventures at the present time” 
and that there was a “less aggressive spirit in Communist China now.”59 Reporting on 
Mao's 70
th
 birthday celebrations in October 1963, Newsweek speculated that “perhaps it 
has finally dawned on Mao that, tactically at least, gun waving is not the best way of 
making friends and influencing people.”60 
 Mao's appearance was his first at a public banquet since he gave up his position 
as Chairman of the Republic in 1959. Newsweek thus described “the barely scrutable 
protocol of the Communist Chinese Mao's appearance” as “a significant event.”61 The 
article also mentioned that Mao shook hands at this important event with black 
American militant Robert Williams, who had been living in exile in Cuba after engaging 
in a gun battle in North Carolina with police and Ku Klux Klan members. A picture of 
this encounter also appeared in Time magazine. While in China, Williams asked Mao 
twice to make a statement on American race relations. He responded with the August 8, 
1963 declaration “Mao Tse-Tung supports the American Negroes.”62 Released weeks 
before the March on Washington, it claimed the Kennedy administration wanted “to lull 
the fighting will of the Negro people and deceive the masses throughout the country.” 
The C.I.A. expressed surprise earlier in the year that “in contrast to the heavy play given 
to US racial problems by Moscow since early May, Peiping has given the Birmingham 
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story routine treatment in both press and radio.”63 Mao's newfound interest, and 
Williams's presence, inspired fear in some corners of white America of a rising tide of 
black militants taking their cue from the Chinese, and even resorting to guerrilla 
warfare.
64
 
 China's weakness at home had apparently led to moderation abroad, at least for 
the time being. Many wondered how long this would last, particularly in light of China's 
success against India in October and November of 1962, when they were supposed to 
have been reeling, chastened and, in Harriman's words, “in no position to undertake 
military adventures.” Writing in the Chicago Tribune around the time of Mao's 70th 
birthday, John Roderick claimed “the Chinese giant which stumbled and fell into an 
economic morass six years ago, has begun to use his wobbly legs. Next year he may 
walk.” This rejuvenated strength was “bad news for the west, and for Khrushchev.”65 
The administration reacted to these developments internally by seeking to balance 
continued containment with tentative outreach and publicly offering “trial balloons” 
hinting that some changes in policy could be under consideration. In November 1962, 
the Policy Planning Staff under Walt Rostow presented a dual goal of making “more 
effective our present policy of keeping the regime under pressure” while being prepared, 
if “given convincing evidence of a basic shift in Chinese policies and purposes,” to 
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“adjust our own policies to the extent necessary to nail down the shift and to use it as a 
basis for seeking a lasting resolution of the China problem.” In the short term, the 
“principal area of maneuver should be in the trade field,” and the United States “should 
be prepared to move progressively to a point where our trade policies toward mainland 
China would correspond to those toward members of the Soviet Bloc.” Before this could 
be put into effect, the American public needed to be informed “more fully” that “our 
stance of reciprocal hostility, which will be maintained as long as necessary, is not an 
end in itself but a means to effect changes in China that will enable us to live at peace 
with whatever regime is in power.”66 This marked the internal triumph of the central 
strategic aspect of the Bowles/Komer approach to taming rather than overthrowing 
communist China. 
 Rusk later said he had realized by then that the United States should try to tie 
China with “little threads” that would draw them into the “community of nations.”67 
Kennedy gingerly reflected this new consensus in what would turn out to be his final 
press conference on November 14, 1963, when he stated that “if the Red Chinese 
indicate a desire to live in peace with the United States, with other countries surrounding 
it, then quite obviously the United States would reappraise its policies. We are not 
wedded to a policy of hostility to Red China.”68 One day later, State Department Policy 
Planning Staff member Mose Harvey released his “Guidelines of U.S. Policy Toward 
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China,” which summarized this new sentiment, stating flatly that “our vital interests are 
disturbed, not by Communist China's existence, but by its expansionism.” Rejecting the 
notion that the Great Leap Forward had set China back significantly and possibly 
inaugurated an extended period of stagnation, Harvey predicted that “we face the 
likelihood that the Chinese Communists' present importance in the Far East will further 
expand if they succeed in modernizing and industrializing.” Given this “likelihood” of 
ever-expanding Chinese power and influence, the best course of action for the United 
States would be to use “a combination of policies which makes belligerence unattractive 
and a favorable evolution of policies attractive.”69 Communist China could not be 
overthrown, but perhaps it could be taught to behave. 
 1963 also proved to be the year when an increasing number of voices in the 
press, albeit still entirely to the left-of-center ideologically, began to argue for wholesale 
changes in United States policies towards China. These voices used reasoning strikingly 
similar to that being advanced within the administration. The overriding sentiment 
among those calling for change was that the United States had more to lose than to gain 
from continuing to isolate a dangerous and unpredictable regime. China's communists 
could change for the better, and the United States could do a great deal to help them 
along that path. Among the first to make this argument was Charles Burton Marshall in 
Commonweal. Less than a week after the election of the liberal and Catholic Kennedy as 
president, this flagship liberal Catholic journal predicted hopefully that “time may work 
                                                 
69
  Guidelines of U.S. Policy Toward China, November 15, 1963, 8, 2, 9, JFKL, Thomson Papers, 
Box 15, Folder 14. 
 83 
 
its changes on Communist China” because the regime was “evolving into a 
gerontocracy.” Anticipating Kennedy's comments almost exactly three years later, 
Marshall suggested the United States “be prepared to exploit whatever breaks may come 
our way,” but “to keep our guard up, not expecting too much,” in the meantime.70 
Crucially, and reflective of how little had yet to change, Marshall made no suggestion of 
outreach on the part of the United States. China must take the lead. 
 More typical of the prevailing sentiment at the time Kennedy took office was a 
piece by Holmes Alexander in the Los Angeles Times calling the current policy of 
isolating Communist China “the right one,” since “our sworn enemies in Asia would 
have far more to gain” from any improvement in relations, particularly an increase in 
trade, “than we would.”71 The notion that the Chinese regime was capable of changing 
for the better, and that “the American recognition of Communist China would accelerate 
the process of liberalization of the internal regime,” was confronted directly in a 1962 
Saturday Review assessment of Professor Harold S. Quigley's book China's Politics in 
Perspective. The reviewer called Quigley's argument to this effect “a wish rather than a 
plausible hypothesis” which was “hardly supported by argument.”72 The author 
seemingly rebutted Bowles's accusation that the status quo was a “posture” rather than a 
“policy” with the rejoinder that altering that policy would be an exercise in blind faith 
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rather than a realistic assessment of the evidence. Absent Chinese moderation, for which 
there was no sign, what those calling for reform needed was a reason to believe. 
 That reason, as is the case with so many belief systems, was fear – the fear of war 
expressed by Pearl Buck, among others. In November 1962, around the time of the 
Cuban Missile Crisis and the Sino-Indian War, Oscar Gass of Commentary, at the time a 
“Cold War Liberal” publication, sounded a pessimistic note over what a perpetuation of 
the current bitter antagonism could mean for Asia and the world. Gass wrote darkly that 
“the continuation of peace between the China and the United States, during the rest of 
the 20
th
 century, depends on changes in China as well as the United States. And we 
cannot be confident those changes will occur.”73 Four months later, the journal published 
a letter from A. Doak Barnett praising Gass's “provocative article” which “effectively 
disposes of many oversimplified assumptions that people have about United States 
relations with China.”74 Less than three years earlier, Barnett had published a book on 
the topic which argued for continuing the policy of “containment with isolation.” But he 
was beginning to abandon this conventional wisdom, and take a prominent role in 
creating a new consensus. 
 Those who had long opposed current policies sensed the moment was ripe for 
action. Former Oregon Representative Charles Porter, ousted from office by the 
supporters of the Committee of One Million in 1960, formed The Committee for a 
Review of our China Policy in the spring of 1963. The Nation, long an opponent of the 
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Committee of One Million, welcomed the new organization as “the right committee in 
the right place at the right time.”75 This group would go on to have little direct effect on 
the debate over China policy, but it inspired the formation of similar organizations by 
academics and other China experts which would exert an indirect influence upon the 
Johnson administration. Even the Nation expected the organization to, at most, “disrupt 
the conspiracy of silence that currently sustains our so-called China policy.” Though 
there is no evidence the new organization played such a role, the silence was beginning 
to end. And that silence had, in fact, been what was sustaining the Committee of One 
Million, as revealed by how stridently its leaders would react to any future public 
statements by government officials questioning the continuation of the policies they 
supported. 
 That future would arrive sooner than supporters of the current policy could have 
imagined. Undersecretary of State Averell Harriman may have publicly stated in June 
1963 that U.S. recognition of Communist China “would merely aid aggression against 
China's neighbors,” but this by no means meant he was closing to door to any and all 
changes in policy.
76
 A month later, shortly before traveling to Moscow to reach an 
agreement on the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, an early attempt to use the Soviets 
against the Chinese, Harriman made an announcement “welcoming a debate” on U.S. 
policy towards Communist China. This set off alarm bells among steadfast supporters of 
the current policy such as the conservative Los Angeles Times. The paper claimed 
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Harriman's “out-of-the-blue declaration” was “the first in a series of trial balloons” sent 
aloft by the president “aimed at sounding out voter sentiment on possible overtures to 
Red China” which had “long” been under deliberation within the administration. The 
story identified Harriman, McGeorge Bundy, and Walt Rostow as the leading advocates 
of an “open door” policy, a term which would become popular within the Johnson 
administration among people who had also worked for Kennedy, though not with these 
three individuals in particular. The supposed goal of this “inner circle” was the ultimate 
adoption of a “two-China” policy.77 While there were numerous members of the 
administration advocating precisely that course, some of whom worked directly under 
Bundy and Harriman, those two never officially endorsed such a policy. Of the three, 
only Rostow could be seen as overtly sympathetic. Nonetheless, changes were under 
discussion, and those who opposed such discussions, let alone actual policy alterations, 
began to notice, and worry. 
 At this time, the strongest voices for change outside the halls of government 
came from religious publications, particularly the liberal Christian Century, a fervent 
supporter in decades past of Protestant missionaries in China such as the parents of Pearl 
Buck. Anticipating by nearly four years Richard Nixon's famous declaration that “we 
simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations, there to 
nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its neighbors,”78 the magazine argued 
in August 1963 that “keeping Mainland China in its resentful isolation, increase there the 
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scourge of hunger, and we create not a suppliant vassal state but a reckless outcast.”79 A 
month later, Commonweal seconded its Protestant counterpart by arguing that “in the 
long run our isolation of the Chinese will produce only calamitous results.” Spurring 
these sentiments was a fear of China's inevitable rise to true great power status. Only an 
end of the U.S. policy of isolation could ensure that “when China becomes a developed 
industrial and military power in the 1970's it will no longer be spoiling to tear the world 
asunder.”80 
 For the time being, it appeared China still very much wanted to do exactly that. 
The Christian Century further developed its fears into policy prescriptions, arguing 
“China should be brought into the United Nations” in order to make that polity “a 
responsible nation in an ordered and peaceful family of nations.” The magazine based  
this call on the future prospect for change in Chinese posturing and policies, rather than 
on their current utter absence. The arguments of those who supported hard-line policies 
were being turned on their head. China must become a member of the United Nations 
precisely because Mao was a madman. The article minced no words. In words that could 
have been written by Marvin Liebman himself, Mao's “call for worldwide racial war 
reflects a degree of hatred and desperation which can only be described as psychotic.” 
But this desperation was not a sign of the success of U.S. policy, but rather of its failure. 
China's leaders “have been isolated so long and so completely that they have lost touch 
with the realities of the modern world.” U.S. policy was not the result of irrational 
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Chinese belligerency, but its cause. Given this reality, a continuation of such a policy 
could only lead to disaster. Referencing the racialized terminology then swirling around 
China's threat to the world, the article concluded with the solemn declaration “the color 
of the peril to mankind may appear now red, now yellow; but the ultimate peril is the 
color of death.”81 Perhaps China could not shoot its way into the United Nations. But it 
might be able to become a member of that international organization by threatening the 
world at gunpoint. 
 Communist China's behavior during this period did much to vindicate the 
evaluations of those who opposed any and all American outreach to that regime. The 
Great Leap Forward's failure had demonstrated both the communist leadership's 
economic ineptitude and cruelty to their own people, providing further evidence that 
communism was a literal crime against nature. All the while, the regime continued to 
divert precious resources to the development of nuclear weapons, invaded a neighboring 
power, and supported the armed subversion and attempted communist takeovers of 
several other states in the region. As the China Lobby had long maintained, the P.R.C. 
was externally menacing but internally weak. Continued isolation would only increase 
this weakness and thereby decrease the menace that regime posed to U.S. interests in 
Asia and the Western Pacific. 
 Yet a growing number of individuals drew an opposing lesson from these events. 
The Chinese communists had endured the most grievous of self-inflicted wounds and 
survived. Their economy had been set back for a while, but their people remained 
                                                 
81
  “Rethinking China,” Christian Century, September 11, 1963, 1091-1092. 
 89 
 
quiescent and obedient, if perhaps no longer enthusiastically so. The P.L.A.'s 
performance against India and the government's increased support for the North 
Vietnamese belied any implication that internal disaster had diminished the regime's 
ability to project power. Furthermore, their ongoing nuclear program, if it succeeded, 
and it surely – and perhaps swiftly – would, could only redound to their benefit and to 
the detriment of the U.S. in the views of the region's population. Isolation had not 
brought the Chinese to their knees. Mao had come closer to achieving this, but even he 
had failed in this endeavor. There was nowhere for China to go but up, and the further 
that nation climbed, the more bankrupt and counterproductive the current U.S. policy 
would appear. China could not be defeated with hostility. Rather, it must be altered 
through outreach. 
 In Harriman's often inconsistent comments, there were hints that by early 1963 at 
least some in the administration were considering a variation on the triangular diplomacy 
Nixon embarked upon nine years later, albeit this time with an initial outreach to the 
Soviets cowing the Chinese into some form of cooperation, rather than the other way 
round. The Test Ban Treaty was the first step. With the Chinese isolated from the 
Soviets, and the specter of Soviet-American cooperation hanging over their heads, they 
would have nowhere to turn but the United States. However, the same seemingly self-
destructive behavior which had estranged the Chinese from the Soviets did not bode well 
for any friendly tidings to the Americans. Neither did the continuing intense mutual 
animosity between the American and Chinese people. Given this sentiment, a split 
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between the Chinese and their Soviet allies was more likely to be an occasion to punish, 
rather than reward, the troublesome Chinese. 
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CHAPTER IV 
“THE MONOLITH NO LONGER EXISTS”: 
HOW AMERICANS VIEWED THE EMERGING SINO-SOVIET SPLIT 
 
 On January 2, 1962, Secretary of State Dean Rusk convened a meeting of his 
Policy Planning Staff to discuss United States options regarding the Sino-Soviet 
“conflict.” For a matter of such immense importance, there appeared to be few, if any, 
available, at least for the time being. Director of  Policy Planning Walt Rostow began the 
meeting by declaring frictions between the two leading communist powers to be a 
“historic and unprecedented development” about which “no one knows what to do.”1 In 
the words of staff member Mose Harvey, “the monolith no longer exists.”2 Over the long 
term, Rostow believed such a development was “essentially favorable” to the United 
States.
3
 Rusk, as was his wont on matters regarding China, expressed skepticism. He 
asked Harvey if, even assuming the Soviets and the Chinese were no longer on good 
terms, their “objectives” were not still “the same.” Harvey bluntly replied that “their 
objectives are no longer the same.”4 Rusk hinted at such differences between Mao and 
Khrushchev when he termed the Chinese leader's foreign policy a combination of 
“Chinese imperialism as well as left-wing deviationism.”5 Agreeing with him on this 
matter was former Ambassador to the Soviet Union Charles Bohlen, who opined that 
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“the essence of the quarrel is that the Russians have become the Mensheviks, while the 
Chinese are Bolsheviks.” Emphasizing the ideological nature of the divisions within the 
Communist bloc, Bohlen argued further that “the evolving situation was not in fact a 
parallel to the divisions that exist within NATO.”6 In other words, Soviet troubles with 
China were in no way analogous to American quarrels with France, and Charles de 
Gaulle was no Mao Zedong. 
 The public phase of the progressive estrangement between the leaders of the 
Soviet Union and the People's Republic occurred almost entirely during the presidency 
of John F. Kennedy. His administration, along with academic experts and journalists, 
avidly followed developments, trying to discern the underlying causes of the acrimony 
so frequently on display, predict the future course of events and, based on their answers, 
propose how the United States government could take advantage of the evolving 
situation to enhance American security and lessen Cold War tensions. A variety of 
factors militated against bold action of any sort, and any kind of outreach to the Chinese 
in particular. Observers within and outside the government, and with or without 
expertise in the region, quickly reached the consensus that Chinese ideological 
extremism and racial chauvinism were to blame for worsening relations between the two 
regimes. These conclusions implied that increasing Chinese hostility to Moscow would 
entail more of the same for Washington. Conversely, a lessening of tensions within the 
communist bloc, and a revitalization of the alliance, would eliminate whatever slim 
chances there were to improve U.S.-Chinese relations. Experts outside of government 
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persistently predicted such a result nearly up to the point when this split had become 
definitive and undeniable. Government analysts and spokespeople tended to agree with 
the assessment of these informed opinion leaders. 
 At the same, administration perceptions of mass public opinion, whether accurate 
or not, further discouraged bold initiatives involving either communist power. 
Government officials persistently underestimated the public's potential exposure to 
information on this subject, which was nearly as plentiful as their own. It would have 
been politically perilous to attempt to exploit enemy divisions the voting public might 
not have even known existed.  Polling evidence that increasing numbers of Americans 
viewed Peking as a greater danger to world peace than Moscow suggested otherwise, but 
also indicated a growing fear of that nation. At the elite level of policy and opinion 
makers, those who least feared the Chinese communist regime, and believed its hold on 
power to be tenuous, tended to discount the extent of difficulties within the Sino-Soviet 
alliance and downplay the significance of whatever differences might have existed 
between the two nations. They were most likely to express a belief in the notion of 
monolithic communism, and to resist the idea of even tentative rapprochement with 
either adversary, but particularly with communist China. Those who viewed the 
monolith as an outdated notion also tended to see the Peking regime as permanent, and 
thus one the U.S. must eventually deal with in a more official diplomatic manner. 
 This was the significance of the dispute between Rusk and Bohlen on one side 
and Rostow and his Policy Planning staffers on the other. The first faction represented 
the past, albeit one which still held the commanding heights of policy making. The 
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second represented a future which would not be realized during the governmental 
careers of nearly all the them. In part, this would be the consequence of one policy area 
both factions agreed upon – the necessity of increasing U.S. financial and military 
commitments to the South Vietnamese government. Such actions would presumably 
both contain a militant China's desire to foment “Wars of Liberation” and not alienate a 
Soviet regime satisfied with the global status quo. 
 As implied by Rostow's opening comments, participants in the January 1962 
meeting offered almost no short-term policy changes. The lone proposal was Rusk's 
suggestion that the Sino-Soviet conflict created “a strong argument for establishing 
diplomatic relations with Outer Mongolia.”7 This lack of policy discussion might 
account for the fact that considerations of domestic and foreign opinion were also absent 
from this particular discussion. For whenever anyone within the administration proposed 
policy changes regarding “Red China,” public opinion was a factor under consideration. 
Complicating a shift in strategy or tactics were considerations of two audiences, one 
foreign, the other domestic, both potentially quite hostile and damaging to Kennedy. 
Numerous officials understood that blatant attempts to exploit Sino-Soviet tensions 
stood the chance of backfiring and bringing the two parties closer together. Outrage at 
being manipulated by a common enemy could override anger at a troublesome ally. 
Equally worrisome was the potential for domestic backlash. The Chinese and the 
Russians were both viewed by the American public as enemies. Positive sentiment 
                                                 
7
  Ibid. 3. That possible recognition of Outer Mongolia was the major public controversy regarding 
Chinese policy during the Kennedy Administration showed both the sterility of public debate at the time 
and the hair-trigger fears of any policy changes within the “China Lobby.” 
 95 
 
toward either was scant. Attempts to improve relations with either were apt to anger 
conservatives eager to accuse any Democratic administration of softness towards 
communism. Thus, even if Rostow was wrong, and there were officials in the White 
House or at Foggy Bottom who had figured out what to do about the matter, there was 
little chance, for the time being, of transforming their ideas into policy. 
 As befitted their rank, Rusk and Rostow dominated the meeting, with Rostow 
advocating boldness and Rusk urging caution. As much as Rusk would deny it in later 
decades, he still operated under Eisenhower-era assumptions that communist rule over 
mainland China was, in the 1957 words of John Foster Dulles, “a passing phase.”8 Near 
the end of the meeting, he raised the possibility of the People's Republic coming undone 
after the death of Mao, who was nearing age 70. Observing that there were an “awful lot 
of Chinese,” presumably making centralized rule difficult, Rusk asked his subordinates 
to investigate the history of executive turnover in China, particularly those moments 
when dynasties lost the “Mandate of Heaven.” The Secretary even speculated about a 
return to “warlordism” or “regionalism,” with the communist government losing 
effective control of Chinese territory south of the Yangtze River.
9
 Veteran Foreign 
Service officer Edward Rice, perhaps the only American “China Hand” from the pre-
1949 period to survive the purges of the McCarthy Era, was less sanguine, responding 
that “the Mandate of Heaven will be lost when the party, army, and security forces are 
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no longer responsive to orders from the top,” and that there was “no evidence as yet of 
such a development on the Mainland.”10 
 Rostow also considered the possibility for changes in China following Mao's 
departure. Yet he was thinking along far different lines than Rusk. Utilizing the example 
of Soviet moderation after the death of Stalin, he wondered if “we could give them a 
vision of possibility if they calm down?” An alternative policy, again marking a 
continuation of the Dulles approach, would be to “buckle them in even more tightly to 
the Russkies.”11 Tethering the Chinese to the Russians implied a cessation of their 
conflict, which many at the time assumed would occur with the death or overthrow of 
either Mao or Khrushchev. Implicit in Rostow's remarks was the assumption that 
personality played a large role in the conflict in addition to, and perhaps over and above, 
ideology, economics, and power. The Soviets, the Americans, and the western (or, to be 
more precise, white) nations in general had long expressed trepidation about rising 
Chinese power. As early as 1955, Khrushchev pleaded with West German Chancellor 
Konrad Adenauer “help us cope with Red China!”12 A revived and supercharged Yellow 
Peril had a way of dissolving East-West tensions, or at least held out the prospect of such 
a development. Rusk, on the other hand, warned near the end of the meeting that “we 
must be careful not to overemphasize Chinese Communist military and economic 
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power.”13 When it came to American views of the Chinese threat, in contrast to opinions 
regarding the U.S.S.R., the hard-liners and the alarmists were not one and the same. A 
rising global power could not constitute “a passing phase.” One could not simply wait 
for it to collapse. It would have to be engaged,  and might be worthy of formal 
diplomatic recognition. 
 In an October 1962 memorandum entitled “Being Nasty to Khrushchev,” written 
during the  Cuban Missile Crisis, Robert Komer suggested one way of discrediting the 
Soviet leader would be to “publicize the Sino-Soviet dispute more widely.”14 But by 
then, the American press had long ago beaten the NSC to the punch, publicizing every 
stage of the dispute far and wide. Though it largely elected not to cover events over the 
subsequent and critical two years, Henry Luce's Time magazine alluded to tensions 
within the Communist Bloc as early as February 1960. Time's two weekly news 
magazine competitors, the liberal-leaning Newsweek and the arch-conservative U.S. 
News & World Report, provided extensive coverage in August 1960 of Khrushchev's 
announcement  that the Soviets were removing all their economic and military advisers 
from China.
15
 Dozens of additional magazines and newspapers on both sides of the 
political spectrum began reporting on developments during the first year of the Kennedy 
Administration. Coverage dramatically intensified in 1962 to the point where, by the 
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time of Komer's proposal, few informed Americans could have remained unaware that 
all was far from well within the supposedly monolithic enemy coalition. 
 This informed public would have also been cognizant of expert opinion and 
analysis included in the news stories, which invariably poured cold water on the 
breathless reportage of the journalists. The pattern was set in one of the first major 
stories on Sino-Soviet tensions, which after talk of a “momentous power struggle” which 
had “suddenly flared into flames,” concluded with the qualifier that experts believed 
“each needs the other too much to risk an outright rupture in relations.16 Speaking with 
an almost monolithic party line, disparate experts on Communist China in an 
ideologically diverse collection of periodicals predicted reconciliation. In October 1960, 
U.S. News had five academic experts – three from the United States, one from Britain, 
and one from India - prognosticate the future course of events. None predicted rupture, 
agreeing that, in the words of Hugh Seton-Watson, “the Chinese will gracefully 
surrender.” A. Doak Barnett claimed “neither side is likely to ignore the immense price 
that a split would involve for them.”17 Both parties had too much to lose from even the 
appearance of a rift, to say nothing of an actual break in relations. The Chinese and the 
Soviets would each be weaker without the backing of the other party, particularly the 
Chinese, who desperately needed Soviet economic and military assistance to develop 
their industry and modernize their armed forces. Thus, it was only a matter of time 
before the Chinese relented and accepted the continuation, at least for the time being, of 
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Soviet predominance. Missing from the analysis of experts were considerations of 
prestige. Ever present were assumptions of the rationality of state actors. Leading 
officials within the administration oscillated between the experts and the journalists, 
migrating over time from the skepticism of the former to the credulity (and, from an 
American point of view, optimism) of the latter. 
 Even before the founding of the People's Republic on November 1, 1949, 
Americans had been predicting that Communist China would become a “Second Tito” 
and detach itself from the Soviet orbit. Sharing the world's longest border, the location of 
which had long been in dispute, particularly from the Chinese point of view, and being 
ruled by two communist parties whose relations in the past had frequently been frosty 
and occasionally poisonous, there seemed to be more pulling them apart than keeping 
them together. However, as Chen Jian and numerous other historians have recently 
pointed out, Mao chose the United States as his regime's primary enemy, and needed 
Soviet support to have any hope of pursuing that rivalry.
18
 Brutal and protracted fighting 
between American and Chinese troops across most of the length and breadth of the 
Korean peninsula between November 1950 and July 1953 sealed their mutual enmity in 
blood. Stalin's death four months before the Korean cease-fire served to, at least 
temporarily, bring the Chinese and the Soviets closer together, leading to a four year-
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long “Golden Age” in Sino-Soviet relations.19 But as Khrushchev's 1955 comments to 
Adenauer indicated, all was not well with the alliance even then, particularly from the 
Russian point of view. Writing in his diary from the Geneva summit in 1955, British 
Foreign Minister Harold MacMillan noted that the Soviet diplomats he interacted with 
on that occasion “are not keen on their Chinese connection,” since the Chinese absorbed 
Soviet resources while growing stronger, perhaps one day strong enough to challenge the 
Soviets for primacy within the bloc. He recounted a Swiss diplomat telling him that one 
day Russia would seek “a situation of peace with the West” and “friendship with other 
Asiatic peoples” to contain the rising Chinese colossus.20 
 Americans recognized the tension inherent in the Sino-Soviet relationship in the 
1950s, but believed any potential split was far in the future. Dulles did not anticipate the 
possibility of one before the 1970s, and believed the best way to bring it about was 
through a “stick” approach of antagonizing the Chinese – thus forcing them to rely on 
the U.S.S.R., to the Soviets' consternation – rather than the “carrot” approach initially 
attempted by President Harry Truman and his Secretary of State Dean Acheson.
21
 
American political scientist and future Kennedy administration State Department official 
Allen S. Whiting wrote in 1955 that while “certain groups in Communist China remain 
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dubious about complete and exclusive reliance upon the Soviet Union,” these factions 
were “too distant from the policy-making center” to have much influence.22 Soviet 
expert Henry I. Roberts wrote in 1956 that while from the Russian point of view a split 
“would be an incalculable setback in prestige and potential strength,” this did not 
eliminate “the possibility of differences” which the United States could at times 
exploit.
23
 In a 1959 article published in the Saturday Evening Post, Chester Bowles 
predicted that “Moscow and Peking view our fast-changing world from rather different 
perspectives and these differences may grow.” Furthermore, the “explosive new force” 
that was Communist China “constitutes a potential threat to the Soviet Union.”24 The 
problems China's increasing power posed for the future health of its Soviet alliance were 
also cited by A. Doak Barnett in 1960, when he wrote “it is clear that relations between 
Peking and Moscow have steadily become more complex as Communist China's stature 
within the bloc has increased.”25 
 Ultimately, it would be changes in Soviet Cold War tactics, not the evolving 
balance of power, which began to break the Soviets and the Chinese apart.
26
 
Khrushchev's pursuit of “Peaceful Coexistence” with the U.S. in the final years of the 
1950s alienated the Chinese, who believed the concept should only apply the the 
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“Intermediate Zone of Nations,” the less economically developed nations outside of 
Europe, North America, and northeast Asia.
27
 While Khrushchev's conciliation irked the 
Chinese, Mao's militancy estranged the Soviets. Furthermore, differing tactics led to a 
lack of policy coordination. Khrushchev refused to support Mao after his forces began 
shelling the Quemoy island group in 1958, precipitating a crisis which led to the United 
States threatening nuclear strikes in order to maintain Taiwanese control over the 
islands.
28
 Other historians have traced the tensions to the beginnings of the Sino-Indian 
border disputes in 1959, which escalated after China's suppression of the Tibetan 
rebellion and India's granting of asylum to the Dalai Lama.
29
 This rivalry pitted the 
U.S.S.R.'s closest and largest non-communist friend against its closest and largest ally 
within the Communist Bloc, placing Moscow in a delicate and ultimately untenable 
position. These tensions emerged for the world to see at the Bucharest Conference in 
June 1960 and the Moscow Conference that November, when Soviet and Chinese 
delegates exchanged insults and engaged in public arguments over foreign and domestic 
policy.
30
 Thus, by the time John F. Kennedy assumed the presidency, it was clear to all 
who cared to notice that the Soviets and the Chinese no longer saw eye-to-eye on a 
number of important matters. 
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 One of the first recorded mentions of the matter occurred in a June 28, 1961 
memo from Komer to Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. stating “the Sino-Soviet dispute may well 
prove to be one of the key determinants of the shape of the 1960s.”31 Most of Komer's 
colleagues at the NSC proceeded with greater caution, hewing to the academic experts' 
recognition of differences with a belief that these differences would not lead to an 
outright split. In an August 1961 National Intelligence Estimate, analysts predicted that 
“it seems to us unlikely” that the two sides “will soon find a way to resolve their 
differences.” At the same time, “each side is aware of the immense danger that would 
result from an open rupture.” Thus, Sino-Soviet relations would in the future be “erratic, 
cooperative at some times and places, competitive at others.”32 The communist giants 
would find it in their respective national interests to muddle along. A Special National 
Intelligence Estimate the following month extended this muddle-through period until at 
least 1971, concluding that their “common commitment to the Communist cause” and 
“common enmity toward the anti-Communist world” would enable the Chinese and the 
Soviets “to act in concert against the West, especially in times of major challenge.”33 
The reasons for this were that, should a break occur, “the very foundations of 
communism would be shaken.”34 
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 While members of the State Department did not dispute these conclusions, at 
least a few were eagerly planning for the contingency of worsening Sino-Soviet 
relations, as well as looking for ways the United States could accelerate this process. In 
the administration's first major internal statement on policy towards the communist 
Chinese in October 1961, the Policy Planning Staff identified “weakening the ties that 
link the Sino-Soviet Bloc” as their second most important goal, behind containment of 
Chinese expansionism and power. Employing Walt Rostow's favorite term during this 
period, the report predicted that “a timely spread of polycentrism in the Communist 
world could assist us enormously.”35 At the moment, there was little sense of how to 
further this process, or even how far along the process had already gone on its own. It 
would not be until the first half of 1962, over a year after Kennedy took office, that the 
State Department fully comprehended the extent of the rift. 
 Among the first outside of the government to spot the extent and permanence of 
the split was British journalist Edward Crankshaw. A longtime writer for The Observer, 
Crankshaw had served as an intelligence analyst during the recent world war, when he 
spent several years in Moscow, becoming something of a Soviet expert. Though not an 
academic, he did cross the line between journalist and expert on Sino-Soviet affairs, and 
ultimately revealed the expert's tendency to assume the two sides had no choice but to 
eventually patch things up. Writing in the Los Angeles Times in early 1961, he described 
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the “conflict” as “violent, acrimonious and fundamental.” Though recognizing the two 
parties had their differences going back to the 1920s, he placed the beginning of the 
“quarrel” in 1958, a presumed reference to the Second Straits Crisis.36 In an article 
published a few months later in the Atlantic Monthly, Crankshaw reminded readers that 
in 1956 he had told them in those same pages “all was not well between China and the 
Soviet Union.” Crankshaw placed the blame on Khrushchev's “too great eagerness to 
seek an accommodation with President Eisenhower,” which had made the Chinese “very 
angry indeed.” While presaging Mose Harvey by writing “so much, anyway, for the 
Communist monolith,” Crankshaw still concluded the Chinese “depend far too much on 
support from the Soviet Union to cut adrift entirely.”37 
 The focus on power discrepancy as both a reason for the conflict as well as why 
it would fail to lead to a complete rupture was also evident in other pieces published 
during Kennedy's first year as president. Writing in Commentary, Richard Lowenthal 
identified the “growth of Communist China into a great power” as “the beginning of the 
end of the single-centered Communist movement.”38 Reviewing a book by Marvin Kalb 
on the state of the alliance, Alexander Dallin in the Saturday Review agreed with the 
author that “it would be supreme folly to anticipate a dissolution of the alliance.”39 A 
few months later, the Boston Globe declared that recent evidence appeared to indicate 
Moscow had “battered down Red Chinese resistance to total Kremlin control of the 
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Communist push for world supremacy.”40 These assessments turned out to erroneous 
and premature. Two weeks after the Globe's declaration of Khrushchev's victory, 
Newsweek reported on “new quarrels between Moscow and Peking.” Still, the magazine, 
which the previous year had been among the first to point to the serious nature of the rift, 
concluded at this stage that “they need each other too much” to fight and “still face a 
common enemy in the West.”41 In October 1961, the Wall Street Journal quoted an 
unnamed “expert”   concluding no matter how much communist leaders may fight 
amongst themselves, they “have always shown an ability to close ranks against the 
common Western enemy.”42 A few days later, the New York Times echoed these 
predictions of Mao knuckling under by observing that “the time when Communist China 
could pose any real challenge to the Soviet Union in a power sense seems remote and 
may never be realized.”43 
 In the absence of new polemics or public spats, the journalists seemed to have no 
choice but to listen to the experts. Meanwhile, even among those who viewed a split as a 
serious possibility at this stage, there was a belief that the fight was merely over, to 
paraphrase Kennedy at a later date, how best to bury the United States. Comparing 
Khrushchev's strategic approach to Mao's, the editors of Time wrote that “while the 
differences may be immensely important, for the West, both flowers remain Red.”44 
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Such sentiment echoed Rusk's question in the State Department meeting less than two 
months later, which Mose Harvey emphatically answered in the negative. During this 
period, Rusk said as little as possible to the public on the matter. In a National Press 
Club Speech on July 10, 1961, the Secretary of State admitted “there is solid evidence of 
tension between the two giants of the communist world,” but that “he could not evaluate 
the severity of the rupture.”45 These carefully-chosen words told his audience nothing 
they had not already known for at least a year. 
 New evidence of increasing tensions was provided in November 1961, when a 
Chinese delegation walked out of a global gathering of Communist Party officials in 
Moscow. Alexander Werth of the Nation concluded “something clearly has gone very, 
very seriously wrong in Soviet Chinese relations,” yet he still predicted Khrushchev 
could keep the Chinese in line.
46
 Others were beginning to think differently. The Boston 
Globe reported at the end of that month that Averell Harriman's appointment as head of 
the Far Eastern Affairs Division of the State Department occurred “at a time when it may 
be possible to exploit tension between Moscow and Communist China.”47 This proved to 
be an apt prediction, because in subsequent years Harriman would become the only 
member of the administration to actually exploit the rift. However, at this time, while 
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predicting that “differences will grow,” Harriman “did not foresee a complete break.”48 
The monolith may have been dying, but it could still cast a powerful spell. 
 One can infer just how troubled a particular writer or speaker believed Sino-
Soviet relations were at a given moment by which word or words they utilized to 
describe the problems in the relationship. What started as a “dispute” or “conflict” in 
1960 became a “split” or “break” by 1963, with various other terms being employed in 
the intervening years depending on one's assessment of the relationship. The significance 
of terminology was alluded to in the introduction to the first State Department 
assessment of the deteriorating relationship in February 1962: 
 
“The words break, breach, rupture, rift, and split have all 
been used more or less accurately to describe a marked 
change for the worse in the special complex of relationships 
between Communist states. Whichever word one uses, it is 
obvious that there are meaningful degrees of change, just as 
there are meaningful degrees of deterioration in quarreling, 
sleeping in separate rooms, going home to mother, getting a 
legal separation, and being divorced, not to speak of 
arranging or undertaking the murder of the other party.”49 
 
After outlining the significance of the terms one employed, the unnamed author, perhaps 
reflecting the imperfect state of information he and other American officials possessed at 
the time, concluded with equal glibness that “by some definitions, the USSR and 
Communist China have already broken, breached, ruptured, rived, split, or whatever.” 
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He went on to qualify this assessment with the caveat “by strict definition, however, the 
word 'break' would be reserved for the cessation of a given relationship (or of any part of 
the relationship) rather than for a deterioration in it.” According to this stricter 
categorization, a break could only be said to have occurred between the Chinese and the 
Soviets within the ideological dimension of their relationship.
50
 
 Like the experts outside of government, this author assumed rationality on the 
part of state leaders. However, by 1962 this assumption no longer led to a prediction of 
eventual reconciliation. Focusing on China, the author noted the ruling party has had “18 
months” to consider “the consequences of its defiance of Moscow,” specifically the loss 
of economic and military aid China needed to become a modern power. Based on this, 
he concluded that Chinese leaders had made a rational decision to wait out the present 
Soviet leadership in the hopes that “a post-Khrushchev Soviet leadership will correct 
Khrushchev's errors, including his China policy.” This was a risky calculation, because if 
Khrushchev's successors proved just as unwilling to accede to Chinese demands, their 
nation would have “lost decades” in terms of development.51 
 With the benefit of hindsight, the author recognized that “there was little prospect 
of a genuine resolution” after “at least the mid-1960s,” so long as each nation's present 
leadership remained in power. This assessment was based on events which had occurred 
in the previous six months and forced the State Department to conduct “a new 
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assessment of the prospects for a break.”52 Another State Department report written three 
months later advanced this altered perception even further by describing relations 
between the two communist party leaderships as “in a state of near-complete rupture.” 
The operating assumption by May 1962, slightly over four months after the first major 
meeting on the subject, was that both leadership groups would attempt “to avoid a final, 
open break with its far-reaching deleterious consequences,” but would ultimately fail 
because “the differences that divide them are rooted in fundamental factors and are thus 
not subject to permanent reconciliation.”53 
 According to this report, the primary differences centered around matters of 
economics, geography, culture, and race.
54
 Missing from this list, interestingly, was 
ideology, which was front-and-center in the previous report, as well as in journalistic 
accounts of the subject. Based on periodicals searchable through Proquest and the 
Reader's Guide To Periodical Literature, as many articles appeared in 1962 in American 
newspapers and magazines on Sino-Soviet relations as had appeared in the two previous 
years combined, and those in 1963 would prove to be as numerous as in the previous 
three years put together. Nearly all mentioned ideological differences, which were 
occasionally cast as theological from the communist point of view.
55
 In early 1962, 
Commonweal, the New York Times Magazine, and Newsweek all labeled ideological 
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differences as the leading cause of the dispute.
56
 In this the journalists of the time would 
find themselves in complete agreement with historian Lorenz Luthi's retrospective 
assessment.
57
 Another explanation was more nationally, and at times racially, specific. It 
was expressed, perhaps in its most sanitized form, by Charles de Gaulle, who told his 
Minister of Culture Andre Malraux, who had been one of the few westerners to travel 
extensively through China during the 1950s, that “every time China becomes China 
again, she becomes imperialist.”58 Even the Nation, located on the opposite side of the 
ideological spectrum, and a fervent supporter of diplomatic recognition of communist 
China, wrote of that nation in July 1961 that “when she is strong, she is an incubus of 
massive proportions.”59 
 The notion of an aggressive national character formed a potent combination with 
the belief in the natural expansionist tendencies of revolutionary communism. Secretary 
of State Rusk had made just this connection in the January 2, 1962 meeting when he 
referred to “Chinese imperialism combined with left-wing deviationism.” Mao's rhetoric 
about China being better positioned than the United States or the Soviet Union, based on 
its immense and largely rural population, to survive a nuclear war as a functioning 
society, further added to fears. As Time magazine put it, “in Peking's view, war is 
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inevitable anyway.”60 Gordon H. Chang was the first historian to point out that the 
Chinese were seen, in the old mold of the Fu Manchu stories and the more recent 
incarnations of “Dr. No” and “The Manchurian Candidate,” as both fanatical and 
inscrutable, equally capable of blood-curdling violence and underhanded trickery.
61
 
According to the New York Times, which one was of the least likely forums for such 
rhetoric, there was a “temperamental incompatibility” between “the devious, secretive 
Chinese and the more extroverted Russians.”62 
 In addition, China was viewed as playing the race card in an attempt to undercut 
Soviet influence, particularly on the African continent. Writing in Foreign Affairs, 
Robert A. Scalapino noted how “Moscow has repeatedly charged Peking with using 
racism to advance its cause in Africa.”63 American government officials leveled similar 
accusations internally. A May 1963 NIE referred to the “xenophobic emotions inherent 
in the Chinese racial, nationalistic, and cultural pride and practices.”64 A Central 
Intelligence Agency memorandum from the same month found a racial basis in China's 
success in courting Asian communist parties away from Soviet tutelage.
65
 Furthermore, 
there was the fear this approach might prove successful not only against the Soviets, but 
against the Americans as well.  Writing from Hong Kong in 1963, Consul-General 
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Marshall Green argued that “In the long run China's greatest threat may derive from its 
status as the world's leading underdeveloped, non-white nation.” A break with the white-
led Russian Communist Bloc placed the Chinese “in a better position to exploit hard to 
handle, white-versus-colored antagonisms and differences between poor and prosperous 
nations.” Green concluded with an allusion to America's own racial vulnerabilities, 
warning his highly-placed readers that “as always, our success in foreign policy is 
heavily dependent upon our success in handling domestic issues.”66 
 Charges of Chinese racism appeared from the earliest days of the dispute, when 
Newsweek reported that Czechoslovakian President Antonin Novotny and Polish 
President Wladislaw Gomulka talked of the appearance of racial prejudice at the 
November 1960 Communist Party Congress. “The Chinese treat us like pariahs,” a 
Polish delegate was quoted as saying. Chinese Premier and Mao's then-designated 
successor Liu Shaoqi was described as displaying “Chinese madness.” According to 
Novotny, the “Chinese delegates' total Asiatic disregard for the value of human life and 
material well-being came as a shock even to the Russians.”67 In his memoirs, transcribed 
after he had been out of power for several years, Khrushchev declared that “Mao Tse-
tung has played politics with Asiatic cunning.”68 It was “impossible to pin these Chinese 
down.” Overlaying this portrait of sophisticated inscrutability with images of primitive 
savagery, Khrushchev  opined that “the Chinese don't recognize any law except power 
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and force. And if you don't obey, they tear your head off.” But Khrushchev disclaimed 
any prejudice of his own, warning that “if we started reviling the Chinese people, we 
would be stepping over the line that separates objective analysis from nationalistic 
prejudice,” and that was exactly “how Nazism got started.”69 Like Novotny, Khrushchev 
deflected his own expressions of racial prejudice by accusing his targets of their own 
deficiencies in tolerance. 
 Recent historians have placed the racist albatross around Russian necks. Utilizing 
Russian archives Chang did not have access to in 1990, Sergey Radchenko made similar 
points about the “cultural and implicitly racist notions of supposed Chinese expansionist 
designs, perfidiously concealed by cunning.”70 As the split became irrevocable in late 
1963, the Chinese and the Soviets actually exchanged polemics debating which party 
was more racist.
71
 Yet even while reporting this development, Newsweek declared that 
“for almost a full month Peking's propaganda machine has maintained an inscrutable 
silence in its bitter duel with Moscow.”72 It would seem that neither Americans nor 
Russians could discuss Chinese prejudice without inadvertently revealing their own. 
 At the time, there was almost no one willing to point this out on either side of the 
political spectrum. Former British diplomat Michael Gordey was an exception. While 
not using the term racist, he concluded based on personal observation that “the Russians 
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have always feared and hated the Chinese,” and that remarks made to him in Moscow 
reflected “a historic Russian fear of the Chinese 'hordes.'”73 But such observations were 
rare at the time. Western observers viewed prejudice as an almost exclusively Chinese 
characteristic. At an early stage in the split, Commonweal flatly declared “the [Chinese] 
regime is at once dogmatically Communist and unequivocally racist.”74 A few years 
later, the same magazine noted “the inescapable touch of racism in Chinese tradition.” 
Yet on the same page, the author approvingly reported that Charles de Gaulle proposed 
outreach to the Russians in order to “combat the Yellow Peril.”75 Christian Century 
claimed Mao's calls for a “worldwide racial war” revealed him to be “psychotic.”76 
Conservative standard-bearer the National Review, in one of its few acknowledgments of 
tensions within the Communist Bloc, argued that “as part of the the non-white world, 
Communist China is tempted to project the Manichaeistic conflict of class struggle on to 
the plane of racial struggle.”77 New York Times journalist Max Frankel, writing in the 
Saturday Evening Post, stated that “the Chinese demonstrate an insistent and 
ostentatious sense of superiority.”78 While acknowledging that “economic, national, 
racial, and ideological” factors all played a role, the Wall Street Journal noted in July 
1963 that “racial overtones have bulked larger in the recent rivalry as the Chinese bid 
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openly for yellow, brown and black support against 'Europe oriented' (white) doctrine.”79 
In a September 1963 speech before the the Massachusetts State Legislature, Averell 
Harriman argued the “racial issue” had been “injected by the Chinese” into the dispute.80 
No one in the United States accused the Russians of anti-Chinese racism. 
 Finally, there was the argument, advanced both then and now, that the P.R.C. and 
the U.S.S.R. were simply too big to succeed as allies for very long. Radchenko elegantly 
summarized this dilemma with the title of his book on the split, which alluded to the old 
Chinese saying that there cannot be two suns in the heavens.
81
 A 1963 dispatch to Robert 
Komer put the matter more bluntly by stating “the two countries are anyhow too big to 
be comfortably allies.” The same note observed that “Soviet actions towards China have 
shown, whatever the provocation, a deep and deliberate meanness.”82 As with Michael 
Gordey's similar observation, it was not made by an American. 
 Analysis about and speculation concerning the causes the friction between the 
Chinese and the Soviets increased in 1962 and 1963 as the depths of their disagreements 
and the vitriol of their mutual denunciations became apparent to all. President Kennedy 
first alluded to the ongoing split on January 6, 1962 when he mentioned “the 
fragmentation of the Communist empire.”83 Throughout that calendar year, the Soviets 
repeatedly denounced Albania, China's one stalwart European ally, while the Chinese 
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condemned Yugoslavia, the “revisionist” regime with which Khrushchev was attempting 
to repair relations. No one was fooled as to whom the true targets were. By the fall of 
that year, leading American press organs began describing differences as irreconcilable. 
In October 1962, the New York Times predicted that “a complete and open break” was 
imminent, while Newsweek concluded the rift had grown “beyond the point at which it 
can still be spanned.”84 
 The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Sino-Indian War, which began almost 
simultaneously that month, pushed the two sides even further apart. Mao condemned 
Khrushchev for backing down in the Caribbean, while Khrushchev, after supporting the 
Chinese in the Himalayas while the Missile Crisis lasted, soon retreated to a position of 
official neutrality once matters in Cuba had been settled.
85
 Time reported that the “split is 
getting wider” after Mao said Khrushchev was “jealous of China's growing strength as 
only a bourgeois woman could be.”86 A week later, the magazine declared “the split is 
real” and that “no one any longer pretended harmony.”87 Responding to this growing 
public awareness, Roger Hilsman, at the time Director of the State Department's Bureau 
of Intelligence and Research, delivered the administration's first public address on the 
matter in Dallas on November 8. This speech reflected the government's continuing 
public caution and official adherence to the skepticism of the experts. While 
acknowledging that Sino-Soviet differences were “very serious,” Hilsman maintained 
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that shared enmity towards the United States would lead the two sides to “patch over 
their differences.” Yet so long as Mao and Khrushchev remained in power, he did not 
foresee the possibility of “genuine reconciliation.”88 Therefore, Hilsman's public line 
was that tensions within the alliance were driven largely by personality. Unnamed State 
Department officials told the New York Times in late December that Sino-Soviet 
relations were “badly strained but far short of a complete fracture.”89 This contradicted 
internal State Department assessments from earlier that year.  
 Though their numbers were decreasing, not everyone subscribed to the notion 
that the split was genuine and its implications profound. In January 1963, in the lone 
piece written on the subject during these years by a member of the National Review's 
editorial board, Managing Editor James Burnham, the magazine's chief spokesman on 
foreign affairs, predicted that “the next twelve months of newsprint will tend to be 
dominated by oceans of such nonsense concerning Sino-Soviet relations.” While 
denying that “the Sino-Soviet conflict is just a fake,” he argued that China's meager 
capabilities, particularly its lack of nuclear weapons, precluded an autonomous foreign 
policy.
90
 The fact that Burnham, a strident advocate of maintaining the Dulles-era 
American hostility towards Communist China, fervently downplayed the Chinese threat 
was also significant. Once again, a China hawk was attacking the China alarmists. A 
nation need not change its policy towards an odious regime it did not sufficiently fear. 
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 Mao stopped mincing words and had the Chinese press mention the Soviets and 
Khrushchev by name in a lengthy January 1963 polemic. The American press almost 
immediately recognized this as the point of no return. Newsweek termed it “a turning 
point in the history of Communism” and, adding metaphorical flourish, opined that 
“Asian Communism, as hungry as a Manchurian wolf, is challenging the European 
brand of Communism.”91 Time also noticed the rapid escalation in tensions.92 In 
February, Dean Rusk termed the rift “encouraging,” “ideological in nature,” and of five 
years in duration.
93
 Concurrent with this assessment was the coalescing view among 
both the general public and the administration that the split was making China a greater 
threat to the United States than the Soviets were. Echoing a Gallup poll from the 
previous month, a State Department spokesman told reporters in April that China's “red 
star, despite the crushing reversal of its great leap forward, will rise menacingly in the 
long run and perhaps become a greater danger to free world enterprises than Russia is 
today.”94 
 Over the next few months, the print media eagerly anticipated a meeting between 
Chinese and Soviet officials in Moscow scheduled for early July. This was seen in 
advance as a last-ditch attempt to avert a complete break. Some expressed optimism. 
East German leader Walter Ulbricht predicted Chinese capitulation, and warned that 
western nations would be disappointed in their hopes for a split between “the white and 
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yellow races.”95 After traveling through both nations, John Massey-Stewart reported 
“few outward signs of disharmony” between the Chinese and Soviet masses.96 Soon after 
the arrival of Chinese envoy Deng Xiaoping (referred to in the story as “Teng Hsiao-
ping”), whom Life Magazine described as a “little Chinese tough man” with a “vulpine 
smile,” it was clear no progress could or would be made.97 The “gloves were off,” and 
international communism was “now grievously – perhaps irreconcilably – split.”98 
Isvestia quickly placed the blame on the Chinese, arguing they wanted war with the 
West.
99
 Time agreed with their Soviet counterpart, writing that Deng's proposal in 
Moscow confirmed “the Chinese were ready to prolong the quarrel indefinitely” and that 
they “still sneer at the Russians as 'Big Noses',” once again accusing the Chinese of 
racial prejudice.
100
 
 Isvestia turned up the vitriol in August, comparing the Chinese to past 
“outrageous aggressors and villains” such as Genghis Khan, Napoleon Bonaparte, and 
Adolf Hitler.
101
 Observing the escalation in “mutual recriminations and vituperation,” 
Newsweek predicted in September that “an open break between the U.S.S.R. and China 
will probably occur soon.”102 While not denying the reality, some American 
conservatives still doubted the significance of the split. Tom Lambert reminded readers 
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of the conservative Los Angeles Times that “the Russians and Chinese, as Communists, 
are united in a common hostility for capitalism and the West.”103 But by this point, 
nearly everyone not on the political right saw the split as genuine, irreversible, and, if 
handled properly, to the benefit of the United States. 
 Considering Rostow's declaration at the start of 1962 that no one knew what to 
do about the Sino-Soviet split, it was perhaps surprising that so little was subsequently 
produced within the Kennedy administration to fill this obvious gap. A May 1962 State 
Department report helped explain why. It concluded that “too blatant a propaganda 
exploitation of the Sino-Soviet dispute, or conciliatory gestures to either party to woo 
them further apart, might well have the counterproductive effects of strengthening the 
forces tending to drive them together, or of easing the strains of their alliance.” Still, the 
report's introduction predicted that “a far-reaching Soviet-US detente would almost 
certainly” lead to “an open rupture of the alliance.”104 The implication was that the 
United States should seek improved relations with the Soviet Union in part to apply a 
death blow to their alliance with China, but must refrain from making this intention 
apparent to the Soviets. 
 Given the opportunity to divide one's enemies in order to conquer them, it was 
understandable that, according to Hong Kong Consul John Lacey, “one is accordingly 
tempted to look for lines of action which the US might take to accelerate the collapse of 
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Communism and the weakening of the Sino-Soviet Bloc.”105 Those in Washington 
resisted this temptation, declaring a complete break would neither “end the cold war” 
nor “result in a decisive shift in the balance of forces that could be brought to bear” in 
either a global war or limited regional conflicts. At the same time, “a break would, 
nevertheless, profoundly affect the nature and course of the cold war” by reducing the 
risk of regional conflicts escalating into world war. In other words, the split reaffirmed 
the Kennedy administration's belief the U.S. could win limited “Brush-Fire Wars.” This 
was perhaps the optimistic reason the report concluded by arguing the split was an 
important reason for the U.S. to increase its military commitments in Laos and South 
Vietnam.
106
 A more pessimistic reason was offered early the following year by C.I.A. 
analyst Ray S. Cline, who warned that “the emergence of a separate Asian Communist 
Bloc, under the leadership of China, could have grave implications for U.S. security 
interests in the Far East because of Peiping's militant and intense anti-Western line.”107 
This reflected the common belief that the split would end whatever restraining influence 
the Soviets still exerted upon China, giving free reign to their expansionist impulses.
108
 
The split thus made a fight in Vietnam both easier to win and more important not to lose. 
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 At no point was there mention, even by those within the administration who 
supported improved relations with China, of exploiting the split to achieve that end, at 
least for the time being. On the one hand, there was the well-founded belief that at that 
juncture the Chinese would reject such overtures. Second, there was some desire to let 
China, as Lacey put it, “stew in its own juice.” Instead of affirming the need for an 
altering of America's policies towards China, Lacey saw the split as vindication of 
American containment. It was “the harvest time of our policies which have these last 
dozen years contained the expansionist forces of Chinese Communism and forced them 
in upon themselves.”109 A State Department analysis of mass American opinion 
concluded that, among the general public, “few see reason to 'exploit' the Sino-Soviet 
right by 'overtures' to Peiping. Indeed, some of those polled cited Red China's troubles as 
proof of the wisdom of the U.S. boycott.”110 Much had changed since Truman and 
Acheson hoped Mao would become the next Tito. By 1962, Khrushchev had long ago 
assumed that role, in both American and Chinese eyes. 
 Journalists and pundits tended to be bolder in their recommendations, while 
experts largely hewed to the White House's caution. As early as June 1962, Walter 
Lippmann forecast the emergence of a de facto alliance between the Soviets and the 
Americans to contain Chinese expansion into Southeast Asia.
111
 Others, particularly 
James O'Gara in Commonweal, advocated using the split to induce the Soviets to agree 
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to “acceptable controls of thermonuclear weapons,” particularly before the date 
“Communist China gets nuclear weapons of its own.”112 This was exactly what occurred 
on July 5, 1963, when Averell Harriman and his Soviet counterpart signed the 
preliminaries for the  Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in the Soviet capital while a 
Chinese delegation sat only miles away. Observers immediately recognized the 
connection between the Sino-Soviet split and this treaty, which began – however 
tentatively - the era of detente.
113
 Europeans expressed great optimism, with reports that 
British officials “see current events as the beginning of a historic switch in alignments 
which may see the Soviet Union an ally of the West in the decades ahead, with mainland 
China as the bete noir of the world.” The Los Angeles Times reported that American 
officials were “more modest” in their hopes.114 
 Throughout this period, the belief that two independent enemies might not be 
better than a monolithic foe remained a prevalent though minority opinion. The crux of 
this argument was that, since “Russia and China are unalterably bent on world 
domination,” they adhered to a common cause, even if they practiced different methods. 
A related argument was the fear that “the rift will spur them to try to outdo each other as 
capitalism's enemies.”115 Tactical and doctrinal diversity could have its advantages, since 
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“Communism now has something for everybody.”116 A more autonomous China could 
prove, if not a more formidable foe, than at the very least a more dangerous and 
unpredictable one. In this vein, Gerald W. Johnson wrote in The New Republic that “it 
would profit us little to have the Bear desist from growling, if it were only to give place 
to the Dragon spitting fire.”117 Americans had come to know the Soviet devil quite well, 
and grown rather comfortable with it. 
 In between these two poles stood Edward Crankshaw, who declared bluntly less 
than two months before the signing of the Test Ban Treaty that there was “no obvious 
way in which we can accelerate or exploit the great division between Moscow and 
Peking.” To his credit, Crankshaw did concede that “fear of wishful thinking” caused 
him previously to predict a Sino-Soviet reconciliation, which proved to be “wide of the 
mark.”118 In this belief, he had been far from alone. In his admission of error, he was 
certainly anomalous. Having downplayed the chances of a complete break in a book 
published in early 1962, by October of that year Donald Zagoria was downplaying the 
effects of a complete break, writing in Foreign Affairs that “no vast opportunities have 
been given Western diplomacy, no magic doors opened to the end of the cold war.” In 
his one policy prescription, Zagoria agreed with those in the Kennedy administration 
who argued that tensions within the communist camp enabled the United States “to take 
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firmer positions” in Southeast Asia “without increasing the risks.”119 Thus, the only 
“safe” way to exploit the rift was to increase the U.S. commitment of resources and 
prestige in Southeast Asia. 
 George Kennan agreed with other experts when he warned against “a fatuous 
fawning on any Communist regime that shows the first signs of independence,” a clear 
admonition against trying to make a deal with the Chinese. Anticipating what historians 
would discover much later, Kennan astutely observed that Chinese leaders needed high 
levels of Cold War tensions for internal reasons.
120
 Because of this need, the Chinese 
would refuse any deal deemed reasonable by the United States. A. Doak Barnett offered 
the conventional view that “this situation is difficult for the West to exploit.”121 Zbignew 
Brzezinski was more ambitious, and his proposals evolved quickly. Declaring in April 
1963 that “no empire or church has ever maintained itself with two capitals,” Brzezinski 
saw the schism as one of “those few moments in history that can rightfully be described 
as turning points.”122 At that time, he echoed the consensus that “it would be unwise to 
rush into a political and diplomatic, or economic, courtship of China.” Rather, the United 
States should continue its “isolation and repulsion of China.”123 By November, his views 
had undergone a sea change. Arguing that China's “basic national territorial interests are 
more directly in conflict with those of the Soviet Union than with America,” he now 
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proposed that “we should gradually extend options to the Chinese for the purpose of 
inducing them to moderate their policies.” This goal was a variation on Truman's and 
Acheson's original carrot strategy. In the first American articulation of balance-of-power 
triangular diplomacy – and what would actually prove to be one of the few – Brzezinski 
concluded that “a stronger China might press the Soviet Union into a better relationship 
with the West.”124 
 During the Kennedy years, such a policy proved impossible for a variety of 
reasons, one of which was fear of inciting public opinion by appearing soft on China, an 
acute concern for any Democratic administration in that era. Two months after their first 
meeting concerning the Sino-Soviet dispute, the State Department issued public relations 
guidelines for how to discuss these developing events with the American public. The 
guidelines stressed that “constant care” must be taken “to avoid exaggerating either the 
nature or implications of the dispute.” In addition, “any suggestion that the US is taking 
sides in the dispute is to be avoided.” Thus, official policy for the time being was to 
downplay Sino-Soviet differences and eschew the impression the U.S. was in any way 
trying to exploit or enhance such differences. In part, this reflected actual policy. Yet it 
also intentionally concealed some of what the administration was doing, particularly 
regarding the proposed Test Ban Treaty and other aspects of improving Soviet-American 
relations. It also somewhat contradicted the admonition that “the American and other 
peoples should be fully informed” about events concerning the dispute.” Compared to 
other foreign policy obfuscations promulgated during this period, this was comparatively 
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minor. While the government was not to overstate the extent of the dispute, it was not to 
minimize it either, or to deny its existence. One of the goals of public relations activities 
was “to counter Communist efforts, as to the present, to gloss over the seriousness of 
their differences and to maintain the fiction of a monolithic unity that no longer in fact 
exists.”125 The communist monolith had by then officially devolved from gospel to 
obsolete shibboleth, a Big Lie promulgated by the enemy. This represented both a 
revolution in official perceptions and in how those perceptions were communicated to 
the American people. 
 Fears about the dangers of appearing to take sides briefly became reality less than 
one month after President Kennedy's assassination. On December 17, Rusk and his State 
Department found themselves trying “to untangle itself from reports that the United 
States wants to help the Soviet Union in its rivalry with Red China.” According to the 
Washington Post, the source of this impression was “not clear,” but “in one swoop,” 
their policy, understood by the press to be “never appear to be taking sides, or you will 
get the worst from all quarters” appeared to be in danger of coming apart.126 That this 
occurred less than one week after a well-covered Roger Hilsman's speech in San 
Francisco speech where he explicitly and ostentatiously refuted John Foster Dulles's 
1957 contention that Communist China was “a passing phase,” was certainly intriguing. 
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 The breakdown of the Soviet Union's relationship with its closest and largest ally 
may have provided a catalyst for improved superpower relations.
127
 There was little 
progress regarding the Test Ban Treaty until Sino-Soviet relations irrevocably worsened 
in early 1963. However, it would soon prove a hindrance to the further improvement of 
this relationship when arms control negotiations beyond the NTBT began to be 
discussed. Years later, Rusk recalled how “in our bilateral talks they often seemed to be 
looking over their shoulders at China.”128 The Soviets no longer saw the strategic 
balance in bipolar terms, leading to divergent views as to what constituted nuclear parity. 
The Soviets tried to count the Chinese as a rival, or even an enemy, one for which they 
needed substantial conventional and nuclear forces to defend against. Thus, the Soviets 
claimed they needed to maintain nuclear superiority over the United States, not to 
overawe the U.S., but to deter the Chinese. This was not an argument American 
negotiators, to say nothing of the American public, were prepared to accept. 
 Like their Soviet counterparts, U.S. leaders believed they needed to increase 
military capabilities to contain and deter a hostile and dangerous Communist China. This 
helped lead to deepening involvement in South Vietnam, which also greatly complicated 
superpower relations. The Chinese appeared simultaneously bent on expansion but 
susceptible to containment because their supposed intentions vastly outran their 
technological and logistical capabilities. Their bluff had to be called. What those who 
advocated containing the Chinese in Southeast Asia universally failed to take into 
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account was that those who controlled the North Vietnamese Army and the National 
Liberation Front were certainly not bluffing. Polycentrism extended further down the 
power gradient than Walt Rostow wished to acknowledge. Had the North Vietnamese 
been nothing more than mere Chinese proxies, American escalation would no doubt 
have succeeded. But just as the Soviets could no longer control the Chinese, if they ever 
could, the same was true of the relationship between Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh. The 
monolith no longer existing created opportunities for United States foreign policy 
makers. But most of those opportunities would not be fully exploited for many years to 
come. The perils of polycentrism, on the other hand, would become apparent far sooner. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE “YEAR OF ACTION”: 
DILEMMAS OF CONTAINMENT AND THE SINO-INDIAN WAR 
 
 In 1962, Communist China appeared to be on the defensive. Wracked by famine, 
increasingly estranged from its most powerful ally and leading patron, and facing 
growing hostility from the United States and its allies, Mao should have been in no 
position to foment any new crises, much less launch a foreign military expedition. If 
Chinese soldiers were to fight that year, it would surely be on their own soil, and most 
likely against their own countrymen. This was no doubt what General Chiang Ching-kuo 
had in mind when he visited Washington in March of that year to meet with leading 
figures in the Kennedy administration on behalf of his aging father. According to Roger 
Hilsman, who talked with Chiang Ching-kuo for 90 minutes on March 8, the Taiwanese 
heir apparent told him that this was the time for his father's forces to “counterattack on 
the mainland.” Referring to “much trouble” in Vietnam, South Korea, Laos and other 
places around China's borders, he declared that  “so long as the Chinese Communists 
were permitted to exist there would be no peace in the Far East.” The regime was more 
vulnerable than ever, and “we must not let (Mao) escape the tight spot he is in today.” 
1962 provided “the best opportunity” for the United States and Taiwan to achieve their 
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shared and cherished goals. It was to be, in the words of Chiang Ching-kuo, “the year of 
action.”1 
 In this prediction, Chiang Ching-kuo was correct. However, it would be Mao, 
and not Chiang's father, who would do the acting, and in the Himalayas, rather than 
along the Taiwan Straits. By 1962, Mao's perpetual fears of encirclement were rapidly 
becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. His attempts to claim the position of leader of 
worldwide communist revolution had transformed the Soviets from benefactors into 
rivals. The United States maintained sizable military bases in South Korea, and was 
expanding its presence in South Vietnam. The de facto U.S. protectorate of Taiwan had 
built up its forces to alarming levels, and Chiang Kai-shek escalated his rhetoric to 
match. Japan remained a painful memory and ever-present specter in Mao's mind, and in 
the minds of hundreds of millions of his countrymen. To complete the ring of hostility, 
relations with India, once friendly, had been deteriorating roughly in tandem with 
relations with the U.S.S.R., albeit mostly for different reasons. Taiwan, through its 
American patron, could be restrained. But India, the world's second most populous 
nation and leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, formally created the previous year, 
could not. It would be the one to poke the dragon, and get badly mauled for its 
impertinence. Lashing out at the weakest link in the apparent chain of encirclement, 
China demonstrated that even at its lowest, it was still by far the strongest military power 
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on the continent, and capable of projecting that power across the most formidable of 
natural barriers. 
 As discussed in previous chapters, the Thousand Days of Kennedy's presidency 
witnessed unprecedented fear of rising Chinese power, with polls showing a decisive 
plurality of the American people – soon to become a clear majority – professing for the 
first time to believe that the People's Republic presented a greater threat to world peace 
than the Soviet Union. Journalists and academics, along with senior government 
officials, fretted about China's demographic, industrial, military, and economic potential. 
But all of this, with the possible exception of demographics, was still entirely potential. 
Unlike the previous two, begun by China in 1954 and 1958, Taiwan initiated the “Third 
Straits Crisis” of 1962. Both sides mobilized substantial forces, but neither fired a shot, 
and no U.S. personnel participated in any manner. The same could not be said with 
regards to the Soviets, who compared to the Chinese were paradoxically appearing ever 
more reasonable and peaceful in the eyes of U.S. policymakers and citizens. American 
and Soviet tanks stood barrel-to-barrel in Berlin, their ships steamed hull-to-hull in the 
Atlantic, their nuclear weapons ready to launch at a moment's notice  if either crisis 
escalated even incrementally. For some reason, Americans sought to put the Cold War 
behind them – at least regarding its primary Soviet aspect – during the most perilous 
period of that entire era. 
 Was this because Mao acted abroad in a manner even more reckless than 
Khrushchev? The lone foreign military action the communist Chinese undertook during 
this critical period of changing perceptions was a very limited foray into India. American 
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editors decided this merited front-page coverage, and their journalists labeled the 
Chinese the aggressors, and the Indians the valiant but helpless – and usually hapless – 
victims. One would thus expect to find hints of a cause-and-effect relationship between 
this action and perceptions of Mao as a new Hitler. All available evidence is contrary to 
this intuitive assumption. U.S. officials and the American press were shocked not by 
Chinese aggression, but by Chinese restraint. Mao Zedong's behavior, while in many 
ways counterproductive, was controlled and rational. Unlike the U.S. in Korea, China 
resisted the temptation to escalate. Its armed forces proved they could violate the 
territory of their most populous neighbor at will and annihilate whatever forces were 
brought to bear against them, but their autocratic master, unlike the actual Hitler, 
decided that was enough. While Chinese actions in no way removed the American 
stigmatization of Mao as a madman, neither did they further degrade his, or his regime's, 
negative reputation. 
 The Sino-Indian War of 1962 did inflict irreparable damage upon China's image 
within the Non-Aligned Movement. Friendly relations with India had been the 
cornerstone of that nation's outreach to the leaders of these states. It also contributed to 
the estrangement between the Chinese and the Soviets. The conflict offered the 
possibility of a split between India and the U.S.S.R., which in the war's aftermath the 
United States did its best to foment. As a senator, Kennedy advocated closer relations 
with India. Along with many of his advisers, he felt a genuine affection for that nation 
not shared by the previous administration. No group of U.S. foreign policy makers at 
that time could have been more inclined to exploit this apparently golden opportunity. 
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However, their sincere attempts ran aground on the shoals of the deep antagonism 
between India and Pakistan. Subcontinental diplomacy could not be refashioned based 
upon a Cold War template. South Asia was on the periphery of the Cold War, and its 
ideological struggles proved peripheral to the concerns of that region's leaders and 
peoples. 
 Kennedy and his advisers had long viewed democratic India as a symbolic, rather 
than a strategic, rival to communist China. The two giants would compete, not directly 
on the battlefield, but indirectly in the realms of state-building and economic 
development, each seeking to be the model for the non-white and post-colonial world. 
Yet the processes of state-building and national consolidation led with seeming 
inexorability to military confrontation. A successful modern nation-state must both 
exercise control over the entirety of its territory and protect that territory from armed 
outside incursion. This process requires expansion of state institutions into areas where 
central authorities previously made their presence felt indirectly, if at all. China and 
India found their interests in conflict almost as soon as their armed forces came into 
close proximity. Tibet's long-time status as a buffer was definitively ended when China 
inserted hundreds of thousands of troops into that region to suppress a 1959 rebellion 
against communist rule. During the revolt, the Dalai Lama fled Tibet for India, and 
soldiers from both nations clashed for the first time that October in Ladakh, along India's 
far northwestern frontier, near where Tibet meets Xinjiang, as well as along the border 
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of India's North East Frontier Agency, on Tibet's eastern border near Bhutan, in August 
of that year.
2
 
 It was not supposed to have come to this. India was one of the first nations to 
formally recognize the People's Republic of China. Beset by internal insurgencies, 
locked in an intractable territorial dispute with Pakistan, and lacking a large army, India 
was in no position to challenge Chinese power. Nor did its leaders desire such a course 
of action. Jawaharlal Nehru's foreign policy was based on independence and autonomy, 
which required good relations on both sides of the Cold War divide, as well as with 
nations on neither side. The culmination of this approach was Indian acceptance of Zhou 
En-lai's Five Principles at the 1955 Bandung Conference, which also proved to be the 
high point of Zhou's early diplomatic career. The principles to which India agreed were 
territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, 
equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. Zhou outmaneuvered John Foster 
Dulles for India's attention, embarrassing the United States and providing ammunition to 
Democrats who believed Dulles was needlessly alienating the world's largest 
democracy.
3
 In NSC 5409, the National Security Council had stated in 1954 that India 
and China were becoming antagonists.
4
 This proved to be excessively forward-looking. 
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By the time there was sufficient conflict to exploit, Dulles was dead, and Eisenhower 
about to leave office.
5
 
 The events which directly led to the border war began near the end of the first 
year of the Kennedy administration, and were initiated by India, albeit in response to 
Chinese provocations which had previously gone unanswered. For several years, the 
Chinese had been constructing military roads in Aksai Chin, within the far northern 
section of Indian Ladakh. This was an entirely barren square-shaped plateau about one 
hundred miles on each side, elevated approximately four miles above sea level. The 
region contained no permanent human population, but was an ideal location for a 
highway connecting Tibet to Sinkiang, which would greatly improve military 
communications along China's western borders. The area held no clear strategic value 
for India, and they had never stationed soldiers in the wasteland, which was shielded 
from the rest of Ladakh by the Karakorum mountain range, part of the formidable Pamir 
chain.
6
 Regarding how little value this territory held for India, U.S. Ambassador to that 
nation John Kenneth Galbraith quipped in his diary during the war in 1962 that the 
Chinese had “occupied it for two years before the Indians seem to have discovered they 
were there,” an assessment which was only a slight exaggeration.7 The Chinese entered 
Aksai Chin in 1957. India did not lodge a complaint until 1959, and did not station 
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soldiers in the disputed region until December 1961, when Nehru established his 
“forward” policy, largely in response to nationalistic outcries in parliament regarding 
violations of national sovereignty. This action violated an agreement Nehru made with 
Zhou in 1959.
8
 
 Scattered voices in the press quickly noticed something momentous was 
occurring on the proverbial roof of the world. That month, Time magazine proclaimed 
the end of Panch Shila, declaring that “Nehru's claim to a special neutralist magic in his 
dealing with Communism” was “not dead but severely damaged.” It also mockingly 
quoted the Indian slogan from the previous decade “Hindi Chini bhai bhai,” Hindi for 
“Indians and Chinese are brothers.”9 In January 1962, Reader's Digest reprinted an 
article written by John E. Frazier for the conservative Swiss weekly magazine Die 
Weltwoche the previous November, entitled “Struggle for the Himalayas.” Based on his 
travels to the Indian front, Frazier wrote that “amid the glacial ravines and snow-capped 
turrets of earth's greatest mountains, one of history's decisive political battles is 
gathering momentum. In simplest terms, it is a conflict over borders; in far greater terms 
it is part of the protracted struggle for the world.”10 
 In March, U.S. News reported growing sentiment in Washington that “sooner or 
later India is going to have to fight Red China.” Declaring the terrain “an impossible 
battlefield for conventional warfare,” the magazine claimed American military experts 
had reached a consensus that this would be “a guerrilla war that could take on 
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dimensions dwarfing the present combat against the Communists in South Vietnam.” 
The writer added that “the Chinese Communists are guerrilla specialists” and the Indian 
army was “ill-equipped.”11 The two-fold assumption behind these predictions was these 
nations were incapable of conventional warfare in such forbidding terrain and that if they 
chose to fight, it would not be a fight over mere strips of border territories. Instead, the 
Chinese were looking to challenge the internal legitimacy of the Indian state. Though the 
predictions of imminent war would prove to be accurate, prognostications as to how the 
war would transpire were well off the mark. 
 During these months, experts within the administration repeatedly downplayed 
the chance of war. A Special National Intelligence Estimate from November 1961 stated 
“we do not believe that Peiping will launch a major military effort against India during 
the next two years or so.”12 A National Intelligence Estimate released the following May 
did opine that “Peiping apparently desires to improve relations with India but it will be 
very difficult to resolve the border differences.”13 But this only meant the dispute was 
likely to continue, not that it would escalate into outright war. In the January 2, 1962 
meeting regarding the Sino-Soviet conflict, Secretary of State Dean Rusk warned of the 
dangers of overestimating Chinese power. As his example, he mentioned that “relative 
Chinese power on the North India border” was “considerably less that Chinese power 
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elsewhere.”14 The accuracy of this assessment depended on what Rusk meant by 
relative. The Secretary of State was correct that, relative  to the Chinese military forces 
stations on its other borders, those abutting India were slight. However, compared to 
what India could muster to oppose them, they were quite formidable. Four-fifths for 
India's half-million man army (one-fifth the size of China's) were stationed opposite 
Pakistan, leaving at most 100,000 regulars to guard the more than thousand mile-long 
border with China.
15
 China would thus face a potentially easier task concentrating 
decisive force in the Himalayas than along other disputed borders such as the Taiwan 
Straits. Of additional importance was the fact that this was the rare Chinese border well-
removed from American or Soviet military forces. 
 In August 1962, Time took note of the pressures Nehru faced, particularly “fears 
in Parliament that India will yield on China's terms” and “cries of 'appeasement'” 
occasioned by reports of possible negotiations.
16
 On what would turn out to be the eve of 
the war, Business Week predicted “a few weeks of skirmishing, followed by military 
hibernation.” Only in the following year would the fighting “escalate into a major 
conflict.”17 Meanwhile, Newsweek wondered if Mao's “aggressive policies on India's 
frontiers could conceivably provoke an open break between the two Communist 
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giants.”18 Nehru shared many of these assumptions. The Prime Minister and his Defense 
Secretary, Krishna Menon, made numerous references during this period to their fear of 
domestic public opinion if they were seen to be appeasing China in Aksai Chin. Along 
with the Kennedy administration and the American press, Nehru believed that any war 
between Asia's two giants would escalate into a massive conflict. In his view, the 
superpowers would not tolerate such a development.
19
 Domestic conditions thus 
necessitated that Nehru provoke China, while he believed the international situation 
would prevent the Chinese from responding too forcefully. 
 Because of a combination of greater public accountability and reduced fear of a 
political leader's wrath, democracies should engage in a more thorough processing of 
information – particularly negative information – within and between military and 
civilian bureaucracies, than autocracies. This would provide leaders of democratic 
nations with a more accurate picture of foreign threats and domestic capabilities. For this 
reason, democratic regimes are theoretically less likely than their authoritarian 
counterparts to initiate wars they stand a poor chance of winning.
20
 Yet India's showing 
against China in 1962 displayed just the opposite. Chroniclers of the war consistently 
and insistently highlighted a failure among the India's political leaders to acknowledge 
reality and process unfavorable information. Neville Maxwell, a British journalist who 
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published the most widely-cited book on the conflict, wrote of a “process of mutual 
delusion” between Nehru and demoralized, sycophantic generals.21 G.S. Bhargava, an 
Indian journalist who wrote the first lengthy account of the war, claimed that “only 
intelligence which suited the political thinking of the men at the helm of affairs was well 
received.”22 D.K. Palit, who was Director of Military Operations at the time, and wrote 
the most-detailed analysis of the conflict's military operations, called the conduct of 
India's generals and politicians “so inept that it verged on the bizarre” and talked of “a 
structured gap in communications between the government and the military” which led 
to the “carrying out of flag-waving operations in a logistical vacuum.”23 These 
comments could just as easily be applied to Gamal Nasser's performance in 1967 when, 
like Nehru, he believed provocative actions designed to appease domestic opinion would 
not lead to a vigorous counterstroke by a powerful enemy, and failed to behave as a 
leader who understood his army was unprepared to face such an attack. 
 According to Palit, the Indian General Staff destroyed all records pertaining to 
the conflict shortly after the war's conclusion, another action more typical of an 
autocracy according to those who believe in the superior war-fighting abilities of 
democracies. None of the other sources made this claim, and the absence of these 
primary sources from historical accounts could merely reflect an unwillingness on the 
part of the Indian armed forces to make them available. Surviving diplomatic records do 
provide a clue into what India's political leaders were thinking. The December 1961 
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invasion and annexation of the Portuguese colony of Goa, the same month Nehru moved 
soldiers into Ladakh, displayed a new-found aggressiveness on the part of the Indian 
leadership. The success of Operation Vijay against token Portuguese resistance left 
political and military leaders overconfident.
24
  The seizure of Goa, along with Diu and 
Daman, from a NATO member nation distressed American policymakers at the time, but 
resulted in no negative repercussions for India.
25
 Palit recalled that General Bijji Kaul, 
commander in the Northeast Frontier Area, or NEFA, assumed Chinese troops were 
demoralized and incapable of taking offensive action.
26
 This was probably the best 
explanation for why the Indians would provoke the Chinese on two widely separate 
fronts. In September 1962, Indian troops seized the Thag La Ridge in the far west of 
NEFA, near the Bhutan border.
27
 The Thag La Ridge was four miles north of the border 
claimed by India.
28
 Even by its own estimation, India had launched an armed incursion 
into Chinese territory. 
 India never expressed any hope that it could concentrate sufficient men and 
materiel on the Ladakh frontier to overpower Chinese forces in Aksai Chin. 
Furthermore, the legitimacy of their claim to the region was open to question, since even 
some maps from the British colonial period showed the territory as belonging to China.
29
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The border in NEFA, however, had been delineated by the 1914 McMahon line as part 
of the Simla Convention between British India and Tibet. No Chinese government ever 
recognized the legitimacy of this demarcation. Both nations officially based their 
respective claims on the borders of pre-colonial polities, the Kashmiri princes in the case 
of Aksai Chin for India, and Tibetan rulers in the case of NEFA for China.
30
 The irony 
that the Kashmiris and Tibetans were each fighting for independence from the nations 
which drew upon their past for territorial legitimacy was no doubt lost on the Indians and 
the Chinese. India's curious moves in NEFA in August 1962 could thus be seen as linked 
with those in Ladakh the previous December. Tactically, India might have been trying to 
coerce the Chinese by luring them into a fight on more favorable terrain. Strategically, 
Nehru hoped to barter part of Aksai Chin for formal Chinese acceptance of the 
McMahon Line. Finally, India's Prime Minister drew from U.S. experiences with the 
Soviet Union the lesson that communist regimes respected shows of force and displayed 
contempt for weakness and offers of compromise.
31
 Troop movements were thus an 
attempt at diplomacy by other means. 
 NEFA may have been the more favorable theater for confronting China, but it 
was still far from ideal. India stationed several divisions in the area, while all of Ladakh 
contained less than one.
32
 The terrain in NEFA, consisting of a 60-mile deep band of 
heavily forested jungles and mountains between three and four miles above sea level, 
superficially appeared to be excellent defensive terrain. Upon closer examination, it was 
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anything but, particularly in the face of an attacking force which had become adept at 
high-altitude fighting and logistics due to years of experience in Tibet. On the Indian 
side of the border, the northernmost roads terminated ten miles south of the McMahon 
Line.
33
 Indian soldiers closer to the border, to say nothing of beyond it on Thag La, had 
to be supplied by air. The mountain valleys south of the McMahon Line in NEFA ran 
north-south, perpendicular to the front line, precluding lateral defensive adjustments to 
counter enemy concentrations. General Kaul thus faced the unenviable choice of 
dispersing his soldiers in order to defend every possible avenue of approach, risking 
destruction in detail, or keeping his front-line forces concentrated but susceptible to 
being outflanked and cut off from reinforcement. On the Chinese side of the border, the 
landscape was quite different. The terrain was less forested, less undulating, and 
snowfall less common, making road-building and maintenance far easier. The Chinese 
could thus concentrate their soldiers for the attack  with much greater ease than the 
Indians could for defense.
34
 Upon entering Indian territory, the Chinese would face this 
challenging terrain, and have to fight nature in addition to the enemy. But they would 
prove quite adept at both. 
 The Chinese reacted to India's encroachment onto their territory in a deliberate 
and methodical manner, setting the standard for their behavior throughout the conflict. 
On September 16, nearly two weeks after the initial incursion, and while a brigade of 
Indian soldiers was busy entrenching itself on or near the Thag La Ridge, they formally 
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protested India's “nibbling” at Chinese territory.35 There was a certain internal logic to 
India's actions. Once the assumption had been made that it was imperative to defend the 
McMahon Line, taking the Thag La Ridge was advisable, since it overlooked and 
commanded Indian positions. However, it was vulnerable to envelopment, and all 
sources agreed that the Indian brigade in question, along with most of the soldiers in 
NEFA, were poorly-clothed and ill-supplied with weapons, ammunition, and 
entrenching tools. The Chinese north of Thag La, equipped with chainsaws, reportedly 
laughed within earshot of the Indian positions when they observed their adversaries 
attempting to use pick-axes and shovels to cut down trees to buttress their defensive 
works.
36
 This lack of respect may help explain why the Chinese took their time engaging 
the Indian forward position even while the enemy was strengthening its defenses. 
 After repeated entreaties to the Indians requesting a mutual withdrawal of all 
military forces 20 kilometers from the disputed McMahon Line, on October 20 the 
Chinese attacked Thag La in force, quickly overcoming resistance and crossing the 
border. By October 22, the day Kennedy announced the naval blockade of Cuba, an 
entire Indian brigade had been annihilated, and the rest of their forces in that sector were 
in full retreat to well south of the proposed 20 kilometer buffer zone.
37
 Also on that day, 
Republican Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper asked John McCone, the Republican head 
of the C.I.A., if any intelligence indicated a connection between Soviet moves in Cuba 
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and Chinese actions in India. McCone responded there was none.
38
 Two days later, after 
Nehru rejected mediation offers from Khrushchev and Nasser, the Chinese captured 
Tawang, the region's largest town, located 17 miles south of the McMahon Line.
39
 The 
Indians elected to make a stand at the Se La massif three miles south of Tawang, 
concentrating their crack 4th Division – which was better trained and equipped than any 
other Indian force in the region – at this major pass. Running more than 20 miles from 
east to west, and parallel to the border, this formidable mountain ridge was the 
northernmost defensible position in the western sector of NEFA.
40
 The Chinese prepared 
for an assault on Se La by building roads from the border to Tawang. They also 
concentrated a division on the eastern end of NEFA near the town of Walong.
41
 On 
November 8, the Indians rejected yet another offer by the Chinese for a mutual 
withdrawal beyond the proposed buffer zone. Despite the previous intransigence 
displayed by Nehru, this action surprised Ambassador Galbraith.
42
 The Indians 
maintained that, given the contrasting geography and infrastructure on both sides of the 
McMahon Line, such a buffer zone would in the future allow the Chinese to attack with 
impunity, effectively rendering the Indian side of the border defenseless.
43
 
 During this lull in the fighting, the United States weighed its options, particularly 
after the conclusion of the Cuban Missile Crisis. In a November 2 memorandum, Roger 
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Hilsman, while recognizing the opportunity presented by China's actions for “increased 
understanding of and sympathy” for the United States among neutral nations, worried 
about “overcommitment” to Nehru to the point where “our prestige is in his hands.” 
Still, Hilsman predicted that if the war were to be “enlarged,” China would come under 
financial strain while the “free world nations” could subsidize India's efforts.44 At this 
point, the United States preferred a protracted war, and believed India was making 
similar calculations. An SNIE from November 9 recognized that the “Indian strategy is 
to hold the Chinese advance through the winter,” and predicted an Indian 
counteroffensive the following spring. China's intentions were labeled “uncertain.”45 
Opposing this view was Ayub Khan, the military dictator of Pakistan, who during this 
period told Galbraith he believed the Chinese had “very limited intentions.” Given this 
assessment, Khan saw no reason to take the pressure off India on his borders so his 
nation's chief enemy could reinforce in NEFA.
46
 According to the SNIE, a continuation 
of the conflict into the following spring would lead to the involvement of far larger 
numbers of soldiers on both sides. At the time, the United States estimated force 
strengths of about 7,000 men on each side in Ladakh/Aksai Chin. The NSC claimed total 
Indian forces in NEFA stood at 35,000, with 15,000 currently in the front lines at Se La 
and Walong, facing approximately 20,000 Chinese.
47
 Robert Komer, whom historian 
Robert J. McMahon called “the administration's most effective advocate of a pro-Indian 
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policy,” wrote to McGeorge Bundy on November 14 that “our real problem is to keep up 
Indian will to throw the Chinese back next spring.”48 It hardly seemed conceivable that 
the Chinese would be able to bring the war to a successful conclusion in a week's time. 
 Before the fighting climaxed, Roger Hilsman composed an analysis of the 
strategic implications of the war for the United States and the region entitled “The Five-
Fold Dilemma.” After reading it, Komer told Hilsman it was “the best job, bar none, that 
I have seen to date. As you know, we got it right to the President.”49 That Komer wrote 
these words after the war's unexpected conclusion demonstrated Hilsman's far-
sightedness. The five dilemmas were ascertaining communist Chinese intentions, the 
future regional strategic situation, the Soviets' dilemma in choosing between China and 
India, and U.S. relations with India and Pakistan respectively. These last two were at 
cross-purposes and in many ways zero-sum, much like Soviet relations with China and 
India. “Minimal aid” would “probably not satisfy the Indians,” but any significant 
military assistance to India would antagonize Pakistan. That nation, while not about to 
become fully “neutralist,” would “persist in pursuing a more independent foreign policy 
than in prior years.” Meanwhile, India's pleas for U.S. military assistance were “bringing 
about a de facto change in its policy of non-alignment.”50 
 China's goals were, at a minimum, the security of Tibet, and at a maximum the 
transformation of Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan into Chinese “satellites.” Hilsman astutely 
                                                 
48
  McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery, 275; Komer to Bundy, November 14, 1962, JFKL, 
National Security Files, Box 322, Folder 13. 
49
  Komer to Hilsman, November 21, 1962, JFKL, Hilsman Papers, Box 1, Folder 20. 
50
  The Five-Fold Dilemma: The Implications of the Sino-Indian Conflict, November 17, 1962, 2, 4, 
JFKL, Hilsman Papers, Box 1, Folder 20.  Underlined in original. 
 150 
 
recognized that China faced multiple constraints. At the operational level, there were the 
“problems with supply lines and maintaining troop concentrations in rugged territory in 
winter.” Strategically, the P.R.C. had to worry about raids from Taiwan.51 In fact, that 
week U.S. News published an article entitled “With Mao Attacking India – Time to 
Unleash Chiang?” While not going so far as to propose that course of action, the 
magazine reported that Chiang was making noises to that effect.
52
 Finally, the suffering 
of the Chinese people meant that “little nationalistic fervor could be aroused for military 
advances into India.” If the Chinese communists behaved prudently, they would keep the 
war limited. Yet even if that were so, “Moscow can be hoisted by its own petard that 
communist aggression is a contradiction in terms.”53 Washington and Moscow would 
each have to choose which of its allies to favor, and lose some support among the other. 
But China and India were far more important to the Soviets than Pakistan and India were 
to the U.S. Even so, regardless of how the war concluded, U.S. exploitation of the 
situation would be a delicate process. 
 After the Indians launched an unsuccessful spoiling attack on November 14 from 
their redoubt at Se La, the Chinese struck on November 16 at both Se La and Walong.
54
 
Though it could be outflanked on foot a few miles to both the east and west, the Indian 
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Army believed the Se La position “impregnable.”55 Even if surrounded, the generals 
argued, the 4
th
 Division had access to enough food and ammunition to hold out until 
winter, which would arrive in early December. On November 18, a Chinese division 
overpowered Indian forces in Walong, and those at Se La embarked upon a chaotic 
withdrawal, during which most members of the 4
th
 Indian division were either killed or 
captured.
56
 That same day, the Chinese launched a final offensive in Ladakh as well, 
clearing Aksai Chin of Indian troops.
57
 Successful on all fronts, and facing no remaining 
organized resistance, over the next two days the Chinese rapidly advanced 30  miles 
further south into NEFA. Their soldiers now stood to the edge of the rich plains of 
Assam, a center of Indian tea and petroleum production. Galbraith wrote that November 
20 was “the first time I ever witnessed the disintegration of public morale.”58 Two days 
earlier, Nehru had declared a state of “total war.”59 The day before that, after the Soviets 
only pledged to deliver six MIG-21 fighter jets, Nehru asked Kennedy for 12 U.S.-
piloted fighter squadrons.
60
 
 Such an immense air armada was intended to both deter the Chinese from 
descending into Assam and to protect Indian cities from strategic bombing. Hilsman 
worried that “Indian morale might break in the face of Chinese attacks on cities,” which 
were in range of planes stationed at bases in Tibet and had almost nothing in the way of 
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air defenses to protect them.
61
 Such fears had deterred the Indian Air Force from 
providing tactical air support to besieged or retreating Indian ground forces in NEFA. 
According to D.K. Palit, the Tibetan bases lacked the extended runways and 
sophisticated maintenance facilities necessary for conducting long-distance sorties from 
extremely high altitudes, of which he claimed the Indian Army and the United States 
were both aware.
62
 Given the overall low state of maintenance in the Chinese air force, 
and their shortage of trained personnel, this was most likely the case. In the end, Chinese 
strategic bombing capabilities, and Nehru's request for American planes and pilots, 
became moot. Before Kennedy could answer Nehru, Mao intervened, ordering the 
retreat of all Chinese forces from NEFA on the night of November 20. According to his 
unilaterally declared cease fire, India must cede all of Aksai Chin and refrain from 
entering the previously proposed buffer zone in NEFA. China would do the same north 
of the McMahon Line.
63
 In the words of John Kenneth Galbraith, “like a thief in the 
night, peace arrived.”64 
 China's restraint shocked both the American press and the administration. Time 
opened its cover story on the war with the line “Red China behaved in so inscrutably 
Oriental a manner last week that even Asians were baffled.” Henry Luce's magazine was 
left to conclude that “the Chinese had less ambitious aims to begin with.”65 In their cover 
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story, U.S. News told its readers that “Mao Tse-tung caught the whole world by surprise 
when he pulled back from what looked like total victory.”66 Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for International Security Affairs Paul Nitze, who acted as the Pentagon's point 
man on the war, admitted in his memoirs that “the Chinese Communists surprised us all” 
with their actions. According to Nitze, the original assumption that “Chinese intentions 
were limited, more political than military,” had been superseded in the war's final days 
by a belief that “their appetite for more territory” might become “whetted by their 
successes.”67 In his memoirs, Hilsman quoted a Kennedy aide asking him “can you 
imagine the difficulty we would have with the Pentagon in pulling back and giving up 
territory that had cost that many casualties, no matter how great the political end it 
served?”68 Lord Caccia, a former undersecretary for the Foreign Office in Great Britain, 
claimed in 1966 that this was “the first time in recorded history that a great power has 
not exploited military success by demanding something more.”69 If only on this one 
matter, Mao appeared in American eyes less like  Hitler and more like Bismarck. 
According to the Boston Globe, “the Chinese never operate recklessly on the strategic 
level.”70 Some had sensed this even before the final attack. In mid-November, the New 
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Republic claimed “China needs only to demonstrate her basic power. That is what she 
now is trying to do.”71 
 Galbraith wrote in his journal at the time that the war's ending “would have been 
extremely confusing to Napoleon.”72 Searching for a more appropriate military figure 
through which to view Mao's actions, the Los Angeles Times quoted a resident of 
Singapore telling one of their reporters that if he was surprised, “go and read Sun Tzu.”73 
Yet the seemingly strange conclusion to the Sino-Indian War can also be understood in a 
Clausewitzian strategic framework as a limited war for limited aims fought with limited 
means. Mao recognized that, in a mere border struggle, India's center of gravity was its 
forces in NEFA, and once these had been rendered helpless, he could dictate terms. 
Furthermore, Chinese divisions were at the end of a tenuous logistical tether which the 
heavy winter snows would soon sever. Just as they had to attack quickly, they had to 
retreat hastily as well. A wintertime raid into Assam would have served no discernible 
strategic objective, and only further alienated global opinion. 
 Already, there were press reports of criticism from African nations and 
“disillusionment with Peking's talk of 'brotherhood.'”74 On a tour of African capitals 
shortly after the war, Zhou En-lai confronted “the reservations of several African 
leaders” regarding the war. The Sino-Indian War thus led to a convergence of global 
opinion regarding China, making it seem less reasonable to those who previously held 
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the nation and its leaders in some esteem and more reasonable to those in the U.S. who 
thought the worst of the Chinese communists. Even as internally the war was seen as 
demonstrating Mao's capacity for rationality, American propaganda abroad used the 
conflict as proof of the “ideological craziness” of Mao's regime.75 
 Mostly, the American press enjoyed partaking in a mixture of schadenfreude at 
Nehru's expense and hope for increasing friendship and cooperation between the United 
States and India. According to Time, nonalignment “was ending in disaster.” In the 
aftermath of the humiliating defeat, “India will never be the same again, nor will Nehru.” 
Gone were the beliefs that communism was not a threat, and that the Soviets could 
restrain the Chinese.
76
 Newsweek claimed that, by arousing Indian anger and moving that 
nation towards the U.S., “the Chinese have made a miscalculation of major 
proportions.”77 Nehru had been moved, in the words of A.M. Rosenthal of the New York 
Times, “out of a world of dreams.”78 The prevalent notion was that India was attacked 
not for its territory, but its ideology. During the war, the Los Angeles Times claimed that 
China's attacks were “motivated by the jealousy of the progress of the democratic 
India.”79 Writing several months after the war in Current History, Vidya Prakash Dutt 
theorized that “India had done too well for China's liking,” which feared that nation's 
experiment with democracy “gave promise of success.”80 This was in keeping with what 
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Chester Bowles and John F. Kennedy had said in the late 1950s regarding the stakes of 
India's success or failure as the world's largest democracy. In addition, the editors of the 
New Republic grasped the aspects of power which were involved, writing during the war 
that from China's point of view “India must be cut down to size and forced to 
acknowledge Chinese primacy, if not, in the last analysis, hegemony.”81 
 Such fears inspired Nehru's pleas for support. The day after the cease-fire was 
announced, Hilsman from the State Department, Nitze from the Pentagon, and Carl 
Kaysen from the White House staff flew 18 hours from Washington to New Delhi. 
Averell Harriman led the delegation in his first high-profile diplomatic assignment for 
Kennedy. They traveled on what was known as a “McNamara Special,” a converted KC-
135 jet tanker normally used for mid-air refueling, which the cost-conscious Defense 
Secretary preferred to chartered jets that included such pricey amenities as sound-
proofing, windows, and climate control. Nitze termed the flight “unbelievably 
uncomfortable,” and Hilsman agreed.82 Though beds were installed on the plane, the 
men arrived exhausted, examples of Galbraith's quip earlier that month that “one of the 
great problems of the world is that all crises are almost certainly handled by tired 
men.”83 When he wrote these words, Galbraith had Nehru in mind. Hilsman observed at 
the time that Nehru gave “the impression of a tired and very old man,” as well as 
someone “embarrassed” to have been put in the position of a beggar.84 Nitze, by 
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contrast, recalled Nehru as “a charming, impressive man” who appeared “dapper and 
handsome,” perhaps the only positive words about the Indian Prime Minister's 
appearance and demeanor during this period which have made it into the historical 
record.
85
 
 According to Hilsman' report, “our welcome was not warm; it was pro forma, it 
was withdrawn, it was very limited.” Harriman did not start the meeting off on a positive 
note when he reminded Nehru of “our association with India in World War II and the 
magnificent performance that Indian troops had given in the Middle East and in the 
Burma campaign.” According to Hilsman, Nehru “did not really respond” to this 
reminder of Indians giving their lives for the British Empire he worked for decades to 
expel from the Subcontinent. Conversely, the Americans were both amused and 
offended by the experience of having to walk by the numerous pictures of leaders of 
non-aligned nations which lined the hallway to the meeting room. None of these leaders 
had lifted a finger to help India in its hour of need. “The irony,” according to Hilsman, 
“was more than funny – it was oppressive.”86 No participant recorded observing the 
other great irony of the situation, which was that participants in the China-Burma-India 
theater such as Hilsman were returning less than two decades later to deal with a threat 
to Assam not from the Japanese, or the Soviets, but from the then-prostrate Chinese. 
 With the exception of Carl Kaysen, who was “very much in favor of a war over 
the Chinese incursion into Indian territory,”the Americans were largely of one moderate 
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mind on the matter,  Nitze, for once, played the dove, arguing for Indian acceptance of 
the cease fire in order to buy time to both revive Indian military strength and possibly 
resolve the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan. In his memo, Hilsman recorded Galbraith as 
arguing to Nehru that “a settlement of the Kashmir issue is fundamental to the problem 
before us,” namely containing China.87 Contradicting Hilsman, Nitze recalled Galbraith 
opposing putting pressure on Nehru regarding Kashmir, terming the matter “too 
sensitive.”88 In his published diary, Galbraith appeared to resolve the discrepancy by 
claiming he believed the initiation of a dialogue between India and Pakistan might bring 
about a “thaw” in relations, rather than a swift and comprehensive solution to the 
Kashmir question, which was what Harriman and the other visitors from stateside were 
pushing for.
89
 
 After a brief tour of what had been the NEFA front, the dignitaries flew to 
Islamabad, where they were once again reminded of how little the Cold War mattered in 
South Asia, even to a formal ally and recipient of U.S. military aid. Nitze recalled that 
rather than being distressed at China's actions, the Pakistanis “were hopeful that enough 
military pressure from Communist China would induce Nehru to concede the disputed 
territory in the Kashmir to them.”90 In a telegram, Hilsman reported to Washington that 
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“some in Pakistan really believe China was Pakistan's natural ally.”91 After ten days on 
the region, the party returned home, having made no progress with either nation. 
 Historians have generally regarded the Sino-Indian War, coupled with the 
concurrent Cuban Missile Crisis, as a turning point in the American image of the 
Chinese communists relative to the Soviets, an event which, in the words of Noam 
Kochavi, “consolidated the perceptual distinction between a hopeless renegade Chinese 
leadership and a more civilized Kremlin.”92 Kochavi was echoing the earlier conclusions 
of Warren Cohen, who two decades prior wrote that China's actions “undermined the 
argument that the People's Republic was not aggressive or expansionist.”93 The 
recollections of those Americans involved painted a very different different picture. 
Thomas Hughes from the State Department's office of the Director of Intelligence and 
Research wrote at the time that China “stands to gain political capital by following a 
display of strength with a display of forbearance.”94 Five years after the fact, and writing 
at the height of the Cultural Revolution, Hilsman claimed the “most portentous lesson” 
of the war was “the skill and sophistication demonstrated by the Chinese Communists.” 
The attack had been “a masterpiece,” a “single, limited, disciplined and controlled 
operation directed to and subordinated to a political end.”95 Nitze recalled how the 
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Chinese “handled the situation with political sophistication and military skill.”96 
American press outlets normally quite hostile to the Chinese communist leadership also 
highlighted Mao's forbearance and moderation, using the war largely as an occasion to 
heap scorn upon Nehru rather than stoke fears of China. There had already been plenty 
of opportunities for that, and there would be many more in the future. 
 Stereotypes about the communist Chinese way of warfare were belied not only 
by their limited aims, but also by the methods used to achieve them. Komer wrote to 
Bundy that early reports indicated  victory was less the result of “overwhelming Chicom 
superiority than Indian ineptitude.” On the contrary, the “Indians seem to have had 
numerical superiority at certain points.”97 G.S. Bhargava claimed in 1964 that the 
Chinese followed the pattern established during the Korean war of combining 
outflanking maneuvers with “human sea” frontal attacks. 98 D.K. Palit, in his more 
thorough account from 1990, countered that “Chinese strengths were greatly 
exaggerated” and that Indians had local numerical superiority in certain key battles, 
concurring with Komer.
99
 At most, China deployed three divisions to the NEFA front, 
about equal to the Indian forces they faced.
100
 Rather than rely on their proverbial 
hordes, the Chinese prevailed with superior weapons, training, and logistics. In other 
words, they behaved very much as a modern western army would aspire to. 
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 Before this final offensive, Gerald Johnson of the New Republic wrote that “it is 
possible that we may discover that we had been giving almost all our attention to the 
secondary, rather than the primary crisis. While Castro was making threatening gestures 
toward the US, the Chinese were actually spilling into India.”101 In the aftermath of the 
conflict, the greatest fear among U.S. policymakers was that, now that China had proved 
they could attack Indian border posts with impunity, they might do so again. Hughes 
wrote to Rusk on the day of the cease-fire that “the long-range threat from Communist 
China will persist even if negotiations are successful.”102 Hilsman's November 30 
telegram from Pakistan predicted that China was “unlikely [to] attempt [an] invasion 
now, but at some time in [the] long run might well.”103 As an academic, Allen Whiting 
wrote in 1975 “the fact that China had crossed the Himalayas in military force for the 
first time in modern history was a fact of overriding importance whose implications were 
to be felt throughout Asia for at least the rest of the decade.”104 As an official in 
Kennedy's State Department, he warned “so long as Peiping's supply lines remain intact 
through Sinkiang and Tibet, Communist China will enjoy the strategic advantage in 
raising the ante and threatening further military action as compared to India's ability to 
maintain adequate defense strength.” Given this unsettling fact, Whiting suggested that 
“attention might be given” to supporting guerrilla operations in Sinkiang, Tibet, and 
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Yunnan to cut these supply lines.
105
 The Chinese communists rapidly crushed the 
Tibetan insurgents who were in part armed and trained by the C.I.A. during the previous 
decade, making future uprisings in that region unlikely, to say nothing about the adjacent 
provinces. That Whiting would make such a proposal indicated the extent it was 
believed the U.S. needed to go in order to effectively deter China on its southern flank. 
 The Sino-Indian War demonstrated both the inability of even China's largest 
Asian neighbor to stand up to the communist giant without substantial American 
assistance and the unwillingness of China to take unnecessary risks to exploit that fact. It 
thus proved to be a poor example of China posing a grave threat to world peace and an 
American-dominated global order. Those who during the next few years used the threat 
of Chinese expansionism to argue in the American press for an increased military 
presence in Southeast Asia failed to employ China's actions towards India as proof of 
that nations' menace. Marvin Liebman, leader of the Committee of One Million, did 
bring up the war in an internal memorandum on December 31, 1963, writing “with the 
retreat from the Great Leap Forward came the invasion of India. Does this indicate any 
real change – except for the worse?”106 But this line of thinking was not echoed by the 
many media outlets sympathetic to Liebman's point of view, or in his organization's 
press releases. Their attention shifted to China's worsening relations with the Soviets, the 
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Chinese nuclear program, and events in South Vietnam. An inconvenient war for both 
superpowers, it would soon be forgotten by each of them, as well as many others. 
  
 164 
 
CHAPTER VI 
YELLOW PERIL WITH A TINGE OF RED: 
CHANGING IMAGES OF THE CHINESE IN THE TIME OF CAMELOT 
 
 Robert Heinlein's bestselling science fiction novel Starship Troopers, published 
in 1959, depicts a future global society very different from that of his own time. The 
differences are as much political as technological, and the former were brought about in 
large part by the rise of communist China. In Heinlein's imaginary future, by the 1980s 
the Cold War had become a thing of the past, and a world war was fought “between the 
Russo-Anglo-American Alliance and the Chinese Hegemony.” The war ended 
inconclusively with “the negotiated treaty of New Delhi,” which notably failed to 
mandate the return of 60,000 Alliance prisoners-of-war from Chinese custody. This 
would seem to indicate the Chinese, though fighting alone, got the better of their 
combined adversaries, as would the fact that shortly after the war the societies and 
governments of their opponents quickly collapsed. Jobless, bitter, but trained to fight, the 
veterans from what had been Britain, Russia, and the United States stepped in to “fill the 
vacuum” and end the anarchy. They may have “lost a war” abroad, but they would win 
the peace at home.
1
 
 The veterans established a praetorian democracy in which only the few who had 
served in the armed forces possessed the franchise, albeit only after they had completed 
their service, thus preventing complete praetorianism. Armies would be numerically 
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small but extremely well-armed, the mass conscription forces of the past having been 
discredited as untrained mobs from the first stalemated war with China in Korea until the 
last failed effort against that nation in the 1980s. China's position at the pinnacle of 
power would itself prove fleeting, as evidenced by the soldiers having read “Tsing's 
classic Collapse of the Golden Hegemony.”2 Government by military veterans would 
thereafter become a global phenomenon, enabling a unified planet to successfully defeat 
giant communistic alien insects in the distant future. Left unsaid, but heavily implied, 
was that such a post-democratic polity might have been the only way to defeat the 
Chinese. Either way, the rise of China meant the death not only of western supremacy, 
but of western liberal democracy. 
 Heinlein was not the first American author of fiction to envision a war between 
the united white nations of the world and an expansionist China, nor was he the first to 
predict a Chinese victory. But he was the first to have done so in over a generation, one 
of the few to place the war within his – and his readers' – own potential lifetime, and the 
first to forecast a Chinese victory unaided by allies or overseas “Fifth Columns.” 
Coming only six years after the end of the Korean War, when Chinese armies compelled 
U.S. soldiers and marines to embark on the longest retreat in their nation's proud military 
history, and at a time when communist China appeared to be on a path of unprecedented 
and inexorable demographic and economic growth, Heinlein's vision of the near future 
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had a certain surface plausibility, one that would be echoed four years later by the 
historian Arnold Toynbee.
3
 
 More than six decades earlier, in the aftermath of China's humiliating military 
defeat at the hands of the neighboring Japanese, the editors of Harper's Weekly, in an 
essay which assessed the potential Japanese threat and found it wanting, made reference 
to widespread speculation about China's potential. They noted how “a great many 
thoughtful people have believed that if we should succeed in teaching our methods to the 
Chinese we might pay dearly for it.” They warned, with measured understatement, that 
“if we could teach China to use her resources in war as Germany has used hers, the 
result might be unpleasant.” Swiftly shifting tone, the authors speculated that “a 
Mongolian domination of the human race would be a calamity worse than the Deluge.” 
Still, they concluded “this danger, if it ever existed, was always remote.”4 After all, at 
that time, the western powers were waxing, and the backward, corrupt, seemingly 
incurious Qing Dynasty was rapidly disintegrating. 
 The global picture in 1961 was very different. Germany and Japan had 
spectacularly risen and fallen. The British and the French were ingloriously unwinding 
their once globe-spanning empires. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. stood supreme, at least for 
the time being. The Chinese – united, modernizing, and aggressive – seemed to be on the 
precipice of outgrowing and challenging their Soviet patron. On its immediate periphery, 
China had been challenging, confounding, and at times humiliating their American 
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adversaries for more than a decade. As the superpower conflict seemed to be entering a 
new, more stable epoch, the Chinese threat loomed ever larger in the American psyche. 
Longstanding racial fears combined with more recent geopolitical realities to revive the 
old Yellow Peril with a new reddish tinge. Though it would later extend to a variety of 
media, during the years of the Kennedy administration these fears were reflected most 
prominently in the motion pictures “The Manchurian Candidate” and “Dr. No,” as well 
as “55 Days At Peking” and “Satan Never Sleeps.” Chinese villains became more 
prominent, more worldly, and more ambitious. They gradually escaped from Russian 
servitude. Hollywood repurposed past stereotypes for the Space Age and the Cold War. 
 This process entailed an unprecedented decoupling in American culture of the 
foreign Chinese from the Chinese residing in America. As the foreign Chinese became 
bloodthirsty communists, their cousins in the U.S. became genuine full-blooded 
Americans. The experience of Chinese-Americans during the Cold War came to diverge 
drastically from that of German-Americans during the First World War or Japanese-
Americans during the second. The perceived threat of Chinese-Americans seemed to 
decrease in direct proportion to increases in the perceived threat from the People's 
Republic. This process was reflected most indelibly in the movie adaptation of the 
Rogers and Hammerstein musical “Flower Drum Song.” As the proverbial Chinese 
hordes threatened to overrun Asia, across the Pacific the “Heathen Chinee” was on his 
way to becoming the “Model Minority.” 
 Those who have most closely studied the history of the Chinese experience in 
America, as well as the history of the American image of Chinese people and Chinese 
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culture, unanimously conclude that white America's fear and loathing of all things China 
long preceded the first appearance of actual Chinese people on U.S. soil. According to 
these scholars, the wave of anti-Chinese prejudice and mob violence which culminated 
in the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, the first U.S. immigration law to single out and 
exclude a specific ethnicity or nationality, was not a reaction to competition for low-
wage jobs between Chinese and European immigrants in places like San Francisco. 
Instead, these acts were merely the sprouting of seeds which had been planted long ago 
and were regularly reflected in American media and cultural artifacts both high and low. 
According to Stanford Lyman, who in 1974 wrote the one of the first general histories of 
the experiences of the Chinese in America, “by the time the Chinese made their 
appearance on American shores they had been preceded by a richly embellished but 
almost entirely negative stereotypy.”5  Stuart Creighton Miller, who in 1969 published 
the first study of early American images of the Chinese, concurred, writing that “the 
unfavorable image of the Chinese is discernible among American opinion makers long 
before the first Celestial gold seeker set foot upon California soil.”6 The American press 
described China as “an unalloyed despotism,” its people a “godless, immoral, and vice-
ridden body of pagans.”7 Whereas colonial American elites frequently felt a sort of naïve 
and sentimental fondness for Chinese culture and civilization similar to that of 
contemporaneous Enlightenment-era European elites, the new republic viewed China as 
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its mirror opposite, “singularly impervious to nineteenth-century ideals of progress, 
liberty, and civilization to which an emergent modern America was fervently 
committed.”8 This assessment ultimately served to “arouse fear and suspicion about 
Chinese immigration to America and to transfer the horror imputed to the Chinese polity 
onto individual Chinese immigrants.”9 These sentiments were evident in newspapers and 
magazines published throughout the United States, not merely on the west coast where 
the Chinese arrived and settled in the largest numbers. 
 Basing his assessment on Edward Said's concept of Orientalism, Gary Okihiro 
identified the origins of the Yellow Peril in “Asiatic stereotypes going back to ancient 
Greeks such as Herodotus, Hippocrates, Aristotle, and Arrian.”10 William Wu dated it to 
the 13
th
 century Mongol invasions of Europe, which he defined as the only time East 
Asians and Europeans met in large numbers and “resided permanently in the same land 
until they both entered the Pacific coast of the United States from opposite directions.” 
Wu's research led him to agree with Lyman and Miller that “when the Chinese 
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immigrants first arrived in the United states, they came into a society that already viewed 
them with hostility and condescension.”11 
 
The first novel to depict a Chinese invasion of the United States was P.W. 
Dooner's 1880 bestseller Last Days of the Republic, in which rural and urban capitalists 
welcome low-cost Chinese labor onto southern plantations and into New England mills. 
Expanding numerically and geographically, Chinese-Americans gain political rights and 
power, conduct military training, and eventually rebel from and conquer the American 
nation.
12
 Dooner set the standard for future works by depicting the Chinese as “masses 
of mindless automata.”13 In his view, Chinese immigrants were the “Trojan horse of 
Chinese imperial ambitions.”14 Ten years later, Arthur Dudley Winton published 
Looking Further Backward. An unauthorized sequel to Edward Bellamy's landmark 
work of futurism from three years earlier, its narrator was Professor Wun Lung Lai, the 
successor to Bellamy's narrator Julian West as professor of modern history at Shawmut 
College. He regaled readers with the story of the Chinese takeover of the United States 
in the year 2020, two decades beyond the setting for Bellamy's American socialist 
utopia.
15
 In 1893, William Ward Crane introduced the specter of an imminent black-
yellow alliance in his short story “The Year 1899,” the tale of an unsuccessful attack on 
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United States by a rejuvenated China and militant black West Indians. In that story, the 
Japanese allied with the white nations, and helped provide the margin of victory.
16
 This 
positive perception of the Japanese changed after their military triumph over Russia in 
1905.
17
 Ray Norton's 1907 book The Vanishing Fleets and John Ulrich Giesy's 1914 All 
For His Country both described the successful use of technological superweapons to 
defeat Japanese invasions of the American mainland.
18
   Unlike in the Chinese invasion 
stories, the Japanese always lost. 
 By then, Chinese villainy had assumed individual, rather than mass, form in the 
character of Dr. Fu Manchu, the creation of English writer Sax Rohmer. Described by 
William Wu as “the first Asian role of prominence in modern literature to have a large 
American readership,” Fu Manchu was introduced in a trilogy of novels published 
between 1913 and 1917. In the first of these books, The Insidious Fu Manchu, which 
was reprinted in 1961, he is described as “the yellow peril incarnate in one man,” 
possessed of “all the cruel cunning of an entire Eastern race, accumulated in one giant 
intellect.” In these novels, Fu's arch-enemy was British secret agent Sir Denis Nayland 
Smith. Capitalizing on the American popularity of his works, which had been set on the 
British Isles, Rohmer wrote additional short stories featuring Fu Manchu in Collier's 
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Magazine in the late 1920s, and produced dozens of additional Fu Manchu novels, often 
with American settings and American heroes, from the 1930s until 1959.
19
 
 While Wu focused extensively on the depiction of Chinese in the pulp detective 
fiction of the early and middle 20
th
 century, he notably failed to take note of the Chinese 
presence in American science fiction, even while mentioning that the Fu Mancu novels 
featured numerous elements of that then-emerging genre.
20
 This was unfortunate, 
because when it came to science fiction, the yellow peril was literally present at the 
creation. Hugo Gernsback, who coined the term “science fiction,” published Philip 
Francis Nowlon's short story “Armageddon 2419 A.D.” in his magazine Amazing Stories 
in 1928. That story, which was novelized as Armageddon 2419 in 1962, featured 
Anthony Rogers, who fights a “Mongol” invasion of the United States launched in that 
year.
21
 In 1929, Nowlon teamed up with artist Dick Calkins, changed Anthony Rogers's 
first name to Buck, and began producing The Adventures of Buck Rogers in the 25
th
 
Century, the “first science fiction comic strip.” In 1934, Alex Raymond started the 
comic strip Flash Gordon to compete with Buck Rogers. Raymond created a world 
“dominated by the yellow peril,” in which the hero battles “Ming the Merciless” from 
planet Mongo.
22
 Flash Gordon soon became the basis for a popular series of movie 
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serials, which George Lucas later credited as the original inspiration for his “Star Wars” 
films. 
 Isaiah Lavender III has connected the spate of such invasion stories to “the 
growing sense of American nationalism,” as well as the intellectual prevalence of Social 
Darwinism.
23
 Perhaps no work better reflected this milieu than Jack London's 
controversial short story “The Unparalleled Invasion,” written in 1907 and published in 
Collier's in 1909. London traveled through Korea and into Manchuria with the Japanese 
army during their war with Russia in 1904, publishing in the San Francisco Examiner on 
September 25 of that year a soon-to-be famous essay on the epochal significance of that 
war entitled “The Yellow Peril.” Written in Manchuria that June, the essay argued that 
Japan's military successes would soon “awaken” the Chinese people who – rather than 
the Japanese – constituted the true yellow peril and threat to white dominance.24 This 
essay formed the basis for “The Unparalleled Invasion,” and parts of it appeared 
verbatim in the story's text. London was pioneering in locating China's threat as 
primarily economic rather than military. “The Chinese was the perfect type of industry,” 
he wrote in both the story and the essay, adding in the essay that “he is not so ill-
disposed toward new ideas and new methods as his history would seem to indicate.”25 In 
the story, Japan's economic and military penetration of China “awakens” that nation to 
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modernity. The people rise up and expel the Japanese in 1922, driving them not only out 
of China proper but also Korea and Taiwan. However, “contrary to expectation, China 
did not prove warlike,” and “after a time of disquiet, the idea was accepted that China 
was to be feared, not in war, but in commerce.”26 Industrial development and trade 
enabled China to break the Malthusian shackles and increase its already gigantic 
population by hundreds of millions. In the 1970s, tens of millions of Chinese migrated to 
French Indochina and British Malaya, Burma, and Nepal. When the French colonial 
army resisted, it was annihilated by China's massive and “splendidly efficient militia,” 
which it chose to develop in lieu of a professional standing army. A large-scale invasion 
and naval blockade by an outraged France proved fruitless, the army annihilated on its 
march to Peking and the blockade ineffective against a nation able to provide completely 
for its own material needs.
27
 
 “The world trembled,” not because of China's territorial expansion (Britain, 
interestingly, did not protest or resist Chinese penetration of its colonies as the French 
had) but because “there were two Chinese for every white person in the world.” All 
conventional uses of force proving useless, the western powers – upon the suggestion of 
an American scientist – resort to large-scale biological warfare, dropping vials 
containing “a score of plagues” onto Chinese territory on May 1, 1976 from thousands of 
“tiny airships” launched from warships parked off China's coast. Massive armies join the 
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combined navies in preventing the stricken Chinese people from fleeing, and soon they 
are exterminated. According to “the democratic American program,” the “howling 
wilderness” China had become was resettled by whites in “a tremendous and successful 
experiment in cross-fertilization,” essentially creating a second United States of 
America. Shortly afterward, on the eve of a war between France and Germany over 
Alsace-Lorraine, the white nations sign a treaty, pledging to never use such weapons of 
“ultra-modern war” upon each other.28 
 Many scholars have taken London's story at face value, most recently Bruce 
Franklin, who called it an “exultation of the superweapon  and Asian genocide.” He 
noted how it was the only work of American fiction before the Second World War which 
“condones unrestrained bombing of the civilian population,” something the U.S. would 
engage in during that war, as well as during the wars in Korea and Vietnam.
29
 Recent 
scholars of London's work have claimed the author “satirized the West's paranoia about 
Asians” with that story.30 Rather than an example of racism, the story was “a very stern 
warning of what can happen if racial hated is allowed to flourish” as well as “an ironic 
indictment of the behavior of imperialistic governments per se.”31 London's essay “The 
Yellow Peril” appears to support this revisionist contention. In that dispatch, London 
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heaps contempt upon Koreans, whom he views as backward and cowardly, finds the 
Japanese gifted only in military matters, but has nothing but praise for every facet of the 
Chinese individuals he meets after crossing the Yalu into Manchuria. He terms them a 
people “deft, intelligent, and unafraid to die,” who are brave in battle, industrious in 
labor, insistent but honest in business matters, and “not dead to new ideas.”32 London 
contradicted nearly a century of conventional American wisdom concerning the Chinese 
people. His affection for them was unmistakable. One was left with the impression that it 
is highly doubtful he would wish to see them wiped off the face of the earth. The 
inescapable conclusion would be that Jack London intended “The Unparalleled 
Invasion” to be at least in part a dark satire, though readers of Collier's most likely failed 
to appreciate this.
33
 
 The idea of the Chinese as an existential threat to the United States in particular 
and western civilization in general had a long pedigree in popular American literature 
when Robert Heinlein wrote his debut novel “Sixth Column.” Serialized in the first three 
months of 1941 under the byline Anson MacDonald, and published in book form in 1949 
under both its original title and “The Day After Tomorrow,” it told the story of white 
American scientists in the far distant future resisting an invasion of the U.S. by “four 
hundred million” bloodthirsty individuals identified as “Pan Asians.”34 John W. 
Campbell Jr. suggested in 1940 that Heinlein write a novel about a “Chinese” invasion, 
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though Heinlein reportedly claimed singling out the Chinese was “racist.”35 The number 
of invaders was, however, suspiciously identical to the traditional American estimate of 
China's population. The scientists ultimately defeat the invasion by inventing a ray gun 
which can only kill those possessing “Mongolian blood.” Heinlein does include a 
Japanese-American character named Franklin Roosevelt Matsui who, despite being of 
Asian ethnicity, is persecuted by the invaders, who identify him as culturally American 
and therefore their enemy.
36
 
 Heinlein's racial politics were thus far from straightforward.
37
 The hero of 
Starship Troopers is Johnnie Rico, the son of a wealthy Filipino businessman, and his 
squad of what Franklin aptly termed “an interstellar Green Berets” is multiracial and 
multinational.
38
 In his biography of Heinlein, Leon Stover claimed Heinlein modeled the 
communistic alien bugs after “Soviet expansionism.”39 But the novel's text makes clear 
the model is Red China, Johnnie Rico observing that “the Bug commissars didn't care 
anymore about expending soldiers than we cared about expending ammo. Perhaps we 
could have figured this out about the Bugs by noting the grief the Chinese Hegemony 
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gave the Russo-Anglo-American Alliance.”40 The global alliance thus triumphed over 
Chinese stand-ins, a new society successfully re-fighting an old war. 
 The films of the early 1960s therefore employed long-established archetypes 
concerning Chinese villainy. In addition, most of them were based on bestselling novels 
published in the 1950s, thus reflecting beliefs and fears from that decade. Disentangling 
what Ken Ono and Vincent Pham referred to as “the complex relationship between 
media representations and historical events and contexts” is always difficult.41 In 
addition to a close reading of the material, three temporal approaches appear useful. The 
first is to attempt to discern how the works were interpreted in their own time. The 
second is to see how that have been interpreted ever since, noting the ways subsequent 
interpretations match or differ from contemporary assessments. A third is to place the 
works within the contexts of past representations of similar themes. The threat posed by 
China was a staple of American culture long before that threat could plausibly be 
claimed to exist. By the time of the Kennedy administration, the day of reckoning 
prophesied for eight decades seemed worryingly close to realization. This was reflected 
in newspapers, magazines, and National Security Estimates. For it not to be reflected as 
well in popular entertainment would have been most odd. 
 Since the trauma of the Korean War, Chinese had been presented as villains, 
though secondary ones at first. The 1954 film “The Bamboo Prison” presented Chinese 
communists as veritable slaves to their Russian masters. When a Chinese interrogator 
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attempts to turn a black American prisoner of war against his nation by reminding him of 
his degraded status back home, the black soldier retorts that his Chinese interrogator is 
no better off vis-a-vis his de facto Russian masters.
42
 Gradually, this began to change. It 
was television which first introduced what Darrel Hamamoto termed the character of 
“the Yellow Red” with the show Adventures of the Falcon, which ran in 1955 and 1956. 
Banished from the silver screen when China became an ally of the U.S. against Japan, 
Fu Manchu reappeared on the small screen between 1956 and 1958 on the syndicated 
program The Adventures of Fu Manchu.
43
 In his exhaustive study of portrayals of Asians 
in American motion pictures between 1935 and 1975, Eugene Franklin Wong claimed 
that “by the end of the 1950s, the industry had clearly re-established the Chinese as 
America's main enemy, overshadowing the Russians if only on the basis of race.” Wong 
also argued that starting in the early 1960s “the American motion picture industry 
gradually began to turn away from a Cold War posture.”44 Lawrence Alloway concurred, 
arguing that “the cold war did not survive the 60s, as a different view of communism 
developed.” He dated the introduction of this development to sometime before 1964.45 
As with U.S. China policy, Hollywood's depictions of the Chinese at home and abroad 
during the Kennedy years were beginning to change, though that change would not 
become fully apparent until after 1963. Just as the Chinese had yet to split from their 
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Soviet allies, Chinese villains had yet to fully liberate themselves from Russian tutelage, 
though that process was well-advanced. Russians were still bad guys, though their role 
was becoming more that of advisers, with their nominal Chinese underlings moving to 
the fore and showing increased initiative. 
 Ian Fleming's 1958 novel Doctor No and the 1963 film of the same title both 
begin outside of the Queen's Club on Richmond Road in Kingston. Fleming lovingly 
describes this thoroughfare as the most exclusive street in Jamaica's capital city and a 
bastion of colonial privilege before adding ruefully that “such stubborn retreats will not 
long survive in modern Jamaica. One day Queen's Club will have its windows smashed 
and perhaps be burned to the ground.”46 This sense of late colonial foreboding is absent 
from the film, which was released one year after Jamaica became independent, and 
which presents the island as a sunny, sexy vacation spot, albeit a particularly dangerous 
one for British secret agents. The danger is from the henchmen of the title character, the 
half-Chinese son of a German Methodist missionary whom Stanley Kauffmann of The 
New Republic, in his lukewarm review of the film, described as “a kind of space-age Fu 
Manchu.”47 In the book, No is very tall, thin, and bald, just as Rohmer described his 
classic Yellow Peril personification.
48
 Played in the film by the white Canadian actor 
Joseph Wiseman, he is a debonair evil mastermind, sporting slicked-back hair and attired 
in Nehru jackets, which his dark-skinned assassins also favor.
49
 The novel chooses to 
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accentuate the German side of No's character. When conversing with Bond in his 
underground lair, No quotes Clausewitz on strategy, paraphrases Freudian theory to 
explain why he is evil, and praises the Nazis for conducting sadistic scientific 
experiments on human subjects.
50
 
 This is not to imply Fleming completely downplays Chinese villainy. In fact, 
every Chinese – or even part Chinese – character in the novel is a villain. After several 
close calls, Bond instructs Quarrel, his faithful local black guide and confidant, to 
“watch out particularly for any Chinese near you.”51 The assassins who massacre the 
staff of the local British intelligence office, prompting Bond's visit, are all “Chigroes – 
Chinese negroes,” with “yellowish skin and slanting eyes.” Fleming has the Colonial 
Secretary, in a panoramic description of the numerous foreign merchant clans who 
dominate the island's commerce, describe the Chinese as “the most powerful clique in 
Jamaica.”52 In both the book and the film, No defends his private island of Crab Key 
with an armored flame-throwing tractor costumed to look like a dragon, which 
incinerates the unlucky Quarrel. The higher one moves up No's organization, the more 
Chinese it becomes. In the film, Chinese soldiers in vaguely Maoist uniforms capture 
Bond and defend their leader's lair, while Chinese technicians keep his nuclear reactor 
running.
53
 In the book, No is working on a freelance basis for the Russians, endeavoring 
to jam the guidance systems on American nuclear missiles near the Caribbean basin, but 
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would be willing to help the Chinese if the price was right.
54
 In the film, he seeks to 
sabotage the U.S. space program, had his services refused by both that nation and the 
U.S.S.R., and says of the Cold War “east, west, just points of the compass, each as 
stupid as the other.”55 The movie set a trend for the rest of the decade for espionage 
thrillers on both the big and the small screen by seeking to move beyond the Cold War 
while vaguely acknowledging its continued existence. 
 The major critics leaned slightly in favor of the film, most of them viewing it as 
superficial escapist fun, though they had doubts as to whether the intended franchise had 
a bright future. Much of this doubt was based on their low estimates of Fleming as a 
writer. Stanley Kauffmann quipped “I find Fleming not objectionable, but unreadable.”56 
Brendan Gill of the New Yorker found the novel a “trashy failure,” but the film a “trashy 
success.”57 The most common complaint was the violence, and the enjoyment Sean 
Connery's Bond appeared to feel while dishing it out. Newsweek quipped that “until he 
[Fleming] invented James Bond, there was absolutely no one with whom the cultivated 
sado-masochist could identify.”58 None saw the film as having any geopolitical import 
whatsoever, despite its setting near Cuba in the immediate aftermath of the Missile 
Crisis, or No's obsession with missiles and nuclear power. 
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 The same could certainly not be said for The Manchurian Candidate, which 
entered theaters the previous October. Critics took that film very seriously, as historians 
and cultural analysts still do today, although they viewed it on the whole far less 
favorably than future generations would. One gets the distinct sense that few would have 
predicted that it would one day be seen, according to the historian Christina Klein, as 
“one of the definitive works of Cold War filmmaking,” a work which would warrant an 
entire book of academic essays analyzing its many facets, and what each of them said 
about Cold War culture.
59
 The 1962 movie was based on a bestselling 1959 novel by 
Richard Condon. Both works revolve around the brainwashing of U.S. soldier Raymond 
Shaw in Korea by Chinese psychiatrist Yen Lo, whom in the film the hero Captain 
Bennett Marco, played by Frank Sinatra, helpfully describes as “that Chinese cat 
standing there smiling like Fu Manchu.”60 Though Yen Lo works on behalf of the 
Russians, serving as director of the “Pavlov Institute” in Moscow, Condon makes clear 
in the novel that all but two of his technicians and assistants who help administer the 
brainwashing are Chinese.
61
 The notion of a Chinese villain with a special aptitude for 
mind control goes back in fiction at least to Fu Manchu, and was reinforced by Chinese 
attempts to turn American prisoners-of-war against their nation during the Korean War. 
In his landmark 1958 book Scratches on our Minds, the first major scholarly work on 
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American images of the Chinese, the political scientist and former journalist Harold 
Isaacs noted – based on interviews of American national and regional elites – the 
prevalence of “the image of the Chinese as brainwashers.”62 (italics in original) 
Condon's novel refers to Marco's desire to “unlock all of the great jade doors” and 
liberate Raymond's mind from its Chinese captors.
63
 
 Presciently anticipating the Sino-Soviet split, as well as pinpointing one of its 
causes, Condon notes how the audience for the brainwashing, a mix in both the book and 
the film of Chinese and Russian communists, was “divided, physically and by 
prejudice.”64 Screenwriter George Axelrod has Yen Lo tell the Russians, who are 
impatient to witness the brainwashed Raymond murder a member of his squad, “I 
apologize to my dear Dmitri. I keep forgetting that you're a young country, and your 
attention span is limited.” On another occasion, however, Yen appears to identify with 
the Russians, insisting he does not mean to insult “our brave Chinese allies” with the 
cover story that Raymond and his squad annihilated an entire company of Chinese 
soldiers.
65
 While the details of Yen Lo's loyalties and personal identifications are 
ambiguous, the broad brush strokes of his characterization are entirely Asian. 
Paraphrasing Rohmer's description of Fu Manchu, Jacobson and Gonzalez called him 
“the satanic concentration of an entire continent's cruel cunning,” while Christina Klein 
                                                 
62
  Harold R. Isaacs, Images of Asia: American Views of China and India, originally titled Scratches 
On Our Minds (New York: Harper, 1958, reprinted 1972), 218. 
63
  Condon, The Manchurian Candidate, 298. 
64
  Ibid. 35. 
65
  The Manchurian Candidate [DVD], MGM Home Entertainment, 1998. 
 185 
 
contextualized his Cold War-era yellow peril by saying the movie “pulled together more 
than a decade of anti-Chinese discourse.”66 
 A secondary villain, the Korean interpreter Chunjin, who betrays the squad to the 
communists and later comes to the U.S. to be Raymond's “houseboy,” seems to be a 
prototype of a new kind of Asian villain, what Robert Lee called the “gook,” a deceitful 
young Asian male who pretends to be meek and friendly towards whites in order to 
betray them.
67
 The character is largely remembered for a protracted karate fight he has 
with (and loses to) Sinatra's Marco, which Frankenheimer claimed was the first “martial 
arts” fight in American cinematic history.68 Interestingly in retrospect, but entirely 
characteristic of Hollywood during this period, neither Asian villain was played by an 
Asian actor. Yen Lo was played by Khigh Dhiegh, a New Jerseyan of North African 
descent. Chunjin was played by Henry Silva, a Brooklynite of Puerto Rican descent. 
Silva generally portrayed “ethnic” villains, East Asians as well as Native Americans, 
Mexicans and Italians.
69
 Dhiegh made a career playing updated Fu Manchus, most 
famously the recurring communist Chinese villain Wo Fat on “Hawaii Five-O,” which 
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ran from 1968 until 1980. Later, he retired to New Jersey and – embracing his fictional 
Asian identity – founded an institute for the study of Taoism.70 
 Critics were not quite unanimous when it came to identifying the movie's 
primary villains. Life  identified them as “Chinese Reds,” while Brendan Gill of the New 
Yorker claimed the “Russians” were the bad guys.71 Arthur Knight of the Saturday 
Review wrote that he quickly came to the realization that “this was not Yen Lo, the Red 
superman, but our old childhood friend, the insidious Dr. Fu Manchu.” Curiously, this 
connection made the film “a good deal more enjoyable” for Knight.72 In a 1988 
conversation with director John Frankenheimer and Frank Sinatra, which was included 
as part of the original VHS release of the film, George Axelrod defended the film against 
charges of prejudice, though interestingly not anti-Chinese or anti-Asian prejudice. 
Axelrod recalled people saying the film was “so anti-Russian, which it wasn't.” 
Frankenheimer added, “we set out to do Dick Condon's book, and that's what we did,” 
abjuring political intent on their part. Axelrod recalled that as he was crafting the script 
in 1961, he expressed to Sinatra his worry that “when the picture is released, if Kennedy 
is just about to have some sort of rapport with the Russians, it's going to embarrass him.” 
Sinatra recalled reassuring the writer by recounting that he had just visited Hyannisport, 
where President Kennedy asked him what his next film project would be. Sinatra 
recalled replying it would be an adaptation of The Manchurian Candidate, to which 
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Kennedy replied “great – who's going to play the mother?”73 That dispelled any concerns 
Axelrod had about possible negative geopolitical ramifications. 
 The film was only mildly popular with audiences, barely breaking even at the 
box office in its initial run. It appears to have made some immediate headway into the 
culture. This is evidenced by a January 1963 Newsweek story about Nikolai Fedorenko, 
who had recently assumed the post of Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations. A 
fluent speaker of both Chinese and Japanese, who was rumored to have spent part of his 
childhood in East Asia, Fedorenko quickly acquired the nickname “The Manchurian 
Candidate.”74 Critics largely concluded the film was a decent if flawed thriller. The 
Saturday Review called it “gripping,” Life termed it “the season's kookiest thriller,” and 
the New Yorker claimed it was “guaranteed to raise all but the limpest hair.”75 Several 
argued it tried to cram too much into two hours, Stanley Kauffmann concluding it had 
enough “gimmicks to furnish three or four other films,” Time that “it tries so hard to be 
different that it fails to be itself,” and America that “in part” it was “brilliant” but that the 
critic was “unable to suspend disbelief in a couple of its main premises,” while 
Commonweal termed it both “spell-binding and ill-conceived.”76 
                                                 
73
  “Exclusive Interview with Frank Sinatra, John Frankenheimer, and George Axelrod,” included in 
The Manchurian Candidate [DVD] MGM Home Entertainment, 1998. 
74
  “Manchurian Candidate,” Newsweek, January 7, 1963, 24. 
75
  Knight, “The Fu Manchurian Candidate,” 65; “Deck of Deadly Queens,” Life, November 9, 
1962, 93; Gill, Brendan, “Bad Men and Good,” 115. 
76
  Stanley Kauffmann, “From Chekhov to China,” The New Republic, December 1, 1962, 26; 
“Down South in North Korea,” Time, November 2, 1962, 101, Moira Walsh, “The Manchurian 
Candidate,” America, November 24, 1962, 1158; Philip T. Hartung, “Are Mothers Necessary?,” 
Commonweal, November 23, 1962, 231. 
 188 
 
 Many of the critics addressed what appeared to be a public debate over whether 
the film was, to use a phrase employed by two of them, “irresponsible.”77 Commonweal, 
which took no position on the apparent controversy, merely noted it was “a rather risky 
film” which presented a “sleazy picture of American mores and politics.”78 Life claimed 
the movie was “enlivened by pot-shots at phony war heroism, momism and right-wing 
fanaticism,” each of which decades later would merit at least one chapter in Jacobson's 
and Gonzalez's book.
79
 Newsweek credited the movie with “the courage to lampoon.”80 
On the other hand, Arthur Knight of the Saturday Review argued that “it is always 
disturbing when melodrama plays fast and loose with serious, even incendiary 
material.”81 Seemingly in response, Moira Walsh of America declined to “join the 
chorus denouncing the film as irresponsible” because “this charge seems to emanate 
from positions fairly far out on both ends of the political spectrum.”82 Given that the plot 
revolves around a foreign leftist plot to take over the U.S. government using domestic 
conservatives as their patsies, the respective but separate outrage at either end of the 
ideological spectrum was understandable. 
 The novel is even more pointed politically. Condon has guests at a party hosted 
by Republican Senator Johnny Iselin – who is Raymond's stepfather – exchange 
“opinions they rented that week from Mr. Sokolsky, Mr. Lawrence, Mr. Pegler, and that 
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fascinating younger fellow who had written about men and God at Yale.”83 Condon also 
intended for Raymond's brainwashing to be a metaphor for how the mass media, 
particularly advertisers, brainwashed the general public. Axelrod and Frankenheimer 
smoothed out some of these rough satirical edges, as well as excising Raymond's 
mother's heroin and cocaine addictions and merely alluding to her incestuous 
relationship with her son. But for them to disclaim political intent with the argument that 
they were merely faithfully adapting Condon's book to the screen is highly dubious, 
since the source material itself was politically provocative. 
 When Mao's “Volunteers” crossed the Yalu River, the Chinese in America had 
every reason to believe they would share a fate similar to that of the Japanese during the 
world war which had ended only five years earlier. The U.S. Congress quickly passed 
the McCarran Internal Security Act in late 1950 over President Harry Truman's veto.
84
 
Also known as the Emergency Detention Act, Title II of the new law authorized the 
internment of enemy aliens.
85
 Chinese communities had been warned. Yet, in contrast to 
recent actions towards the Japanese, the law primarily targeted behavior, while merely 
casting suspicion based on ethnicity. Unlike Japanese-Americans, Chinese-Americans 
were offered an opportunity to escape punishment and prove their loyalty by rejecting 
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their ancestral nation's current official ideology.
86
 This was further indicated when the 
conservative McCarthyite Nevada Democratic Senator Pat McCarran co-sponsored the 
McCarran-Walter Act of 1952. This law removed race-based bans on non-white 
immigrants, replacing the system established in 1924 with national quotas. The annual 
quotas for non-white nationalities remained small, and such simultaneous restrictions 
and expansions made American immigration law, in the words of attorney Dan Danilov, 
“an absymal mess.”87 But the new law was of a piece with the 1943 repeal of the 
Chinese Exclusion Act and the 1947 War Brides Act, the latter of which allowed for the 
entry of 6,000 Chinese women.
88
 Whether because of increased tolerance or Cold War 
imperatives, the old purely race-based animosities towards Chinese living in the United 
States were fast disappearing.
89
 
 They were replaced by “a mixture of tolerance and pity.” While the miniscule 
quotas by themselves would not have altered the demographics of American 
Chinatowns, tens of thousands of new immigrants arrived outside the quota system as 
political refugees.
90
 The arrival of large numbers of often wealthy and well-educated 
families with women and children forever transformed Chinese-American communities, 
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which only a few years before were shrinking bachelor societies of aging men. Yet, as 
was often the case for minority groups, the path forward was not to be smooth. 
Diverging from McCarran, Joe McCarthy raised the alarm of Mao intentionally planting 
Communists among the refugees fleeing to Hong Kong. Meanwhile, continuing 
restrictions, quotas, and inconsistencies in the law encouraged document fraud, with 
immigrants pretending to be the relatives of legal aliens, the so-called phenomenon of 
“paper sons.” These fears created a rare bureaucratic alliance between the U.S. State 
Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service. The ensuing investigations lasted into the early 1960s. Officials 
granted amnesty to Chinese immigrants suspected of fraud if they identified those who 
assisted them, or those they themselves suspected of also committing fraud. Ultimately, 
federal authorities interviewed well over 30,0000 individuals, or nearly one-third of all 
Chinese-Americans.
91
 Few were deported, but it cast a fearful pall over the community. 
 The novel, musical, and musical film Flower Drum Song reflected all these 
developments, albeit to varying degrees. Published in 1957, C.Y. Lee's novel was one of 
a number of works by Chinese-American authors to achieve popularity during that 
decade, in marked contrast to the neglect at that time of works by Japanese-Americans.
92
 
Christina Klein credited this to “the emotional bond that Americans felt with the people 
of China” due to their status as allies during World War II, though this fails to account 
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for that nation's more recent status as a bitter enemy.
93
 Whatever the reason, the most 
successful composing duo on Broadway quickly optioned the novel. A stage musical 
premiered in 1958 and ran for two years.
94
 The film version, released in late 1961, was 
the fifth out of six Rogers and Hammerstein stage works to be adapted for the screen, 
and would become the only one not to turn a profit. Unlike the racially-mixed Broadway 
cast, the film's cast was nearly entirely Asian, making it the first such Hollywood 
production, and the only one until 1993's “The Joy Luck Club.”95 
 The musical and its film version,which diverge substantially from the novel in 
tone, substance, and plot, center around a romantic rhombus which, in standard comedic 
fashion, must be sorted out by the final curtain or reel. The picture bride Mei Li and her 
father Dr. Li, a former Peking University professor of Philosophy, stow away from Hong 
Kong to San Francisco aboard a cargo ship, illegally entering the U.S. so Mei Li can 
marry Sammy (Samuel Adams) Fong, a night club owner with an outer-borough accent 
and a street-wise vocabulary straight from Frank Loesser's “Guys and Dolls.” Sammy 
loves Linda Low, a burlesque dancer in his club, who is dating law student Wang Ta. 
Wang's wealthy and tradition-minded immigrant father, Wang Chi-Yang, ends up taking 
in the Li family, and fancies his son marrying Mei Li. Sammy's wealthy and controlling 
mother insists he go through with the arranged marriage until Mei Li reveals on her 
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wedding day that she came to the U.S. illegally, declaring – based on a movie she had 
seen on television about Mexican immigrants, “my back is wet.” Wang Ta's father does 
not share Sammy Fong's mother's concern with immigration law, agrees to let his son 
marry Mei Li – who loved Wang Ta anyway – and Sammy's mother is forced to allow 
her son to marry Linda, who is a natural-born citizen. All ends happily with Mei Li 
concluding the film by telling Wang Ta “tomorrow we must go to the Temple of Ding-
Hao and thank the Goddess of Heaven for television.”96 
 Along the way, the film presents a vision of a self-contained, yet very American, 
Chinatown featuring Chinese cops, Chinese hoods, Chinese businessmen, Chinese 
entertainers, and even Chinese beatniks. “Flower Drum Song” thus engages in a sort of 
“reverse yellowface,” with Asian actors playing parts that would normally be reserved 
for white actors, and in fact are “played” by white characters in Lee's novel, which aims 
for a semblance of realism. The male leads of Sammie Fong and Wang Ta are essentially 
trust fund children (though Sammie is in advanced middle-aged, and Wang Ta  his late-
20s), their parents subsidizing their business enterprises and education, respectively. 
This Chinatown is a far cry from the crowded slums of the late-19
th
 century, or for that 
matter the actual Chinatown of 1960s San Francisco. 
 The film was thus an update of early 20
th
 century “melting pot” immigrant stage 
dramas, with Chinese standing in for Irish, Italians, and Jews, and the setting suitably 
upgraded with the latest in consumer goods and luxurious postwar living. The “Grant 
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Avenue” scene is set during a Chinese New Year parade which features a Chinese 
marching band playing “Stars and Stripes Forever” while Chinese children walk behind 
dressed in Revolutionary War costumes.
97
 Its most analyzed and deconstructed scene in 
this regard is the song-and-dance number “Chop Suey,” sung by Wang Chi-Yang's 
willful sister Madame Liang at a party celebrating her completion of citizenship classes. 
Before bursting into song, Liang – who wears traditional Chinese clothing but 
throughout the movie quotes the Constitution, the Declaration of Independence, and 
Abraham Lincoln – declares “I am happy to be both Chinese and American,” to which 
Wang Chi-Yang replies “you are like the Chinese dish the Americans invented. 
Everything is in it – all mixed up.”98 After her vocal, the younger, more assimilated 
guests perform, in rapid succession, a square dance, a waltz, the Charleston, and various 
swing and rhythm and blues  steps. The notion that Liang can become fully American 
without sacrificing her Chinese heritage reflects the librettist Hammerstein's left-leaning 
tolerant liberalism.
99
 Juanita Hall, an African-American who had previously played the 
Vietnamese character Bloody Mary in “South Pacific,” portrayed Liang on both stage 
and screen. She is the film's only primary non-Asian actor.
100
 In the 2006 commentary to 
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the DVD, Nancy Kwan, who played Linda Low, expressed surprise when she was told 
by the musical theater expert interviewing her that Hall was African-American, Low 
having assumed Hall was at least part Asian.
101
 
 There are numerous revealing differences between the musical and its source 
material. There is no Sammie Fong, for instance, in Lee's book. In the novel, Mei Li 
does marry Wang Ta. But she and her father enter the country as legal refugees, the 
latter having been a master cook for an American general who assisted the Guomindong, 
and the former a singer of traditional Chinese songs, hence the book's title.
102
 The 
widower and former landlord Wang Chi-yang fled Hunan for San Francisco five years 
earlier in 1949 with his two sons, largely because he objected to Mao's westernizing and 
modernizing tendencies, specifically communist insistence on the wearing of western-
inspired clothing. San Francisco is one of the few places left where he can live a 
nominally traditional Chinese life, although his teenage son has already forgotten 
Chinese, and Wang has a hard time being understood by the coastal natives who 
dominate Chinatown, which in the book is both much more Chinese than in the musical, 
while also containing far more white people. His wealth, unexplained in the musical, is 
described in the book as largely derived from generous remittances from  a wealthy 
uncle in Hong Kong.
103
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  Though ending happily like the musical, the novel is at times quite melancholy. 
For instance, Linda Low is a minor character who ultimately commits suicide. Lee 
highlights the continuing bachelor culture of Chinatown, where young men like Wang 
Ta have an exceedingly difficult time finding American-born Chinese wives. In the 
book, he is a medical student, and spends much of his time with Chinese-American men 
who have post-graduate degrees but can only find menial jobs. Most prominent among 
them is his friend Chang, who has a doctorate in political science and works in a grocery 
store, perhaps the first of his kind, he quips. “I hear there is a Ph.D. washing dishes at 
Fisherman's Wharf,” Wang Ta informs him with all seriousness. Chang, an erstwhile 
Hans Morgenthau, tells Wang Ta that “China – I mean Red China – is like and inflated 
bullfrog which is more of a bluff than a great power.”104 
 A genuine work of literature – unlike Doctor No or The Manchurian Candidate – 
The Flower Drum Song is perhaps the only source material Rogers and Hammerstein 
adapted but did not do justice to. Reviewers, already familiar with musical's charms and 
limitations, gave the film mixed reviews. Curiously, they found its depiction of Asian-
American life patronizing. Newsweek joked the movie “makes plain that all Chinese are 
cute as little dolls and most of them are rich as Mme. Chiang.”105 The New Yorker 
declared that “the settings are every bit as authentic as Fu Manchu.”106 Even the 
unprecedented use of a nearly all-Asian cast came in for criticism because almost none 
of the actors were Chinese. “Honest fellows, they don't all look alike,” scolded Time 
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magazine, no paragon of ethnic sensitivity when it came to reporting news from China 
during this period.
107
 Brendan Gill of the New Yorker spotted “the oddest glimpses of 
'The Jazz Singer' and 'Abie's Irish Rose,'” two obvious inspirations, and Philip Hartung 
of Commonweal correctly recognized that Jack Soo's Sammy Fong was a “sort of 
Chinese-American version of a Damon Runyon character,” Loesser's “Guys and Dolls” 
having been based upon Runyon's stories.
108
 Thus, Rogers and Hammerstein's attempt at 
humanizing, celebrating, and Americanizing Chinese-Americans was deemed 
insufficiently authentic, even in its own time. 
 Two other films about China released during the years in question, both of which 
were set in China and touched heavily upon the potential threat to the West posed by that 
nation, have escaped scholarly attention, and perhaps for good reason. “55 Days At 
Peking,” released in the summer of 1963, was produced by Samuel Bronston, the self-
styled “King of the Epics,” who had found box office success in 1961 with both “El Cid” 
and “King of Kings.” As its title indicates, the film focuses on the siege of the foreign 
legations in the Qing capital during the Boxer Rebellion in 1900. Charlton Heston, who 
starred in “El Cid,” plays the Marine Major Matt Lewis, who in this telling leads the 
defense of the legations. David Niven plays British diplomat Sir Arthur Robinson, who 
seeks at first to conciliate the Boxers, ingratiate himself with China's rulers, and stoically 
endure their humiliations. Early in the film, his wife asks him “you remember what 
Napoleon said about China?,” to Robinson replies “I'll never forget it. Let China sleep – 
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for when she wakes, the world will tremble,” citing the same quote Chester Bowles used 
to preface his 1959 Saturday Evening Post article on the potential Chinese threat. 
Robinson tells the Dowager Empress “China's greatest virtue is her patience, and if she 
will exercise that now, she will achieve everything,” advice neither the Dowager then, 
nor Mao in the film's own time, heeded. Meanwhile, Robinson warns Lewis “you're not 
in the Wild West now, you know. You don't go around shooting Chinese like you do red 
Indians.” Though a man of action, Heston's Lewis is introduced to the audience as a sort 
of “non-ugly” American, instructing his men as they march to Peking “this is an ancient 
and highly cultured civilization, so don't get the idea you're any better than these people 
just because they can't speak English.”109 
 Before long, all attempts at cultural sensitivity and conciliation are cast to the 
winds as the Empress's duplicitous advisers convince her to unite with the bloodthirsty 
Boxers and unleash their Oriental hordes upon every white person they can get their 
hands on. The Boxer Rebellion was the last time before the movie's own period that the 
world's powers were united as one against the Chinese, and the film both celebrates this 
multinational coalition and hints and its fragility. It would, however, be stretching 
matters to find much intentional political symbolism in this particular movie. Its writer, 
Philip Yordan, declared that “it's pictures we're making, not history” in reply to 
criticisms of the considerable liberties the scripts he wrote for Bronston took with the 
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historical record.
110
  As with “Dr. No,” critics' low expectations were largely met. They 
praised the film's high production values, particularly the lavish sets Bronston had 
constructed on the plains of Spain.
111
 The ethnic stereotypes and use of white actors to 
play the main Chinese characters were noted but not disapproved of, Time joking that 
“Prince Tuan, complete with jeweled-gold fingernail scabbards” appeared “about as 
welcome as Dr. Fu Manchu at a meeting of the A.M.A.,” and Moira Walsh observing 
that English actors “oddly, but not ineffectively,” played all the Chinese officials.112 The 
critic from the National Review claimed to enjoy watching “thousands of evil-eyed 
Chinese villains” being mowed down by modern western weaponry.113  Newsweek did 
take note of the fact that Heston's on-screen love interest, the Russian Baroness Natalie 
Ivanoff, played by Ava Gardner, was killed off with a half-hour remaining in the film. 
Finding this odd, the critic surmised that “after all, Ava is a Russian, and she has an 
affair with a Chinese general, so for her to live and marry Heston would have been 
controversial.”114 Thus Cold War politics and racial anxieties might have intruded into 
even this confection. 
 The Cold War is ostensibly at the heart of “Satan Never Sleeps,” such as that 
1962 film can be said to have one. Director Leo McCarey, whose career had been on the 
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decline since the commercial and critical triumphs of “Going My Way” in 1944 and 
“The Bells of St Mary's” in 1945, returned to the the subject of the Catholic priesthood, 
albeit in southwest China rather than midwestern American. William Holden stars as 
Father O'Banion, a former Marine and newly-minted Chinese missionary, who is 
followed to his new assignment by the smitten Siu Lan, played by Vietnamese actress 
Frances Nuyen. O'Banion intends to replace the wise old Father Bovard, played by 
Clifton Webb, who worries about abandoning his local converts to both the new priest 
and the advancing communist forces, O'Banion having picked late 1949 as a propitious 
moment to begin a career as a missionary in the Chinese interior. Leading the Red 
Chinese forces is Colonel Ho San, a former parishioner of Bovard's, played by Weaver 
Lee. To mock Christian non-violence, Ho San repeatedly slaps O'Banion, yelling out 
“he's a paper tiger!,” which inspires the former Marine to thrash the communist, much to 
Bovard's disapproval and Siu Lan's delight
115
 Ho San sacks and loots the church, rapes 
and impregnates Siu Lan, and imprisons Bovard and O'Banion. But he is purged by a 
visiting Soviet official for treating the priests and their congregants with insufficient 
brutality. The Russian has Bovard tortured in order to extract a public confession. Yet 
the priest remains defiant, inspiring the villagers to rise up in revolt. The loyal 
Christians, including Ho San's parents, are promptly massacred by Chinese soldiers, 
inspiring his reconversion. He leads Siu Lan and O'Banion across the border – 
presumably to Burma – and eventually to Hong Kong, Bovard sacrificing himself to 
ensure the escape's success. 
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 The film, a commercial failure, is essentially a screwball comedy set during an 
apocalypse. Critics noted this “unfortunate mixture” of “pseudo-romantic fun-and-games 
and the extremely serious Red oppression.”116 The strained relationship between the 
older and younger priest was dismissed as a tired retread of “Going My Way.”117 The 
redemption of the rapist, and his marriage to his victim, was universally condemned as 
offensive. “The colonel, it turns out, isn't really a nasty, Red rapist after all, see? He's a 
nice Christian rapist,” Time rancidly concluded.118 Of Ho San's transformation into a 
“comic hero,” Newsweek responded “Aw. McC'mon.”119 As Moira Walsh put it, “it takes 
real talent to produce a film that everybody will hate, but this may be it.”120 Nonetheless, 
the making of the film indicated that a famous director believed the time was propitious 
for him to revive his career by exploiting anti-Chinese sentiment. 
 In this assessment of his audience at least, Leo McCarey was correct. The 
remainder of the decade would feature, among other attractions, the Chinese assassin 
Odd Job in “Goldfinger,” no less than five “Fu Manchu” remakes, and the musical film 
“Thoroughly Modern Millie,” a comedy about the white slave trade which revived 
Chinese stereotypes not seen in Hollywood productions since the 1920s, the film's 
setting.
121
 On television, beginning in 1964 an American and a Russian secret agent 
joined forces on “The Man From U.N.C.L.E.” to battle mostly Asian villains in a distant 
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post-Cold War future. “Get Smart,” which premiered in 1965, featured an assortment of 
predominately Asian henchmen.
122
 In a 1966 episode of “I Spy,” the American heroes, 
after saving the world from a Chinese Communist, are decorated in the Kremlin by the 
K.G.B. To quote Khigh Dhiegh from that year, “we're getting back to the era of the 
'Yellow Menace.'”123 The earlier part of the decade witnessed the tentative beginnings of 
that era's revival. The Chinese had yet to fully emerge as villains in their own right, and 
the Russians were not yet associated with the good guys. But that was the emerging 
trend. 
 This was also reflected in comic books which, for the first time since “Buck 
Rogers” and “Flash Gordon” in the 1930s, embraced Yellow Peril stereotypes. The first 
of many examples to come was the character of Radioactive Man, formerly Chinese 
nuclear scientist Chen Lu, who turned himself into a super-powered mutant in order to 
serve his nation. He made his debut on American newsstands in June 1963, crossing the 
Himalayas and invading India, as the P.L.A. had done the previous year. There he is 
confronted by Thor, who nearly succumbs to Radioactive Man's powers of mind 
control.
124
 Modern geopolitics thus converged with old stereotypes, giving them new 
life, and the American people new enemies who were variations upon old themes.  
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 CHAPTER VII  
CONCLUSION: POSTURING AND POLICY 
 
 As a member of Merrill's Marauders, fighting in Burma behind Japanese lines, 
Roger Hilsman established both a personal familiarity with the Chinese and a pattern of 
putting himself in the vanguard. He and his fellow commandos did not constitute a 
strong enough force to win the campaign. But they could blaze a trail and set an example 
for the larger, better-equipped forces in the rear who  would prevail. Such was the case 
nearly two decades later in San Francisco on December 13, 1963, three weeks after the 
assassination of President John F. Kennedy. At infinitely less personal risk, he became 
among the first to engage a new enemy in open battle. That enemy was the China Lobby. 
Like the Japanese in 1944, they were well past the peak of their power, but still 
formidable, intimidating, and unwilling to yield without a fight. Kennedy had demurred 
from antagonizing them. But in his speech before the Commonwealth Club, Hilsman 
attacked many of the China Lobby's most cherished beliefs and assumptions, declaring – 
or at the very least heavily implying – that the new administration no longer subscribed 
to them, and the previous one may not have either. It was a rhetorical reconnaissance-in-
force, of no decisive value in and of itself. But it gave hope to other enemies of the 
China Lobby, and began the process of that faction's marginalization within the foreign 
policy elite. Hilsman's words marked the posthumous end of the Kennedy 
administration's China policy, and the beginning of a new approach, one that is still 
being followed to this day. 
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 The ideas Hilsman expressed that afternoon were years in the making. The 
decision to publicize them had been made several months earlier at the very latest. In his 
memoirs, published in 1967,
1
 the former Assistant Secretary of State claimed the speech 
was given primarily due to “pressure from the public press.” It was thus an attempt to 
move public opinion given in response to manifestations of that opinion, specifically the 
seemingly widespread sentiment that a continuation of Eisenhower-era polices and 
postures in the context of the Sino-Soviet dispute had become “increasingly ridiculous.” 
Erstwhile “China Hands” such as James Thomson, Allen Whiting, and Robert Barnett, 
who had pushed for years within the State Department for a change in policy, helped 
Hilsman write the speech. They intended the speech to be an open rebuke of the late 
John Foster Dulles, who in San Francisco in 1957 had declared the Chinese communist 
regime to be a “passing phase.”2 The speech's primary purpose was to make clear those 
in power in the United States no longer believed that to be the case. 
 At its heart, Hilsman's speech was a less evocative and minimally provocative 
rewriting of the speech some in the State Department had crafted for President Kennedy 
two years previously, but which he never gave. Hilsman declared his support for 
“policies of strength and firmness, accompanied by a constant readiness to negotiate,” 
which had long been the approach taken towards the Soviet Union.
3
 Hilsman closed with 
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the sound bite “we pursue today toward Communist China a policy of the open door,” a 
phrase with an obvious pedigree concerning Sino-American relations, and one the 
Kennedy State Department had long toyed with. Like the crafters of the shelved 
presidential address endorsing a “Two Chinas” policy, Hilsman's speechwriters intended 
to demonstrate that the United States would no longer participate in the rhetorical hate 
spiral which had existed for so long between the governments of both nations. 
According to Hilsman, China “has used hatred as an engine of national policy,” but from 
now on “we will not sow the dragon's seed of hate.”4 If Hilsman was correct, the 
Johnson administration would take the high road in an attempt to curry favor with global 
opinion, as Chester Bowles and Robert Komer had previously advocated. 
 Hilsman laid the lion's share of the blame for China's isolation upon the Chinese 
leadership themselves, but did not entirely exonerate his own side. Like a bleeding-heart 
judge sentencing a criminal who had endured a rough childhood, Hilsman assumed the 
Chinese communists were  not irrevocably depraved, but capable of reform and able to 
learn from their mistakes. The People's Republic might be “the torchbearer of a rigid 
totalitarian ideology that threatens all its neighbors,” but it was led by men who “have 
seen extraordinarily little of the world.” Expose these leaders to new ideas, and new 
policies might follow. The Chinese communists were not incapable of learning and 
adaptation. They had proven themselves to be “pragmatic when their existence is 
                                                 
4
  Roger Hilsman, “United States Policy Toward Communist China,” Department of State Bulletin, 
January 6, 1964, 16, 17. The previous year, James Thomson expressed his support for the publicizing of 
the phrase “an open back door” as the term for a revised China policy. See Thomson to Rice, December 
27, 1962, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, James C. Thomson Papers, Box 15, Folder 4. 
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threatened.” Mao was therefore not Hitler. He need not be vanquished, and could be 
engaged, provided he remained contained. As for the American people, they had proven 
themselves all-too-willing to misunderstand the Chinese people and their influence over 
them. American involvement with China have been both “intense” and “not wholly 
real,” implying the intensity existed largely in the imaginations of Americans. This 
intensity of feeling “was fed by illusions as well as good will.” Americans had 
overlooked “the depth and fervor of Chinese nationalism” and were unaware of the 
“sense of repeated humiliation” that Mao had proven so adept at exploiting.5 
 Eisenhower and Dulles had failed to take these factors into account. Even worse, 
they had fed, rather than sought to dampen, the sentiments of bitterness and betrayal felt 
by so many Americans towards the Chinese. They had embraced irrational emotion 
rather than hard-headed sobriety. It was now “time to take stock – dispassionately,” of 
U.S. policy in that region. Chiang Kai-shek's American supporters had long called those 
who wanted to engage with Mao naïve. Hilsman was now accusing them of excessive 
sentimentality. Mimicking a line from the proposed Kennedy speech, Hilsman observed 
“there has been perhaps more emotion about our China policy that about our policy 
toward any single county since World War II.”6 Hilsman was openly proclaiming 
himself, and by extension his State Department and his president, to be the 
dispassionate, reasonable, and hard-headed faction. 
                                                 
5
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6
  Ibid. 12, 15. 
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 While Hilsman attacked Taiwan's most ardent American supporters, he expressed 
support for the Taiwanese people and their rulers. He praised Taiwan's strong economic 
growth, claiming its rapid development provided a model for “less developed nations 
everywhere,” exactly what mainland China had desired but so manifestly failed to offer. 
America's support for the continued de facto independence of Taiwan was sacrosanct. 
“So long as Peiping insists on the destruction of this relationship” as the “sine qua non” 
for any improvement of relations with the U.S., “there can be no prospect for such 
improvement.”7 The United States would not sacrifice a small ally to gain a colossal 
potential friend. But if Mao did not demand this surrender, relations could improve. 
Though Hilsman never uttered the words “a passing phase” or mention Dulles by name, 
the message was clear. The U.S. government now recognized that the Chinese 
communists were not going anywhere, and was prepared to work with that regime to 
bring it in from the diplomatic cold. 
 In a letter written to United Nations Ambassador Adlai Stevenson six days after 
delivering the speech, presumably to provide him with media talking points, Hilsman 
declared that “our policy towards Communist China is one of firmness, flexibility and 
dispassion.” The speech “signifies no change in U.S. policy, no new departure.” It was 
instead “significant primarily as the first attempt in some time to articulate the policies 
we have been pursuing toward Communist China for several years.”8 In this statement, 
the Assistant Secretary was instructing the Ambassador to tell the press nothing 
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8
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journalists had not already figured out for themselves. Max Frankel of the New York 
Times termed the speech “an important summary of their [the Kennedy and Johnson 
Administrations] long-held but rarely articulated views on Communist China.”9 
Numerous stories in major newspapers alluded to the “open door” phrase in their 
headlines.
10
 The Baltimore Sun did not, but included the phrase in the article's lead, 
stating Hilsman “unveiled a new kind of 'open door' policy toward Red China.”11 This 
was the only intimation that a change had been made in more than rhetoric. Regardless, 
the rhetoric was immediately seen as significant in its own right. The Christian Science 
Monitor called the speech “the most articulate and complete statement of American 
policy on mainland China to have been made in many years.”12 
 Only Frankel went beyond the text of the speech to attempt to confirm precisely 
who Hilsman was speaking for, beyond himself. This would soon become a very 
important and highly disputed matter. He reported that a White House spokesman 
explained that the text of the speech was approved within the “higher levels of the 
Administration, but not by President Johnson personally.”13 The phrase “higher levels” 
was a vague one, and this choice of words was most likely deliberate. An editorial in the 
Hartford Courant noted that the State Department distributed the text of the speech to 
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media outlets, implying they believed it to be important.
14
 The Washington Post 
expressed disappointment Hilsman had not gone farther. Comparing his statements to 
those of Dulles, the editors found all too many similarities in substance, the “chief 
difference” between the two speeches being their “tone.” The Post lamented “after six 
years, has the United States nothing more to say than if China changes, the situation 
might improve?”15 However, in a piece of news analysis, Frankel expressed the 
emerging consensus that “the most remarkable fact” concerning the speech “was that it 
was made at all.” Throughout the Kennedy years, China had been the foreign policy 
issue which must not be named, as the president let his administration “slide into 
timidity” in the face of pressure from the China Lobby and its supporters.16 
 The China Lobby itself, in the form of the Committee of One Million, 
immediately recognized the threatening implications of Hilsman's remarks. They 
charged him with “promoting a 'two Chinas solution.'”17 In this assessment, the 
Committee was correct. Hilsman stated the U.S. would enter into negotiations with 
communist China and welcome it back into the family of nations if that regime ceased to 
demand the destruction of the Taiwanese regime as a precondition for negotiations. This 
would constitute a “Two Chinas” policy in all but name. In a December 31 internal 
memorandum, Marvin Liebman, the director and usually the sole paid employee of the 
Committee, castigated “the demoralizing softness of Mr. Hilsman's major theme of 
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conciliation and tolerance.”18 This was the first time the Committee had felt compelled 
to condemn the actions of a member of any administration. From that moment on, its 
utterances to the media and to supporters would take on an increasingly strident tone, 
reflecting opposition to the growing acceptance of an alternate point of view and the 
increasing fearlessness of their adversaries. Especially symptomatic of the organization's 
shortcomings was the fact that it took them more than two weeks to issue a statement. 
 The Committee of One Million was most likely reacting to and reinforcing 
statements made by the Taiwanese government, though even if they were waiting for 
Chiang's response, there was still a considerable lag time. Within a week, Chiang's 
government let it be known that they had immediately reached out to the Johnson 
administration expressing “disagreement” and requesting “clarification.”19 According to 
the Christian Science Monitor, the speech provoked “eager interest in Japan, scorn in 
Peking, and intense disapproval on Chinese nationalist Formosa.”20 Chinese spokesman 
Ta Kung Pao claimed Hilsman was requesting that China “open the door to welcome the 
thief.”21 The People's Daily headline read “Hilsman grieved at the United States being 
trapped in a blind ally of opposing China but vainly attempts double-faced maneuver to 
recoup failure.”22 The newspaper had previously used the phrase “blind alley” to 
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describe Eisenhower and Dulles's confrontational approach.
23
 The use of that term in this 
instance was reflective of Mao's belief that Kennedy was “worse than Eisenhower” 
because he was duplicitous in maintaining the same hostile policy while employing 
conciliatory rhetoric. Had Mao adopted that approach, the U.S. media would no doubt 
have accused him of “Oriental trickery” or, perhaps, inscrutability. 
 Instead, they soon said that about their own government. For the first, but by no 
means the last time, Secretary of State Dean Rusk undercut a junior administration 
official who hinted at a softening of policy toward communist China. Shortly after 
Taiwan lodged its complaint, Rusk reassured them that there was no change in American 
policy, “seeming to cancel the conditional policy toward Communist China that Hilsman 
had proffered in his speech.” According to veteran pundit Arthur Krock, Rusk merely 
“thickened this fog” which already “suffuses American Far Eastern diplomacy.”24 Ten 
days later, while formally announcing the United States was taking the Soviet side in the 
Sino-Soviet dispute, confirming what had been evident for at least one year, Rusk 
assured China hard-liners that Hilsman's speech “simply referred to the longest possible 
range future.”25 Rusk said he saw no sign of “significant change” in relations with the 
Chinese, but was hopeful regarding near-term improvement of relations with the 
Soviets.
26
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 Hilsman sent his talking points to Stevenson the day after Rusk appeared to have 
disowned his speech. Later that day, the U.N. Ambassador made a statement on the 
matter which sought to resolve the contradictions within the State Department. The 
Christian Science Monitor summed up Stevenson's remarks by claiming the Johnson 
administration was now pursuing a “two-pronged policy” coupling no change in the 
existing policy of nonrecognition with “a new disposition to keep the subject under open 
discussion and in the public eye.”27 This aptly summed up Hilsman's intention, which 
was to begin the process of policy change by moving the debate beyond the corridors of 
Foggy Bottom. As the Guardian in Britain aptly predicted, “time will be allowed to 
erode the old policy.
28
 
 This approach understandably created confusion and gave the appearance of 
inconsistency. A New York Times editorial noted the role reversal of the now forthright, 
honest Chinese and the scheming, backhanded Yankee by claiming Rusk had “made 
American policy seem even more of a Chinese puzzle than before.” Echoing Hilsman's 
speech by writing that “the Chinese Communists have shown prudence on issues 
involving national survival,” the editors called for “normalization of contacts with the 
Chinese,” including “open diplomatic relations” once “Peking accepts the 'two China' 
concept.”29 This was the first time the nation's most influential newspaper had called for 
normalization. That it did so within a month of Hilsman's speech, and in doing so 
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utilized his arguments and proposals, demonstrated how that speech had altered the elite 
conversation by legitimizing advocacy of policy change. Hilsman's plan to prepare 
public opinion was beginning to bear fruit. The Committee of One Million had declared 
in 1962 that “the only force that has so far blocked a U.N. seat for Red China has been 
American public opinion.”30 Popular support was easier to maintain when the other side 
was mute. Increasingly, that would no longer be the case. 
 For those who in the tradition of Bowles and Komer believed time was not on 
America's side when it came to the policy of isolating communist China, the conversion 
of the New York Times could not have happened soon enough. If the communist 
monolith was no more, the Free World monolith was beginning to crumble as well. By 
the end of January, France had established full diplomatic relations with the People's 
Republic. In his first public statement after this event, Rusk reiterated that the U.S. “will 
never abandon” the Chinese nationalists.31 He said so in Tokyo, while visiting a 
Japanese ally eager to resume trade with mainland China. At one time willing to employ 
Yellow Peril rhetoric with a zeal not seen since the heyday of Kaiser Wilhelm II, Charles 
De Gaulle now found common cause with China over their mutual desire to develop a 
nuclear capability in defiance of the recently-signed Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. 
Chinese moral and material support for the FLN in Algeria was moot after the signing of 
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the Evian accords.
32
 Given France's current foreign policy priorities, a rapprochement 
with China made sense beyond its certainty to irritate the Americans. 
 This was the latest and most pertinent example to date of the notion that, in the 
words of columnist Louis Fleming, “as the years have passed since the victory of the 
revolution in 1949, it is Washington, more than Peking, that has been isolated by its 
China policy.” Hilsman's speech was the first sign that “reluctantly, the United States is 
speaking about the unspeakable.” Though Fleming supported Hilsman over Rusk, it was 
not because he discounted the Chinese threat. Citing incursions into Korea, Tibet, 
Russia, India, and Indochina, Fleming declared that “of all the postwar powers, China 
has proved the most predatory.” This was the language of the Committee of One 
Million. But he employed these facts to draw a very different conclusion. China must 
now be engaged not in spite of its menace, but because of it. One must accept “the 
realities of China,” and Hilsman's attempt at doing so “was critically new in terms of 
State Department policy. He had opened a dialogue that must now be pursued, and 
cannot but lead to change.”33 
 Noam Kochavi wrote that Hilsman's speech “comprised no less, but also no 
more, than an important midstage” in the evolution of U.S. policy toward the People's 
Republic of China.
34
 In this assessment, Kochavi went farther than any previous 
historian of Kennedy's foreign policy. But he did not go far enough. According to the 
                                                 
32
  For examples of France's volte face concerning Western and white solidarity, see Matthew A 
Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold 
War Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
33
  Louis B. Fleming, “U.S. Reviewing Its China Policy,” Los Angeles Times, January 5, 1964, N1. 
34
  Noam Kochavi, A Conflict Perpetuated: China Policy During the Kennedy Years (Westport, 
Connecticut: Praeger, 2002), 230. 
 215 
 
traditional, purely archival approach to diplomatic history, Kochavi was exactly correct. 
But he ignored public perceptions as influenced by and reflected in the popular press. 
This is inadequate, particularly on this issue. Hilsman himself wrote that the primary 
reason he gave the speech was to answer the prodding and taunts of the media. It is thus 
essential to bring the public into the picture. Until Hilsman's San Francisco speech, the 
public was entirely in the dark about the new ideas that had been bandied about for years 
within the Kennedy administration. For the American people, this was no midpoint. It 
was the beginning. In terms of the opinions expressed by the most influential press 
organs, it was the beginning as well. Hilsman had raised the checkered flag. A race to 
endorse changing China policy was now on. 
 Assessing the impact of Hilsman's speech two days after it had been given, Max 
Frankel concluded that “it did not change policy, but it changed Washington's posture.”35 
There was an irony in the truth of this observation.  In an April 1962 memorandum 
outlining many of the ideas Hilsman would later publicly express, Chester Bowles called 
the isolation of China “a national posture rather than a national policy.”36 Yet Bowles 
objected to the posturing of Eisenhower and Dulles not because it was empty posturing, 
but because it was the wrong kind of empty posturing. As a politician who gave a speech 
on “The Power of Public Opinion,” Bowles understood the value of symbolism and 
rhetoric for rallying opinion to change a policy or, in the words of Hilsman, “to move a 
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nation.” This would take time, and the shocks of unexpected events, as is invariably the 
case. All of Kennedy's foreign policy officials who advocated changing China policy 
would be out of government by the time that policy had been significantly altered. It was 
the man their president had defeated who would realize their visions and reap the 
political benefit. During his fabled visit to meet with Zhou En-lai and Mao Zedong in 
Beijing in February of 1972, Nixon toasted his hosts by reminding them of the Chinese 
saying that the journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step. The first of those 
thousand steps were made during Kennedy's Thousand Days. They marked the turning 
point. 
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